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ART. I. — *God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.

WE called the attention of our readers to this volume by Dr. Bushnell, in our Review for October, 1849. In what we then said of it, we confined ourselves chiefly to the author's theory of language, and to some general remarks on the character and tendency of his doctrines; we propose in the present article, and those which may follow it, to enter into a more particular and thorough examination of his views and statements as a theologian, — not, indeed, because it is of much consequence to the community what are or are not the peculiar beliefs and opinions of Dr. Bushnell as an individual, but because the questions he raises are highly interesting in themselves, and of great importance in the present state of theology among those outside of the Catholic Church.

The topics on which Dr. Bushnell discourses in this volume are the Divinity of Christ, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and what he calls "Dogma and Spirit in general." His work is far from being methodical, or approaching the character of a systematic treatise on all or any one of the matters upon which it touches. In consequence, we shall be unable to throw our review of it into that methodical and systematic shape which we always prefer when it is possible. The most philosophical and logical method of considering the work would be to com-

mence, after what we have said of the Preliminary Dissertation, which contains in some measure the principles of the author's theory, with his last Discourse, entitled "Dogma and Spirit," and then proceed to the consideration of what is said on each of the particular mysteries discussed. But this would compel us to recast the author's whole work, and reduce it to its logical order,—a labor which we are unwilling to bestow upon it, and which would oblige us to begin with the discussion of some knotty metaphysical questions, not at all to the taste of the majority of our readers, and which we would spare them, after the very unreasonable amount of metaphysics inflicted upon them during the last year. We shall follow, therefore, the method of the author himself, and take up the topics on which we propose to comment, as far as practicable, in the order he presents them.

Dr. Bushnell, as our readers are aware, is a Congregationalist minister, the pastor of a congregation in Hartford, Connecticut, which calls itself Orthodox, that is, orthodox in the sense of the New England Puritans, which means, that they hold Calvinistic doctrines against Arminius, and nominally Catholic doctrines against Unitarians. His Discourses have found several opponents among the ministers of his own sect, and one or two attempts have been, directly or indirectly, made to convict him officially of teaching heresy. But thus far these attempts have failed, and he appears to stand at this moment, if not acquitted, at least unconvicted, of the charge of teaching doctrines really incompatible with those generally held by the Puritan churches of New England. This is a significant fact, and indicates either a greater departure from sound doctrine, or less respectable theological attainments, on their part, than most people have supposed.

Dr. Bushnell does not avowedly reject the sacred mysteries we have named as the subjects of his Discourses; he even professes to hold them, and assumes the air of defending them against Unitarians. The reality revealed or declared in them he makes the profession of believing; but he opposes the verbal and dogmatic statements of them hitherto received by Christian theologians. These statements are not the reality itself, and tend to conceal rather than to exhibit it; and he seems to think that, if the truth or the revealed reality could be divested of these state-

ments, and insisted on irrespective of them, all, whether Trinitarians or Unitarians, orthodox or heterodox, would be found to be of one mind, and to embrace substantially one and the same truth, or fundamental reality. This fundamental reality, the truth that underlies the orthodox statements of the mysteries, it is his aim to set forth, and he appears to hope by so doing to bring about a true Christian union between the various Protestant sects, and even between Protestants and Catholics. His method is to show the inadequacy, and the contradictory and absurd character, of the approved dogmatic statements of the several mysteries, and then to set forth the truth which those statements were intended to express, or the reality that underlies them. We have, then, two things to do,—to consider, 1. His representations and criticisms of the approved statements; and, 2. The mysteries as set forth in his own statements. We begin with the mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity.

“I speak of the more commonly accepted doctrine. What that doctrine is, I am well aware it would be exceedingly difficult to state. Let us pause here a moment, and see if we can find our way to any proximate conception of it.

“It seems to be agreed by the orthodox, that there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the Divine nature. These three persons, too, are generally regarded as belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being. They are declared to be equal; all to be infinite; all to be the same in substance; all to be one. But, as soon as the question is raised, what are we to intend by the word *person*, the appearance of agreement, and often of self-understanding, vanishes.

“A very large portion of the Christian teachers, together with the general mass of disciples, undoubtedly hold three real living persons in the interior nature of God; that is, three consciousnesses, wills, hearts, understandings. Certain passages of Scripture, supposed to represent the three persons as covenanting, coöperating, and co-presiding, are taken, accordingly, so to affirm, in the most literal and dogmatic sense. And some very distinguished living teachers are frank enough to acknowledge, that any intermediate doctrine, between the absolute unity of God and a social unity, is impossible and incredible; therefore, that they take the latter. Accordingly, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, in their view, socially united only, and preside in that way, as a kind of celestial tritheocracy over the world. They are one God simply in the sense that the three will always act together, with a perfect consent, or

coincidence. This view has the merit that it takes consequences fairly, states them frankly, and boldly renounces orthodoxy, at the point opposite to Unitarianism, to escape the same difficulties. It denies that the three persons are 'the *same* in substance,' and asserts instead, three substances; and yet, because of its clear opposition to Unitarianism, it is counted safe, and never treated as a heresy. However, when it is applied to Christ and his work, then it breaks down into the same confusion as the more common view, reducing the Son to a really subordinate and subject position, in which the proper attributes of deity are no longer visible or supposable:

"But our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the verbal profession of one person. They suppose themselves really to hold that God is one person. And yet they most certainly do not; they only confuse their understanding, and call their confusion faith. This I affirm, not as speaking reproachfully, but, as I suppose, on the ground of sufficient evidence, — partly because it cannot be otherwise, and partly because it visibly is not.

"No man can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person. For, as he now uses the term, the very idea of a person is that of an essential, incommunicable monad, bounded by consciousness, and vitalized by self-active will, which being true, he might as well profess to hold that three units are yet one unit. When he does it, his words will, of necessity, be only substitutes for sense." — pp. 130–132.

How far the author here reproduces the statement of this sacred mystery approved by his own brethren, we shall not undertake to say; but we can assure him that he by no means states the doctrine as held by orthodox theologians. "No man," he says, "can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person." Who, we would ask him, maintains the contrary? No Christian theologian ever asserts that there are in God three wills and three understandings, or three consciousnesses. Will and understanding are Divine attributes and follow the Divine nature, essence, or substance, which is indistinguishably one as opposed to plurality, and simple as opposed to complexity or composition. The distinction of persons asserted by Christian theology is not a distinction of the substance, essence, or

nature of God, for that is identically one and the same in each of the three Divine persons. So there are not three wills and understandings in God, but only one will and one understanding. Hence to allege, because we say there are three persons in God, that we hold there are three wills and three understandings in God, is to misrepresent us, and to reason very sophistically.

No doubt there is no will or understanding where there is no person; but this creates no difficulty, for God is not impersonal, and nobody pretends that we hold him to be so; indeed, so far from this, the charge against us is that we make him too personal, assigning him three persons instead of only one person. No doubt, again, that, where there are no will and understanding, that is to say, no rational nature or substance, there is no person conceivable. But this is no objection, for God is rational nature or substance, terminating as its last complement in the three Divine persons. The three persons do not stand disjoined from the Divine substance; they do not terminate each a portion or division of the Divine substance, but each has, so to speak, under it the whole undivided, indivisible, and indistinguishable substance, nature, or essence of God, so that we can say, as we are taught in the Athanasian creed, and in all the rigor of the terms too, "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God." The word *person* in itself, and taken distinctively, is not equivalent to the word *God*, for the term *God* expresses the three distinct persons in the unity of the Divine essence. Yet each person is God, and when we name either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Ghost, without intending to mark the personal distinction, we name all that we do when we name explicitly the three persons, because the distinction of persons is *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, because the persons, though really distinguishable, are inseparable, and because the whole Divine nature, essence, or substance, as we have just said, is indivisibly under each person. Personality is properly the terminus or last complement of rational nature, and the Divine nature, which is rational nature, instead of terminating in a single personality, as is the case with us, terminates in three personalities, or persons.

The author says, again, "Our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the

verbal profession of one person." With his permission, this is false; for their precise *verbal* profession is, that God is three distinct persons in one Divine substance, or essence, and none of them ever say, or allow any one to say, that he is but one person. The author need not labor to prove that three are not one in the sense they are three, or that one is not three in the sense it is one, for nobody does or can believe it. Orthodox theologians are not so stupid as to contend that God is three persons, and yet but one person; for they hold that of contraries one must always be false. What they teach is, that there is one God and one only God; but that in this one God there is the distinction *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, of three real persons, and that these three real persons subsist without prejudice to the strict and absolute unity and simplicity of the Divine being, or essence. Distinctions *ad extra* undoubtedly destroy the absolute unity of the subject of which they are predicated, but distinctions *ad intra* do not, for we distinguish in the cube, for instance, length, breadth, and depth, and yet without prejudice to its unity. We bring not this to illustrate the distinction of persons in God, but to show that distinctions *ad intra* are not incompatible with unity of substance. This being so, we can assert, after having asserted the distinction of persons in God, the strict unity of the Divine essence, without denying the reality of that distinction. It is false, then, to say that, while professing three persons, we retain the verbal profession, or even the virtual profession, of one person only.

We do not prove, nor undertake to prove, by natural reason, that God is three real persons in one essence, or to explain how he can be so, nor are required to do it, for we profess it, not as a revelation of the intelligible, but as a declaration of the superintelligible, and we believe it not on the authority of natural reason, but on the authority of God declaring it. We know from revelation that God is distinctively three persons in one indistinguishable nature, and we therefore know that he can be, for we may always safely reason *ab esse ad posse*. All we undertake to do by reason, and all we are required to do, is to show, not that the dogma is true, nor that it is possible even, but that reason is utterly unable to show that it is impossible, or that it involves, as our author, in common with Unitarians, contends, a contradiction. As he accuses us of stating the

dogma, it is contradictory and absurd; as we ourselves really do state it, and as it is held by all Christian theologians, it is neither one nor the other. The author falsifies the orthodox statement, and his objections have force against it only as he falsifies it. If he falsifies it ignorantly, he is incompetent to speak on the subject, and should return to the seminary and recommence his theology; if he does it knowingly, and therefore wilfully, we leave it to himself to characterize his grave moral delinquency.

But let us hear our author still further.

“Methods are also resorted to, in the way of explaining God’s oneness in consistency with *his existence in three* persons, which show that his real oneness, as a spirit, is virtually lost. Thus it will sometimes be represented, that the three persons are three sets of attributes inhering in a common substance; in which method, the three intelligences come to their unity in a virtually inorganic ground; for if the substance supposed be itself of a vital quality, a life, then we have only more difficulties on hand, and not fewer; viz., to conceive a Living Person having in himself, first, the attributes of a person, and secondly, three more persons who are attributes in the second degree, — that is, attributes of attributes. It can hardly be supposed that any such monster is intended, in the way of bringing the three persons into unity; therefore, taking the ‘substance’ as inorganic, we have three vital personal Gods, and back of them, or under them, as their ground of unity, an Inorganic Deity. I make no objection here to the supposition, that the persons are mere attributes of a substance not themselves; I ask not how attributes can be real enough to make persons, and not real enough to make substances; I urge it not as an objection, that our very idea of person, as the word is here used, is that of a living substance manifested through attributes, — itself the most real and substantial thing to thought in the universe of God, — I only call attention to the fact that this theory of Divine unity, making it essentially inorganic, indicates such a holding of the three persons as virtually leaves no unity at all, which is more distinct than a profession of mental confusion on the subject.

“But, while the unity is thus confused and lost in the threeness, perhaps I should also admit that the threeness sometimes appears to be clouded or obscured by the unity. Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a ‘three-fold distinction’; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation, — that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinctions, but as metaphysical and real persons. Or, the three are sometimes compared, in their union, to the soul, the life principle,

and the body, united in one person, called a man, — an illustration which, if it has any point or appositeness at all, shows how God may be one and not three; for the life and the body are not persons. Or, if the soul be itself the life, and the body its external development, which is possible, then, in a yet stricter sense, there is but one person in them all.” — pp. 132, 133.

The several methods here enumerated are new to us, and we cannot forbear asking the author what *Tractatus de Trinitate* he has studied, and if in fact he is not somewhat accustomed, like his friend Theodore Parker, to substitute his own gloss for the text he studies, — what he fancies his author ought to say, for what he does say? It is a little remarkable that no neologist seems able to see *straight* or single, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an instance in which one faithfully reproduces the orthodox doctrine he proposes to controvert. No orthodox theologian ever confounds the distinction of persons with the distinction of attributes; for the distinction of persons is a real distinction *ad intra* in God, whereas the distinction of attributes is not a real distinction in God, but simply a distinction in our mode of conceiving the Divine Being, — what theologians call *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*, that is, a distinction which is only *eminently* or *equivalently* in God. In God himself there is no real distinction, as we have often occasion to repeat, between his essence and his attributes. He is not like creatures composed of matter and form, substance and quality, essence and attributes, for he is, as all our theologians teach, most pure and simple act. He is not wise, powerful, just, and good, in the sense of being endowed with the qualities expressed by these adjectives, but he is wisdom, power, justice, goodness, in their essence, their substance, and absoluteness. No one who maintains this, and all orthodox theologians do maintain it, can be such a simpleton as to call the Divine persons attributes, and still maintain that they are real distinctions in God. Consequently, the objection of the author falls of itself, for the doctrine against which it is urged is no better than a figment of his own brain.

“Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a ‘threefold distinction’; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation, — that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinc-

tions, but as metaphysical and real persons." Whether this is the case with some of the author's own brethren, or not, he knows better than we, and we confess we have noticed in some of the statements of Professor Stuart of Andover absurdities hardly less striking; but we find nothing of the sort among our own theologians. No orthodox theologian protests that the three Divine persons are merely somewhats, or distinctions, but all, without exception, maintain that the distinctions, the *somewhats*, are three really subsisting persons in the highest and most perfect sense of the word *person*. They assert, not only a distinction, but a distinction of real persons, and therefore never make the protest here alleged. The protest they make is, that by the distinction of persons they mean no distinction of the nature or essence of God, but simply a distinction in its terminus, so that the assertion of three persons, or *subsistentiæ*, does not deny the strict unity of nature or essence. To speak of the three persons, after this, as real persons, is no inconsistency, implies no contradiction. What the author means by a metaphysical person, and a metaphysical person that is real, we are not able even to conjecture. A metaphysical person that is real would, in our vocabulary, be a contradiction in terms. The distinction of persons, not of essence, in God, is not a metaphysical distinction, but a real distinction, and the Divine persons are real, not metaphysical, persons.

The illustration which the author notices and refutes, borrowed from the union of the soul, the life principle, and the body in man, the appositeness of which escapes us, we have never seen adduced, and could never ourselves adduce it. And, indeed, of all illustrations borrowed from created things to help us to a conception of the sacred mystery, our theologians are in the habit of remarking, that they are unlike in more respects than they are like, and that none of them are ever to be taken throughout, or for more than some single point of resemblance, or analogy; for we must never hope, by our natural reason, to comprehend what is in itself this mystery of mysteries.

It is long since we have studied any of the standard works of the author's own sect, but we are inclined to believe that a serious study even of them would have given the author a more correct apprehension of the commonly received doctrine of the Trinity. His statements and ob-

jections induce us to believe that he has never even read a treatise on the Trinity written by an able theologian, and that his chief knowledge of the doctrine has been gathered from the writings of rationalists and infidels. When we had the misfortune and the shame of being, not only a Unitarian, but a Unitarian minister, we could have considered his representation of the doctrine substantially correct; but then, and we blush to say it, we knew the doctrine only from the statements of those whose very purpose it was to make it appear ridiculous and absurd. There is no resemblance between the doctrine of the Trinity we are taught by our theologians, and that we had learned from Unitarian and infidel books, reviews, and discourses; and not one of the objections we were accustomed to urge, or to hear urged, against the sacred mystery, has the least force or speciousness, when urged against the doctrine as actually taught by orthodox divines. The doctrine against which Unitarians and unbelievers direct their attacks is, for the most part, a creature of their own imagination, and their objections evince, when not their malice, only their own ignorance of the real matter in controversy. The high conceit the anti-orthodox have of their own intellectual superiority, on theological subjects, over their opponents, is founded on their ineptness. There are more things, and profounder things, in heaven and earth, than are dreamed of in their philosophy; and, generally, the *progress* which all classes of neologists so loudly boast consists precisely in their not apprehending the deeper sense of the theology from which they dissent, and their having taken up with a sense that lies altogether nearer the surface. We say this not idly, nor in a tone of sarcasm; but deliberately, with a full conviction, and ample evidence, of its truth. No neologist has ever yet gone back to the old theology, and penetrated its sense, but he has been struck with the depth, clearness, and justness of the views of the theologians at whom he had been previously accustomed to make himself merry.

But let us pass to the author's own statement and defence of the sacred mystery.

"To indicate, beforehand, the general tenor of my argument, which may assist you to apprehend the matter of it more easily, I here suggest that the trinity we seek will be a trinity that results of necessity from the *revelation* of God to man. I do not undertake

to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all. I only insist that, assuming the strictest unity, and even simplicity, of God's nature, he could not be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures. These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms. As such, they bear, on the one hand, a relation to God, who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or bring him within the discourse of reason; that also which is necessary to produce mutuality, or terms of conversableness, between us and him, and pour his love most effectually into our feeling."—pp. 136, 137.

"I do not undertake," says the author, "to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all." Modesty is always commendable, but not always the affectation of modesty, as an excuse for not accepting, or even considering, a revealed dogma. The author attempts to make what the lawyers term a false issue, and to provide a means of escape, if accused of denying the Trinity, because asserting, as the Trinity of the Holy Scriptures, a trinity which lies, so to speak, below God, and is distinguishable from him. No theologian asks him to tell how the interior being of God is composed, for no one believes that it is composed at all. God is most simple and pure act, and therefore excludes from his interior being, or essence, all composition and all plurality of substance. How many times must we repeat this? Nobody questions, that to fathom the interior being of God is a matter too high for us; for every one concedes at once that it is superintelligible to every human intellect. But this is nothing to the purpose. The question relates, not to our ability or inability to fathom the essence of God, but to our ability or inability, with the aid of Divine grace, to apprehend and believe what God has himself supernaturally declared to us concerning his own interior being, or superintelligible essence. If God has made us a declaration concerning his own interior being, there is no modesty, no diffidence of our own abilities, in waving it aside, under the pretence that it is too high for us. God knows better than we do what is or is not too high for us; and to assume

that any thing which he has chosen to declare for our belief is too high for us to receive with filial submission, firm faith, and devout gratitude, is to assume to be wiser than God himself.

The author's subterfuge will avail as little as his affected modesty. The sacred dogma of the Trinity is admitted on all hands to involve a mystery, and if the Trinity be a mystery, it must necessarily pertain to the superintelligible, and therefore to the interior being, or essence, of God; for it is only in that interior being, or essence, that God is superintelligible. In respect to the universe, as author of the natural order, God is not superintelligible, but naturally intelligible; "for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, *are clearly seen*, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity."* We know from revelation, that God's superintelligibility is in his essence or interior being, in what he is in himself; for it is that which the blest see in the beatific vision, and which they can see only by the *ens supernaturale*, or the supernatural light of glory; and we know also from the same source, that what God is in himself is precisely what is declared to faith in the sacred mystery of the Trinity, on which depends the mystery of the Incarnation, and into which, as their principle and end, all the mysteries of our holy religion are resolvable at last. To exclude the Trinity, then, as pertaining to the essence or interior being of God, is to exclude the whole Christian order or new creation, in like manner as to exclude God as the intelligible would be to exclude the whole intelligible order, or natural universe.

No doubt God can in a supernatural or extraordinary way make us a revelation of facts and truths of the natural or intelligible order, and he has certainly done so in the Holy Scriptures, in which he has revealed historical events and precepts of the natural law. The more sober among American Unitarians, though admitting no other revelation, in some sense admit a revelation of this sort, and therefore claim to be Christian believers, and complain that injustice is done them when they are denied the Christian name, and placed in the ranks of those who reject the Gospel. A revelation of this sort has its value, and is indis-

* Rom. i. 20.

pensable to all but the very *élite* of our race; yet, in relation to the matter revealed, it is, as the Anglican Bishop Butler says, very falsely, of the Gospel, only "a republication of the law of nature." It declares nothing not within the intelligible order, and manifestly contains, and it is the boast of Unitarians that it contains, no mystery; for mystery is not merely the unknown, differing from the known only in the simple fact of being unknown, but something which in its very nature is superintelligible to every human intelligence, — transcending not only the known, but, as to natural reason, the whole order of the knowable, and remaining, intrinsically considered, as much a mystery after it is revealed or declared as it was before. It is something which, in its very nature, cannot be intrinsically revealed, or laid open to us, in this state of existence, but only extrinsically declared. Now the question between believers and unbelievers turns, not on the supernatural or extraordinary revelation of the intelligible, — a revelation which, materially considered, Herbert of Cherbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, and Rousseau might as easily accept as Socinus, Priestley, Belsham, Henry Ware, or Dr. Channing, — but on the supernatural revelation or declaration of the superintelligible, of mystery, which even when revealed or declared is still mystery, and therefore apprehensible only extrinsically, with the understanding of faith, not intrinsically, with the understanding of knowledge. Evidently, then, to exclude the superintelligible from our theology is to exclude, along with the sacred mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity, the whole Christian order itself.

To explain Christianity so as to bring it within the intelligible order is to identify it with nature, to make it and nature one and the same thing, which, though attempted by all rationalists who do not wholly disavow the Christian name, is only an indirect and cowardly way of denying it entirely. The Christian order, as a distinct and substantive order, is conceivable only as transcending or lying above the order of nature, therefore only as superintelligible; for the order of nature and the intelligible order are one and the same. In the order of nature there may be much that is unknown, but there is nothing that is superintelligible; for the unknown in nature is of the same order with the known. The Christian order, then, since it is superintelligible, must be the creation of God in the sense in which

he is superintelligible. God, as we have seen, is superintelligible only in his interior being, in what he is in himself. The effect cannot be asserted without the cause, the creature without the creator, for otherwise atheism would be assertable, and men might be atheists without any impeachment of their common sense, which it would be both absurd and impious to maintain. Consequently, it is impossible to assert the Christian order at all, without asserting God's superintelligible essence or interior being—what he is in himself—as its cause, or creator. What he thus is, we of course, in this world, know only by faith, not by vision as do the blest in their beatified state; but still we must apprehend it in the same sense that we apprehend other declared mysteries, or we can assert nothing at all of the distinctive Christian order. Clearly, then, our author must exclude from his theology the whole Christian order, as distinguished from the order of nature, which is to deny it; or he must include in his theology some declaration of the interior being of God, or of what God is in himself. But he expressly excludes whatever pertains to the interior being of God, as too high for us, and places the only trinity he recognizes, not in God, but below him, and therefore really denies, whatever his intention, or the respectable name by which he may call himself, the Christian religion, and degrades himself to the category of unbelievers, if not to that of apostates.

The author complains in the outset of the orthodox statement, that it represents the Trinity as “belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being.” The author here, as throughout, confounds the mystery of the Trinity with the mystery of the Incarnation, as we shall have frequent occasion hereafter to remark,—a blunder that would be unpardonable in the youngest catechumen. The Trinity is eternal; the Incarnation takes place in time. But let this pass for the present. The complaint is absurd. The author professes, sincerely or otherwise, to hold the substance, the reality, of the sacred dogma, as commonly received, and to object only to the form in which it is commonly stated or represented. If, then, he objects to a representation or form of expression which is essential to the statement of that substance or reality, he falls into the absurdity of objecting to a statement without

which he cannot state what he himself professes to hold. The substance or reality universally intended by the dogma as commonly received, does pertain to the very *esse* or substantial being of God, for it is God eternally subsisting as three distinct persons in the unity of one Divine nature, essence, or substance. To deny this is to deny, not merely the outward form, representation, or expression, but the inner form, the very substance and reality itself, of the sacred mystery. The author himself cannot deny this, for he professes to assert the proper Divinity of the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, against Unitarians, who maintain the contrary; and they cannot be properly Divine, that is, God, unless in God, for nothing below God, out of God, or distinguishable from God, is God. To represent the mystery as belonging, not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, is to deny the very substance, the very reality, declared in the dogma, the precise thing the author professes he does not deny. He should complain of his own statement, then, not of the orthodox statement.

"The trinity we seek," says the author, "will be a trinity that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man," that is, a trinity that belongs, not "to the substantial being of God," but to "the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed." The author professes to be a Trinitarian minister; he is the pastor of a professed Trinitarian congregation, and is in this very discourse addressing an assembly of Congregational ministers, who profess to hold the Trinity, as commonly received by the Christian Church, to be a fundamental article of the Christian faith; and therefore the trinity he is seeking, at least the trinity he is bound by his own profession, as well as by the law of God, to seek, must be the true Christian Trinity,—the truth, substance, or reality intended by the orthodox statement of that sacred mystery. It is this he must ascertain, set forth, and defend, or fail in his avowed attempt. A trinity totally different from this, even if a truth, a reality, is nothing to the purpose. The moon in its order is as real as the sun, but not therefore is the sun the moon; nor is the moon the sun because it shines only by reflecting the light of the sun. The author may deny the Trinity, fall back on the intelligible, and be a Unitarian or an unbeliever, if he chooses, and is prepared to risk the consequences, but he

must not claim to be a believer in the Trinity in the orthodox sense, because he asserts another trinity, of an entirely different order. The Trinity of Christian orthodoxy is undeniably necessary, eternal, and self-existent, and no more dependent on creation or revelation than are the being and perfections of God in the sense in which he is naturally intelligible. Consequently, a trinity that is not necessary, self-existent, and eternal, whatever else it may be, is not the Trinity of Christian theology. The distinction of persons in the Godhead, understand what you will by it, is, if there is any truth at all in the orthodox dogma, an eternal distinction, and therefore it is perfectly idle to attempt to resolve it into certain imaginary or even real distinctions which originate in time, and have reference solely to God's manifestation of himself to man. A trinity, if such there be, that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man, is not eternal and self-existent, and therefore is not God, nor is God it; consequently, it is not the Trinity of Christian theology. If the author says there is no other trinity, he only denies the Trinity, and avows himself a Unitarian or an unbeliever, and vainly and falsely professes to hold the substance, the reality, of the orthodox dogma.

God "could not," says the author, "be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures." Understand the word *evolving* in a sense not pantheistic, and this is true, if we speak only of the Christian order; but not true if we speak of the intelligible order, for in this order God is, in regard to it, efficiently and sufficiently revealed, without being revealed as three distinct persons in one Divine substance. In the intelligible order, as author of nature, God is intelligible, his perfections, the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, from the creation, or foundation, of the world, being understood by the things that are made. Yet in this order he is not clearly seen as three persons. No trace, no intimation even, of God as Holy Trinity, is to be found by natural reason alone, in the whole natural order, and no man, left to that order alone, could ever have in the remotest degree even dreamed of the Trinity of Christian theology; because, as creator of the natural universe, the distinct persons have not each a distinct office, and therefore he is revealed in it to

natural reason only in the unity of his being. The simple fact, then, that men have entertained the belief that God is three distinct persons in one substance, of which the first hint is not in nature, is conclusive proof, if we consider it well, that it has been Divinely revealed; for that which in no sense exists cannot be an object of thought, and *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. Error may be entertained, but error is always the misapprehension or perversion of truth, for pure falsehood, being pure negation, is absolutely unintelligible; but where there is no truth in the order of the error to be misapprehended or perverted, there can be no error. No man could have a false notion of God, if he had no notion of God at all. As there is nothing in nature that can in any sense suggest the notion of the Trinity to natural reason, uninstructed by revelation, the fact that the notion is entertained is a proof that it has been derived from God's supernatural revelation of himself, and is therefore a truth.

But if we pass from the order of nature to the Christian order, we concede that God cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without being *revealed* as three distinct persons in one Divine substance. But why not? If he is not three persons in one substance, he can be; for it is absurd to suppose that God cannot efficiently or sufficiently reveal himself as he is, without revealing himself as he is not, or that in being revealed as he is not, he is efficiently or sufficiently revealed as he is. It will not do to say God can lie, or that he can tell the truth only by means of a falsehood. The reason, then, why God cannot "efficiently or sufficiently reveal himself to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," must be, because he is in himself such three really subsisting persons in one essence, and because the Christian order is a new creation, in which God creates distinctively as three persons, or in which each of the Divine persons has a distinct office, so that it reveals him explicitly in his tri-personality, as the natural order reveals him explicitly only in the unity of his being. The natural universe is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but indistinctly,—"Let us make man,"—the new creation is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost distinctly. And hence the baptismal formula is, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, *and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,*" in which the three persons are

distinctly marked. Here we may see the reason why the belief in the Holy Trinity is fundamental in Christian faith, and wherefore to deny the Trinity is not a secondary, but a primary or fundamental error,—the virtual denial of every truth pertaining to the Christian order; for it denies the whole new creation, by denying God in the sense in which he is its creator, its first and its final cause. It was not about a mere diphthong, as somebody has foolishly said, that the Catholics and Semiarrians contended in the fourth century, for in that diphthong was involved the whole question of Christianity or no Christianity. It is not for a mere scholastic subtilty, or vain theological distinction, that we contend against the Unitarians to-day, in contending for the sacred mystery of the Trinity, but for the whole Christian order, the whole new creation, against mere rationalism, naturalism, deism, or pantheism. Not without reason, then, does the orthodox believer hold him who denies or casts doubt on the sacred mystery of the Trinity to be no Christian believer, but the bitter enemy of the Christian religion and the souls of men.

Understood in the sense we here explain it, the author's assertion, that God "cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," can be accepted. But this is not the sense in which he himself understands it. He does not mean that the three persons are evolved or manifested, because God is three eternally subsisting persons in one substance, but that the persons result from the revelation itself, or that God, in order to reveal himself efficiently or sufficiently to us, must assume three persons, or personate a father, a son, and a holy spirit. "These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation." The author holds, that God cannot reveal to us, in language, any thing of which we have not direct and immediate intuition, and that he can reveal himself only in so far as he exhibits himself to our intuitive apprehension. In order to do this, he must make use of such methods of self-exhibition as are adapted to the nature of our understanding. These methods are the personations, as in a drama, of the characters of a father, a son, and a holy spirit, and through these impersonations, by virtue of what we already know of the characters personated, as existing in the intelligible order, he extends our knowledge of himself. These persons

or personalities "bear, on the one hand, a relation to God who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other hand, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or to bring him within the discourse of reason."

The trinity of persons said to be evolved in the process of revelation is not the absolute God, not God as he exists in eternity, conceived as existing in himself prior to all creation in time, or outward expression, but the revealed or manifested God. The following extracts may help our readers to seize the author's thought:—

"To bring the whole subject fully before us, let us endeavour, first of all, to form the distinctest notion possible of God, as existing in himself, and unrevealed. Then we shall understand the better what is necessary to reveal him. Of course we mean, when we speak of God as unrevealed, to speak of him anterior to his act of creation; for the worlds created are all outgoings from himself, and in that view, revealments of him. God unrevealed is God simply existing, as spirit, in himself." — p. 137.

"Observe that, when God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through media. And as there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds, in fact, that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the One must appear in the manifold; the Absolute in the conditional; Spirit in form; the Motionless in motion; the Infinite in the finite. He must distribute himself, he must let forth his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs. It must be to us as if Brama were waking up; as if Jehovah, the Infinite I am, the Absolute, were dividing off himself into innumerable activities that shall dramatize his immensity, and bring him within the moulds of language and discursive thought. And in whatever thing he appears, or is revealed, there will be something that misrepresents, as well as something that represents him. The revealing process, that which makes him appear, will envelop itself in clouds of formal contradiction,—that is, of diction which is contrary, in some way, to the truth, and which, taken simply as diction, is continually setting forms against each other.

"Thus, the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him. He will think, deliberate, reason, remember, have emotions. Then, taking up all these manifold representations, casting out the matter in which they are cross to each other, and repugnant to the very idea of the God they represent, we shall settle into the true knowledge of God, and receive, as far as the finite can receive the Infinite, the contents of the Divine nature." — pp. 139, 140.

"There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar,—a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect, God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now, this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us. Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation."—pp. 145, 146.

"Thus, the Divine Word, or Logos, who is from eternity the Form, or in the Form of God, after having first bodied him forth in the creation and the government of the world, now makes another outgoing from the Absolute into the human, to reside in the human as being of it; thus to communicate God to the world, and thus to ingenerate in the world Goodness and Life as from him. To make his approach to man as close, to identify himself as perfectly as possible with man, he appears, or makes his advent through a human birth,—Son of man, and Son, also, of God. Regarding him now in this light as set out before the Absolute Being (who he representatively is), existing under the conditions of the finite and the relative, we see at once that, for our sakes, if not for his own, he must have set over against him, in the finite, his appropriate relative term, or impersonation. A solitary finite thing, or person, that is, one that has no relative in the finite, is even absurd,—much more if the design be that we shall ascend, through it, to the Absolute; for we can do this only under the great mental law of action and reaction, which requires relative terms and forces, between which it may be maintained. Besides, there may have been some subjective or internal necessity in Christ himself, (for we know nothing of his interior structure and wants,) requiring that, in order to the proper support of his attitude, he should have in conception some finite relative impersonation. For one or both these reasons, when he appears in the human state, bringing the Divine into the human, there results, at one and the same time, a double impersonation, that of the Father and that of the Son,—one because of the other, and both as correspondent or relative terms. As Christ himself appears in the finite, he calls out into the finite with him, if I may so speak, another representative of the Absolute, one that is

conceived to reside in the heavens, as he himself is seen to walk upon the earth. This he does to comfort his attitude, or more probably to make it intelligible; for if he were to say, 'Look unto me, and behold your God,' then his mere human person would be taken as a proof that he is only a flagrant and impious impostor; or else, being accepted as God by those who are more credulous, they would, in fact, receive a God by apotheosis, and under human boundaries. Therefore, he calls out into thought, as residing in heaven, and possessing celestial exaltation, the Father, who is, in fact, the Absolute Being brought into a lively, conversable, definite (therefore finite) form of personal conception, and sets himself on terms of relationship with him at the other pole; so that, while he signifies or reveals the light and love of God, in and through the human or subject life, he is able to exalt and deify what he reveals, by referring his mission to one that is greater and higher in state than himself, viz. the Father in heaven."—pp. 168, 169.

"But, in order to the full and complete apprehension of God, a third personality, the Holy Spirit, needs to appear. By the Logos, in the creation, and then by the Logos in the incarnation, assisted or set off by the Father as a relative personality, God's character, feeling, and truth are now expressed. He has even brought down the mercies of his heart to meet us on our human level. So far, the expression made is moral; but there is yet needed, to complete our sense of God, the Absolute, another kind of expression, which will require the introduction or appearance of yet another and distinct kind of impersonation. We not only want a conception of God in his character and feeling towards us, but we want, also, to conceive him as in *act* within us, working in us, under the conditions of time and progression, spiritual results of quickening, deliverance, and purification from evil. Now, action of any kind is representable to us only under the conditions of movement in time and space, which, as we have seen, is not predicable of the Absolute Being abstractly contemplated. God, in act, therefore, will be given us by another finite, relative impersonation."—p. 171.

This last *developed* person, or personality, is the Holy Ghost, who completes the trinity of personal representations. The author, it will be seen, distinguishes between Absolute God and revealed God. God, as Absolute God, is no Trinity; but the revealed or manifested God is, and God is Holy Trinity only in the sense in which the manifested God, as distinguished from Absolute God, is God; that is, in a purely representative sense. The distinction between God himself and the representation of God to us is conceivable, but the representation is not itself God, and no distinction between God unrepresented and God repre-

sented is admissible or conceivable. The representation must represent him truly, as he is independent of the representation, or it is a false representation, and the God represented is not the true God, Absolute God. God as Absolute is God, neither more nor less than God, and all that is or can be predicable of God at all must be predicable of him conceived as necessary and eternal being, as prior to, and independent of, his representation or revealment, that is, in the language of the author, as God Absolute. A revelation does not make that which it reveals, nor in any sense whatever affect or modify it. If a true revelation, it declares the object precisely as it exists *a parte rei*; if it does not so declare it, it is a false revelation, and not to be trusted. No distinction, then, can be made between God unrevealed, the God Absolute, and God revealed, or represented to us. Whatever the process of revealment, or the methods of representation, they in no sense affect or modify God himself, nor are they themselves to be confounded with him, or to be taken for him, for their purpose is simply to present him to us as he is, independent of themselves. A representative trinity is then no real Trinity at all, and has nothing to do with the question before us, for the substance, the reality intended by the orthodox dogma, which the author professes to hold, belongs, not to the representation of God, but to God Absolute, as he is in himself, self-existent, eternal, immutable, immovable, and independent. To deny that he is Holy Trinity in this sense is simply Unitarianism, and none the less so because God is said to be Trinity in a representative sense.

"Thus the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him." As eminently existing in him, as the effect in the cause, they may be assigned, not only to the representation, or represented God, but to Absolute God, for all things do so exist in him, and all that is in God is God; but if really and literally assigned to God, as formally existing in him, they are falsely assigned, and the God thus represented is neither the revealed nor the unrevealed God, for he is no God at all. That such things may be assigned to him tropically or figuratively, to help our imaginations, and to give us a lively apprehension of him, is no doubt very true, but they are never to be taken literally. They are figures used, not to present him to our

reason, to our proper intellectual apprehension, but to our imagination and senses, and therefore, though modes of sensible apprehension, never enter into our rational conception of God. Sensible apprehension is always subject to the limitations of space and time, but rational apprehension is not, and it is not necessary to prove that we have rational apprehension. The God we are to call God revealed is God as declared to our rational apprehension, not to our sensible apprehension, and the God so declared must be identically the God undeclared; for between reason and its object there intervenes no idea, species, or representation. The idea is the reality, not a mere image or representation of it, and even when there are media of apprehension, reason never mistakes these for the object apprehended.

"When God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through *media*." Cannot be to the senses, agreed, for we have, and can have, no sensible intuition of God, that is to say, God is not revealed to our senses, is for us no sensible object; cannot be to the understanding, denied, for that would be only saying that he cannot be revealed at all. The author himself agrees that God is one, infinite, absolute; then what is not one, infinite, absolute, is not God, but something else, or nothing. God must be revealed as he is, or else he is not revealed at all. Therefore, if revealed at all, he must be revealed as one, infinite, absolute. But if he cannot be so revealed, how does the author happen to know, or to be able to affirm, that he is one, infinite, or absolute? If God cannot be revealed as he is as unrevealed, how has the author been able to tell us what he is as unrevealed, and to say wherein what he calls God revealed is distinguished from "the God Absolute"?

"As there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the one must appear in the manifold; the absolute in the conditional; spirit in form; the motionless in motion; the infinite in the finite." Bad philosophy, as well as bad theology, my dear Doctor. There are, in the author's sense, no infinite media, we grant, for whatever is infinite is God, and God is not something between God and man. But that the one can be apprehended only in the manifold, we deny; for the manifold, that is, the multiple, is itself inconceivable without the intuition of

unity. The conditional is the negation of the absolute, and like all negation inconceivable without the positive denied. The finite is simply a negative conception, and for the same reason presupposes the conception of the infinite. The positive must always precede in the mind the negative, as St. Thomas teaches and proves. Consequently the conception of the one, the absolute, the spiritual, the motionless, the infinite, all of which are positive conceptions, must precede the conception of the manifold, the conditional, the material, the motional, the finite. The order of knowledge must follow the order of being, for what is not is not intelligible or knowable. No logical process can extract the one from the many, the absolute from the conditional, spirit from form, that is, in the author's sense, matter, the motionless from motion, the infinite from the finite, for the best of all reasons in the world, because they are not contained in them, and you cannot get from a thing what it has not. Logic is mere analysis, and analysis adds nothing to the conception analyzed; it only deduces or demonstrates what is already in it. The mistake into which many fall on this point is owing to the fact that they take the negative conceptions in the *sensus compositus*, in which sense is included, not only the purely negative conception, but also, obscurely it may be, the positive conception, which always precedes and accompanies it in the mind.

The author's doctrine, that God can be revealed only as finitely represented, derived from sensism, is only a denial, in other terms, that God can be revealed at all. "These three persons, or personalities," he says, "are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms." The infinite, we need not tell the author, is indivisible, and must be conveyed entire, as a unit, or not at all. No finite form can convey the infinite, for no form can convey more than it can contain, and no finite form can contain the infinite. The infinite in or under finite forms is the finite, not the infinite. There can be no finite representations of the infinite, for no representation can exceed itself, and as the infinite is indivisible, the infinite finitely represented, that is, represented with limitations, is precisely the finite. God in or under finite forms is not God, but creature, if any thing. Thus, in our Lord, that which is limited, finite,

or conditioned is not God, but man, and Christ is God, because his person which has assumed human nature is Divine, not limited, not subjected to the human form,—which would be man assuming God, not God assuming man,—but remains God in all the infinite plenitude and independence of the Divine nature. The person of Christ is not in or under a human form, for if it were it would not be a Divine person, but a human person, since whatever is in the form of man is man. Christ is indeed in the form of man, yet not because he has, if we may so speak, parted with the form of God, and assumed that of man, but because he is literally and truly man as well as God, perfect man and perfect God in the unity of one Divine person. Either, then, God can be revealed without being represented in or under finite forms, or he cannot be revealed at all; for nothing finite is God, and nothing but the finite can enter into or be represented by finite forms. Hence the author's theory of a representative trinity, as “the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed,” cannot answer the purpose for which he concocts it, and can be no medium through which God as he is can be represented, and God represented as he is not is not God, but a fiction.

But these imaginary, fictitious, or representative persons, according to the author himself, do not represent any thing to us of the interior being or essence of God. “I do not,” he says, “undertake to fathom the interior being of God.” “That is a matter too high for me, and I think for us all.” Then his trinity of persons represents nothing to him of God in the sense in which God is superintelligible, not intelligible to us without it; and then it is quite superfluous. The author's whole theory is built on the assumption, that God is in himself unintelligible, and that he does not and cannot reveal himself as he is. This assumption is not warrantable. God, to the full extent to which the author supposes him representable by the trinity of persons he imagines, is naturally intelligible, is naturally a subject of thought, is naturally within the discourse of reason. His natural attributes and perfections, his unity, his eternity, his immensity, his wisdom, his justice, his goodness,—the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity,—are not only intelligible to us, but actually known, clearly seen from the creation or foundation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, as St.

Paul expressly declares. God, save as to what he is supernaturally in himself, is naturally intelligible, and it is only in and by his intelligibility that any thing is intelligible, for his light is the light of our light. The author's machinery for revealing God could not serve his purpose if it were needed, and would not be needed if it could.

The author forgets, also, the distinction between faith and knowledge, and is all the time considering what may be intrinsically known of God, not what God has extrinsically declared of himself for us to believe. It is true nothing can be declared to us in words, so as to be *intrinsically* known, of which we have not already intellectual apprehension. Words are signs, and can signify to *knowledge* only what the mind apprehends without them. Signs do not interpret themselves, and the mind must have in itself a key to their signification, or they can signify nothing to it. The word *tree* is no sign to me unless I have seen a tree. This, confined to the sphere of knowledge strictly so called, we readily concede; but in the sphere of faith, belief, whether human or Divine, we do not concede it, for the very characteristic of faith is to believe what is not seen, — *fides est credere quod non vides*, as says St. Augustine. If we could from signs learn nothing, obtain no intellectual apprehension at all, all belief, all faith, human as well as Divine, would be out of the question, and all revelation of the supernatural, and all history would be to us empty formulas and unmeaning words. This is a point the author has not duly considered. But as it is a point to which we must return, in our examination of his Discourse on "Dogma and Spirit," it will suffice to add here that God can reveal to us, so that we shall know it intrinsically, only what is within the naturally intelligible order, but that he can *declare* the superintelligible so that it shall be apprehended, though obscurely and extrinsically only, yet sufficiently for faith, and so that in faith something more than an empty formula or unmeaning word shall be present to the mind. Faith is not impossible, for without it it is impossible to please God, and faith, the blessed Apostle tells us, is *sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium*.* Hence the notion the author entertains, that nothing is declared to us of the Christian order beyond

* Heb. xi. 1, 6.

what is collected from God's exhibition of himself to our intuition, is unfounded, as we showed in replying, in our number for April last, to *The Mercersburg Review*. Consequently, as God in the natural order is intelligible, and as in the superintelligible order he is declared only to faith, — not revealed nor required for faith to be revealed to vision, — the author's supposed machinery for representing God is as unnecessary as illusory.

Finally, the author in some sort confounds the process of revelation with that which is revealed, the representation with the represented, otherwise he could not call his representative persons God. A little sound philosophy would have taught him that in knowledge there are but two things, the intellective subject, and the intelligible object, and that what is not a *parte rei* the one is the other. The old notion of species or representative ideas interposed between the intellective subject and intelligible object, and that what is immediately apprehended is not the object itself, but its *species*, *phantasm*, *idea*, or *image* in the mind, is now universally exploded, and was never in reality held, as the moderns have supposed, by the sounder scholastics. That we see all in the idea is, we believe, true, but the idea is not the representative of the object in the intelligible order, but the object itself, — is in fact, in the order of intelligibles, as St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Cardinal Gerdil teach, God himself. We say *St. Thomas*, for though he has the air of holding the contrary, and usually adopts the Peripatetic forms of expression, his principles, as Cardinal Gerdil has shown in his *Defence of Père Malebranche against Locke*, are not only not opposed to it, but do in reality imply it. But let this pass. It is undeniable that what is apprehended in the fact of knowledge is the object itself, not its image or representative. Hence what in the fact of knowledge is not object is subject, and therefore, in the intuition or apprehension of God, what is not God, or is distinguishable from God, is the intuitive or apprehending subject, that is, the human mind itself.

The author must concede that his trinity of persons pertains either to the subject or to the object. If he concedes the latter, he must maintain that the persons are not merely representative persons, but God himself, that is, three eternally subsisting persons in the unity of the Divine

substance, which is the orthodox doctrine; and then he must abandon his notion of a merely representative trinity, of a trinity that belongs not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, and resulting of necessity from the revelation of God to man. In such case he must concede that his whole theory is from beginning to end false and illusory, with not the slightest foundation in reality; for whatever pertains to God is God, and nothing distinguishable from God is God, or can be said to pertain to him save as his creature. If, on the other hand, he distinguishes his trinity of persons from God, and makes it merely representative of God, as he evidently does, he makes it purely subjective, places it, not on the side of the object known, but on the side of the subject knowing, and then it is the subject itself, or a mere figment of the human mind, without any reality at all. Let him, then, do his best, and he can find no medium between the orthodox dogma of the Trinity, and bald, naked Unitarianism.

We insist on this last point as fatal to the author. His pretension is to place himself between the orthodox formula and the Unitarian formula, and to concede the objections adduced by the advocates of the latter, without surrendering the truth or reality intended by the friends of the former. The Trinitarian asserts that God is three real, distinct, and eternally subsisting persons in one Divine substance; the Unitarian denies this, and asserts, as its direct contradictory, that God is not three persons, but one only person, as he is one only substance. Against the Unitarian the author asserts, in words, God is three persons, as the Trinitarian maintains; but against the Trinitarian he asserts that these three persons are not three eternally subsisting persons in the Divine substance, but simply three representative persons, by which the unknown and unintelligible God is represented to us. But to assert three representative persons is not to assert any thing against Unitarians, for what they deny is, not that there are three persons, but that there are three persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the Divine substance or essence. Consequently, when the author denies them to be such persons, he concedes the whole Unitarian formula. So, on the other hand, the concession of three representative persons is the concession of nothing to the Trinitarian, for it is not

for three persons the Trinitarian contends, but for three real, distinct persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the Divine Being. He then does not deny the Unitarian error on the one hand, and save the Trinitarian truth on the other; but denies the Trinitarian truth, and asserts at best only the Unitarian error.

The fact is, the author falls below the Unitarian error, and denies not merely the tri-personality of God, but that God is himself person at all. The only personality he recognizes is a personality, not in God, but in the representation of God to us. God reveals himself as personal, not because he is so, but because it is only under a personal form that we can conceive him. He is personal only in relation to our mode of conceiving him, as he is said also to have hands and feet, to reason and deliberate, and to be subject to human passions. The error of the Trinitarian, according to the author, is precisely in affirming that what is true of the representation, — of the methods adopted, in consequence of our weakness, to bring God within our conceptions, — is true of him absolutely considered, or as he is in himself. As God has not in himself hands and feet, passions, &c., for he is pure spirit and impassible, so has he not personality in himself. Consequently, God absolute is impersonal, and the author's doctrine necessarily leads, if not to formal atheism, at least to formal pantheism.

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- ART. II. — 1. *The Village Notary; a Romance of Hungarian Life.* Translated from the Hungarian of BARON EÖTVÖS, by OTTO MENCKSTERN. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1850. 12mo 3 volumes.
2. *Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady.* By THERESA PULSZKY. With an Historical Introduction, by FRANCIS PULSZKY. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1850. 8vo. pp. 375.
3. *The Hungarian Revolution.* By JOHANN PRAGAY. New York: George P. Putnam. 1850. 8vo. pp. 176.
4. *Parallels between the Hungarian and British Constitutions.* By J. TOULMIN SMITH, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn,

- Barrister at Law. From the Second English edition. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 8vo. pp. 64.
5. *The Christian Examiner*, for May, 1850. Art. VIII. Boston: Crosby & Nichols.

THE future historian of American popular delusions will find none more worthy of his consideration than that which obtains with regard to the liberty of the press. Our theory is, that the American press is free, the freest in the world, and in the letter of our laws there is nothing to the contrary; but in sober reality there is no press in the world less free or more fettered, for it has not only a master, but a master who is the worst and the meanest of tyrants. The mob is the censor of the American press.

Nor is this mob precisely of native origin and growth. We are pained and ashamed to say, that our masters are not our countrymen, but the scum of foreign demagogues cast upon our shores by the revolutionary tides of Europe since 1831. These miserable demagogues, keensighted as to the means of mischief, saw at once what a powerful weapon the American press would be in their hands when the time for violence should come. They have labored slowly, stealthily, surely, to obtain the control of it, and now make no secret of the fact that it is their slave. These are the foreigners against whom our fathers warned us, and theirs the foreign influences we were admonished to resist;—not, as fanatical or bigoted Protestants have foolishly imagined, the poor Irish Catholic emigrant, who comes here to escape oppression, to enrich us by his industry, and to bless us by his faith and piety. He is always welcome, for in his *Irish* character he is an important element in the sum of our national greatness, and in his *Catholic* character he cannot fail to exert a salutary influence in elevating and preserving our civilization, and in maintaining our republican institutions, by asserting the reality of religion and the supremacy of law,—two things indispensable to our political salvation, and not to be expected from Protestantism under any or all of its forms. No; the foreigners we have to dread are not the poor, industrious Catholics, who land on our shores, whether from Ireland or Germany; but those young and old infidels, who, having failed to complete the ruin of their respective countries by the conspiracies they have hatched, the rebel-

lions they have fomented, the revolutions they have attempted, have flocked hither, partly to escape the halter, and partly to demoralize our republic, that it may demoralize the world.

Whoever wishes a full demonstration of the extent of the power that these fugitives from justice and enemies of mankind wield amongst us, needs only to mark the course pursued by the American press with regard to the Red Republican revolutions of Europe in 1848. The mark of their iron boot was easily seen on the neck of almost every writer in the land. No publisher dared offer a book against these nefarious revolutionary movements; scarcely one editor dared hint that they were not wholly commendable, and the community were led to believe that they were glorious uprisings of the people in behalf of the inalienable rights of man. It is true, personal violence was seldom resorted to, for the time had not come to follow the example of the ruffians at Rome, who murdered Ximenes, editor of the *Labaro*, because he recommended a moderate and manly policy, — an example followed more than once in other places, — and, moreover, the master does not usually beat or kill his unresisting and obedient slave. These foreign mobocrats amongst us had other means of commanding compliance with their will, and of ruining any one who might show a disposition to oppose them, less offensive to American sentiment, and less hazardous, than plunging, in cold blood, a dagger into his heart.

The United States are and ought to be a republic. That is a question never left to their choice. It was settled for them by a higher power than their own. Erect a monarchy to-day, it will be a ruin to-morrow; call together an army to support it, and your army will fall into the pit dug by unseen hands for Sennacherib. Here we are bound by the law of God to be republicans, for here republicanism is the legitimate order. But there are two kinds of republics, as there are two kinds of monarchies. The absolute domination of the Czar differs infinitely less from the constitutional sway of Victoria, than the stars and stripes from the bloody democratic flag of Europe. The principles from which the American republicans and the European democrats start, the ends the two parties respectively propose to be attained, and the means they respectively employ, lie in totally different, and for ever irreconcilable orders. Ameri-

can republicanism is legal in its origin, loyal and conservative in its character; European democracy is mere wild anarchy. An American republican can be a good citizen; a European democrat, if consistent, must be a vile demagogue. The former can save his soul; if the latter get into heaven, Satan need not despair.

The press being under the control of a mob created by foreign demagogues, the ordinary sources of information are corrupted, and it becomes almost impossible for the mass of our citizens to get any correct intelligence of European political movements. There is not a more unmitigated tyrant in the world than your Simon Pure Red Republican, hoarse with yelling "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!" He will neither give you correct information, nor suffer you to get it. If the press he controls were content with simple advocacy of anarchy, the mischief would be far less. But no, he and his slaves must not only preach and teach the gospel of disorganization, but must be constantly on the alert that no word be uttered in contradiction, or if uttered, that it shall be discredited. It was almost impossible for the most impartially disposed of our citizens to get any correct information on European affairs while the struggle was going on. Care was taken that all news intended for our market should get a ruddy baptism, and if some one ventured to collect information from independent sources, a thousand tongues were ready to declare it a tory, a legitimist, a conservative, an Austrian, or a Russian lie, and the luckless wight, in most cases, was worried till he was fain to submit for the sake of peace, if not of life.

The notions which have been current among us with regard to the Hungarian rebellion is a case in point. People have classed the Magyar cause with that of the French, the German, and the Italian democrats, and supposed that "Young France," "Young Ireland," "Young Italy," "Young Germany," and "Young Hungary" were all members of the same family. In all the European countries in which revolutions were effected, or attempted, the parties were supposed to be the same, — on one side the awakened democracies, on the other fallen and flying sovereigns. It will be strange news to the mass of the American people, to be told that the Hungarian movement had nothing in common with democracy, save in so far as,

if it had succeeded in breaking the power of Austria, and dissolving the Austrian Empire, it would have prepared the way for the triumph throughout all Western and Central Europe of Red Republicanism, because it would have left standing no power competent to stay the revolutionary tide; and that, in itself considered, it was thoroughly aristocratic, and at bottom nothing but a war of the untitled Magyar nobility to maintain their "historical right" to domineer over the unfortunate peasants of Hungary. Yet such is the simple, naked fact, notwithstanding the abuse heaped upon a contemporary* for daring to intimate it, and notwithstanding Mr. Cass's stultification of himself in his anti-Austrian and unstatesmanlike speech in the Senate last winter, in which he made a ridiculous attempt to enlist the nation on the side of Hungary. That such is the fact, we trust to be able to prove before we close.

The works we have placed at the head of this article are all written to sustain the Hungarian rebellion, and three of them come from Magyar sources. *The Village Notary* is a romance, but it contains more truth than either the essay by Toulmin Smith, or that in *The Christian Examiner*, and may be recommended to those who wish to obtain a more exact notion of the state of things in Hungary than they can get from the perusal of political narratives and disquisitions. The author is an Hungarian noble, but his tutor was a radical of the French school, and Eötvös became the leader of the small, and utterly uninfluential, party of republicans. Pulszky says of him:—

"He wrote a novel, in which he put together a variety of small sketches and studies from nature, and formed them into one grand picture, for the express purpose of caricaturing the political doings in our counties. But, fortunately for the public, Baron Eötvös was a better poet than a politician, and his political pamphlet ripened, very much against his will, into one of the most interesting works of fiction that Hungarian literature can boast of. His book was eagerly read and enthusiastically admired; it was devoid of all political action."

The *Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady* form a very interesting volume. The lady is Theresa Pulszky. She is a Viennese, and after her marriage with Pulszky, who is an Hunga-

* *The North American Review*, July, 1849.

rior, she resided in Magyarland. Her husband was a patriot, and his share in the rebellion was large enough to have insured him the prison or the scaffold, if he had remained in Hungary. Mrs. Pulszky saw every thing in Hungary with his eyes, of course. An historical introduction, covering about a hundred pages, is prefixed to the narrative. It is a clear and rapid sketch of Magyardom from the invasion of Arpad to the beginning of the late rebellion, and the author, no doubt, endeavoured to write as fair a transcript of the Hungarian annals as he possibly could.

The Hungarian Revolution is a book got up for sale. It gives a sketch of the unfortunate war, and a brief account of the principal actors in the drama.

The Parallels between the Hungarian and British Constitutions is a very remarkable pamphlet. Its object is partly indicated by its name, and the author attempts to arouse the sympathies of Englishmen in behalf of the Magyars, because of a very striking similarity between the Hungarian and English constitutions. He maintains that the Hungarian struggle is substantially the same with that of England, when she renounced her allegiance to the last of the Stuarts, and, moreover, thinks that the Hungarian constitution, inasmuch as it provides for local institutions of a democratic nature in the counties and towns, is far superior to the British. The author and his friends had as little success in creating an excitement in England as similar parties have had in America. The newspapers there, as here, were thoroughly Magyarized, but a motion of sympathy in the House of Commons fell under the table, and received a contemptuous permission to lie there.

The article in the *Examiner* is an attempt, and the only respectable one hitherto made, to answer the case put by the *North American Review*. The writer, a lady, makes the most of her materials, and, by a skilful selection and arrangement of facts, she will doubtless convince some of her readers that "the worse is the better reason." Yet she can be fully answered without any other resort than to the facts stated by herself in the course of her article.

We suppose that the friends of Hungary will not complain of us for accepting the authors cited above as our guides, particularly as they are all written by persons who are intensely prejudiced in favor of the Magyar rebellion. We have read them carefully, and we are of opinion that

even a stronger case than that of the *North American Review* can be made out by facts unwillingly or unconsciously admitted by these authors. We shall accept their facts, and avail ourselves of no others, to sustain us in our dissent from their conclusions. The policy pursued by each is substantially identical. It is in setting in a very strong light every real or fancied affront received from Austria, in imputing to her malicious intentions whenever they are unable to deny the justice and expediency of her acts, and in saying every thing that can be said about Magyar bravery, generosity, and loyalty, and as little as possible about any thing which might impress the reader unfavorably towards the Magyars. In fact, these books amount to an apotheosis of Magyardom, which is *primâ facie* evidence against them as historical records; for the Magyars are simply men, after all, like the rest of us, and probably are not far above, or far below, the other nations of Europe in point of social and moral virtues. The case of Austria has not as yet fairly been put; for it is a great mistake to suppose that Mr. Bowen's article is an apology for Austria. When she tells her story, it will be very possible that an accurate summing up of accounts as they stand between her and the Magyars will not be quite as favorable to the latter as many good people have imagined, as the considerations we propose to offer may lead some to suspect.

In the beginning of the ninth century, the Magyars were yet tenants of the wilds of Central Asia. They were a savage tribe of Tartars, and several other swarms from the same Tartar hive had gone before them into Europe. The Huns and the Turks were their brethren in blood. The memory of Attila, the terrible king of the Huns, is cherished yet in Hungary. Madame Pulszky thus speaks of him:—

“At a small distance from Petronell, a high *tumulus* reminds the traveller of the mighty dominion of the Huns and their king Attila, whom modern writers treat merely as a destructive Asiatic chief, though tradition invests him with the noblest generosity and the most praiseworthy forbearance, as well as with that invincible bravery which the French and Italians ascribe to Charlemagne, and the Welsh to King Arthur.” — p. 9.

A pleasant bit of gossip from a Viennese girl! Her husband's country was her country, and his God was her God.

In the year 889, the Magyars entered Europe, and pitched their tents on the banks of the Danube. Europe found

that a nest of stark mad hornets had appeared in her midst. The Magyars were indeed dreadful neighbours to the nations around them. They pushed southward as far as Otranto, eastward to Constantinople, westward until they ravaged Provence, and northward as far as Bremen.

In the mean time, they came into the possession of Hungary in the following manner :—

“ When Arpad approached the confines of the country, he sent ambassadors to Swatopluk, to ask him for grass from the Hungarian heaths, and for water from the Danube, and in return he offered the Czechish king a white steed with a purple bridle. Swatopluk, who had no idea of the Oriental meaning of the demand, readily accepted the horse, and provided Arpad’s ambassadors with a plentiful supply of hay and water. Upon this, the Magyars advanced upon the great plain between the Danube and the Theiss. Swatopluk would have opposed them, but they offered him battle, and routed his army. The king of the Czechs was glad to make his escape on the very horse which he had accepted in exchange for his kingdom.”

The cruelties practised by the Magyars everywhere, and the indomitable courage which commonly insured them victory, made them so terrible to the Christians, that a new petition was added to the Litany :—“ From the cruel Magyars, Good Lord, deliver us !” In fact, the well-being of Europe, at that time, demanded their utter extinction, or their conversion to Christianity. They continued to harass their neighbours for half a century, when Henry the First chastised them severely, and shortly after they were subdued by Otho the First. The permanent establishment of Christianity in Magyarland dates from the year 1000, when St. Stephen was crowned king of Hungary. He sent ambassadors to Rome to acquaint the Pope with the conversion of the nation. Sylvester the Second sent him a golden crown, the holy crown of St. Stephen, which the Magyars always regarded as a sacred relic. Moreover, the Pope honored him with a patriarchal cross, and with the title of Apostolic King. The successors of Stephen often used these concessions of Sylvester to the great detriment of the Hungarian Church ; in fact, they sometimes appeared to regard the possession of the cross as an investiture of the spiritual rights of an Hungarian patriarch.

Up to this period the Magyars possessed all the virtues and all the vices of a barbarian soldiery. The conversion

of the nation made its civilization possible, and, in the progress of time, certain; but the savage manners of the Magyars seemed to present almost insurmountable obstacles to the holy work. St. Stephen preached the Gospel, and offered his people a living example of Christian life. He encountered an opposition no less stubborn to all his plans for political reform, but he lived long enough to see his institutions established upon a firm basis. Before his time, the nation was governed by chiefs of the race of Arpad, who were regarded by the haughty magnates, not as kings, but as leaders. At his accession, Stephen was called *primus inter pares*. He assumed the title and the authority of a king. He made a collection of the fundamental laws and customs of the nation, and published them under the title of *The Hungarian Constitution*, which, with a few alterations, was in force until the 4th of March, 1849, when it was abolished by the Emperor Francis Joseph. This constitution, given more than eight hundred years ago, is the venerable instrument which the Magyars of 1849 vainly essayed to defend by the effusion of their bravest blood. It establishes royalty upon a feudal basis, it guaranties the rights and privileges of the titled and untitled nobles, and leaves the immense majority of the people to a slavery so hopeless, that the revolutions of eight centuries only sufficed to make its abolition seem but the more impossible, and it is only now that there begins to be a prospect of its disappearance.

All the Magyar apologists have labored to obscure the relations which have hitherto subsisted between the nobles and the peasants, and the burden of their insinuations is, that the humane Magyars were always thwarted in their endeavours to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry by the ruthless despotism of Austria! One can hardly believe that impudence can be carried to such a height, yet it is. It will be well, then, to glance at the ameliorations which have been at any time effected or proposed in the condition of the serfs, and to see whence they have proceeded. We shall find, at least, that Austria has done somewhat more than is commonly supposed.

Hungary was peopled by a tribe of the Slavonic race. The Slavonians, or Slaves, are of Indo-Germanic origin, and their migrations into Europe began about five hundred years before the Christian era, and ceased in the seventh

century after Christ. They were then, as they are now, a most important race in point of numbers. They were divided into a number of independent tribes, inhabiting Russia, Poland, Silesia, Galicia, Pomerania, Slavonia, Hungary, Croatia, Servia, &c. Christianity did not effect much among them until the ninth century. Their most glorious epoch was in 650, when Samo united nearly all the tribes in one grand Pan-Slavonic empire, as brief and as brilliant as the empire of Napoleon, and its shadow, even at this day, visits the Slave in his dreams, and reminds him that his long-suffering race held a high position before the Magyar came,—before the houses of Hapsburg, of Hohenzollern, and of Romanoff were dreamed of. The Slaves in Europe number some seventy millions, and all speak in dialects of the same tongue. During the period which intervened between Charlemagne and Otho the First, they were nearly everywhere reduced to a servitude so great and so miserable, that the name of their race, which is said by their philologists to signify glory, has passed into modern languages to denote a person who cannot hope for liberty, and is our word *slave*. They have remained in the same degraded state in Hungary unto this day. In some other provinces they attained partial independence, and in others still they formed powerful states. Slavonia, Bohemia, and Poland are cases in point. Russia is the most signal example, now the only Slavonic nation which is independent, and by this title, as well as by almost common consent, she stands at the head of the race. Europe may yet become Cossack, for the gaze of Russia is steadily fixed upon a new Pan-Slavonic empire, and, if the dream is realized, this great race will command the world.

Swatopluk lost his kingdom for a horse, as we have seen. He fled, leaving his people to the mercies of the pitiless Magyars. The Slovacs resisted the invaders, but unsuccessfully. The original inhabitants who were serfs under their old masters remained serfs. All the Slovacs who were taken in arms were either killed or reduced to servitude. A great number of the Slovak nobles and freemen, who escaped this doom, fled to other provinces. A few remained, and voluntarily submitted to Arpad. In most cases, these were allowed to remain free, but they were contemned, as belonging to an inferior race. The Slaves in Hungary were very numerous, for, besides the aborigines who

remained in bondage, or were reduced to servitude, the Magyars annually brought prisoners captured in their predatory excursions, and these, with scarcely an exception, were bound to the soil. The Magyar in those days, whether leader or soldier, was a freeman. Pulszky says,—

“The Magyars were free and equal in political rights, with the exception of the chiefs, who formed a high aristocracy among them. They were warriors when young, and herdsmen when old, and amidst the numbers of captive bondsmen and *native serfs*, they formed a *national aristocracy*.” — p. 30.

The Magyars were a nation of soldiers; hence it is easy to see that they needed a numerous body of slaves to perform menial offices, and to till the ground which was seized by Arpad immediately after the conquest of the country, and divided among his followers.

Every Magyar was a freeman until the days of St. Stephen. The overwhelming majority of the natives were slaves. A few who submitted were allowed to remain free, but their freedom brought them privileges nearly equal to those of the free black in Carolina. The distinction of race became in a few years a settled thing; so much so, that an attempt, on the part of St. Stephen, to open a wide door to their gradual emancipation did not meet with the success he anticipated. He made a law providing that a slave who embraced Christianity should obtain his freedom, and a freeman who persisted in his paganism should be enslaved. It is natural that a law of this sort, condemning the proud Magyar to servitude, and elevating the wretched serf to freedom, should meet with strong opposition, and it did.

“Thonuzoba, chief of the Bissens, set the pagan Magyars an example, which taught them at once to escape from servitude and Christianity. He proceeded to Abad, on the banks of the Theiss, and dressed in full armour, and sitting on his horse, he caused himself to be buried alive, as an expiatory sacrifice to the gods. For he preferred death with his fathers to eternal life with Christ.” — Pulszky, p. 31.

Some of the obstinate pagans fled. A few were resolved to remain in Hungary, and yet cling to their errors. Where the authority of Stephen was acknowledged, these were enslaved, but it is not to be supposed that they remained slaves. The king not unfrequently employed force

to subject the stubborn unbelievers, and, as far as the Magyars were concerned, his law may have accomplished nearly as much as he expected. Pulszky says:—

“To the honor of the Magyars, we find that in almost every instance the example and the doctrines of their prince sufficed to open their minds to Christianity.”—p. 16.

No doubt of it. Such energetic preaching, combined with the terrible penalty threatened in case of recusancy, could scarcely fail in converting the Magyar, who covets social freedom, and abhors compulsory labor with an intensity that scarcely ever had a parallel in any land. The law of St. Stephen left the Magyars free, as it found them, with a very few and evanescent exceptions. But it worked no wonders for the natives who were in bondage. It is true that some of them were emancipated as soon as they declared themselves Christians. A few of these contrived to preserve their liberty, and to transmit it to their descendants, and hence there are some men in Hungary of Slavonic blood, who enjoy a certain degree of consideration in society. But in the eyes of a true Magyar, no length of time can efface the stain that is caused by descent from a Slave. Great talent will enable a man of the proscribed class to find favor with the poor Magyar population, or the untitled nobility of Hungary; but the magnate will scarcely endure his presence. Kossuth is an instance in point. He is a naturalized Slovak. Fortuitous circumstances, and a firm resolution to assert the privileges of the Magyar race against his brethren in blood, won for him the confidence of the untitled nobility. But the magnates of the kingdom stood aloof, with few exceptions, and their lukewarmness or hostility did much to ruin his cause. And it is more than probable that they refused to join his party, not because they were favorably disposed towards Croatia, but because the Magyar cause was intrusted to a man who was not of the dominant race.

Several circumstances go to prove that nearly all the Slaves remained in bondage, notwithstanding the liberal law of St. Stephen. The freemen were never taxed, and the public burdens were borne by those who were not free. This fact is significant, inasmuch as it indicates pretty clearly the relative proportions of the slaves and the freemen. Fifty years after the death of St. Stephen, we find

the slaves as numerous as ever, and, as few Magyars sank into servitude, and few or none were taken in war, it is clear that no great alteration had taken place in their condition. In fact, the difficulties which obstructed emancipation were very great. The chief hindrance arose from the indomitable pride of the Magyar, who could not stoop to the level of a man tainted with base Slavonic blood. Then who was to remunerate the master for the loss of his serf? This last was a very weighty consideration, and it is perfectly natural that it would afford a continual pretext for the evasion of the law, as in fact it did. The gleam of sunshine for the Slave, which came into the land with Christianity, soon disappeared. The great majority of the class that were naturalized or emancipated under Stephen sank again into bondage by the time the third generation was born. Pulszky corroborates all this. He says, —

“ Besides the three large classes of freemen, we find in this period a fourth class of citizens, the emancipated bondsmen, and the naturalized aliens, who were not called upon to do military service, who had no political rights, and who paid taxes to the king, but who were not subject to any one besides him. *This class produced*, in the course of time, the citizens of towns and the mass of the people, *those that are not freemen*, who are subject to their lords, who work for them, and who pay their taxes to them.” — p. 32.

This is one of Pulszky's significant admissions. It indicates precisely what liberty was worth to the Slave who was emancipated by the law of St. Stephen. The constitutional right of a Magyar is to do military service, to pay no taxes, and to enjoy full political rights, especially the right of suffrage. The emancipated bondsman was not to be a soldier, he was to pay taxes, and he was not to enjoy any political rights. Why, then, even in his best days, he was a *slave*. All that he gained was the privilege of becoming the king's slave. And when the royal power began to decline, as it speedily did, the Magyar regained his slave, and, in the language of Pulszky, the whole class “produced in time the *mass of the people*, who are slaves, who work for their lords, pay taxes, and are subject to them.” The Magyars are a nation of soldiers, and after they had carefully debarred the freedman from the privilege of voting, and compelled him to pay taxes, they could not devise a better method of drawing an impassable line between them and him than by refusing him admission into the ranks.

So it turns out, that, as a body, the Magyars were always freemen, and, as a body, the natives were always slaves. We are speaking of Hungary proper, not of Croatia, or of Transylvania. The Magyar *could* be condemned to slavery for some great crime, but the race was a race of freemen. A Slavonian *could* be emancipated, and his descendants might be distinguished, but the race was enslaved. In Hungary proper, a Magyar slave or a Slavonian freeman was an exception to the rule.

We have pointed out with some care the condition of the people at the period immediately following the promulgation of the Constitution by St. Stephen, because in all essential particulars their condition in 1840 was not much better than it was in 1040. Several improvements have been suggested, and some have been made in their favor, but the system has come down to our times very little changed for the better.

A closer view of the Hungarian Constitution will show yet more clearly what the mass of the people have had to endure from Magyar domination. The Constitution provides for a feudal state of society in its most objectionable form. The freemen were divided into three classes. The first comprised the magnates, the high nobility, and the bishops; the second, the lesser nobility and the proprietors; and the third, the soldiers. It was a maxim of Magyar law, that the common freeman has as much liberty as the greatest magnate, and that his proprietary rights are as sacred. The king was the owner of all the land, and the actual possessors held of him, under the usual condition of military service. In case of forfeiture, or of a family becoming extinct, the land reverted to the king. These three classes formed the Diet, or parliament of Hungary. The consent of this assembly was required to make the royal decrees laws. The parliament of Hungary is now composed of two houses, and some of the reformers of 1849 suddenly recollected that the upper house had no constitutional existence, whence they argued that it ought to be abolished. This was a retaliatory measure, designed to punish the resistance of the magnates to the measures of Kossuth, and their contempt for his Slavonic blood. It is true that the parliament formerly consisted of one house, or rather of one assembly. The members were all soldiers, and they met in an open field, armed to the teeth. The

great nobles were nearest to the person of the king, and, of course, they nearly monopolized his ear. Every measure that passed was in reality theirs or his. The lower nobility and the people were present simply to hurra! When the Magyars became civilized, they built houses for themselves and for the parliament. The practice of meeting in the open field was gradually abandoned, and, as the distinction between the magnates and the people became more strongly marked, the greater nobles began to deliberate, at first apart, and then in a separate hall. The Magyar people have still a constitutional right to be present at the meetings of the Diet, but it is physically impossible to get them all into one house.

This Diet sometimes had stormy sessions, denoting the ferocity of the Magyar character in those days. Queen Helen appears at the Diet of 1132, and asks for vengeance upon the persons who had deprived her husband of his eyes.

“Fanaticized by the queen’s speech, the magnates rose, and, drawing their swords, killed sixty-eight friends and advisers of King Koloman, because they suspected them of being privy to the mutilation of Bela. At another meeting of the magnates Helen stood forth and asked them whether they were of opinion that Boris was the legitimate son of Koloman. Those who replied in the affirmative, or who gave an evasive answer, were executed on the spot.”—Pulszky, p. 37.

The Slaves, the mass of the people in Hungary, were represented at this Diet precisely as the slaves of our Southern States are represented at Washington. The laws concerning the public burdens have been already noticed. No freeman could be taxed. This axiom was always regarded as absolutely immutable. A curious instance of the tenacity with which the Magyars cling to their old privileges was afforded a few years ago. A fine suspension bridge was thrown across the Danube, at Pesth. Count Szecheny, a magnate who had for some years interested himself in the cause of reform, urged the Diet to pass a law compelling every freeman who crossed the bridge to pay a small toll. The measure was vigorously opposed, not because it was inexpedient, but because it was unconstitutional, and no direct tax had ever been laid upon a freeman since the foundation of the kingdom. The Count carried his measure by a bare majority, for the untitled nobles were averse to the plan. It has always been thus. The villain popu-

lation have had to pay every tithe, tax, and burden that has been ever voted in parliament.

The land was held by freemen, of course, and no slave, under any circumstances, could own a single rood. So far as the administration of justice was concerned, he was subject to class legislation of the most oppressive character. Justice was supposed to emanate from the king, but the military governors had a constant jurisdiction in civil and in criminal cases, which generally weighed heavily upon the slave. A thief, if he were free, made restitution in money; if he were a slave, he lost his nose, or one of his eyes, and there was an end of the matter. This is a specimen of the distinctions that were enforced in all other cases where justice was to be administered. Another Magyar institution which weighed heavily upon the slaves was the *Stalarium*. It was a species of court-martial granted to counties when the district was troubled by burglars, robbers, or house-burners. Seven judges were necessary, and if an accused person were found guilty, he was hung on the spot. It was necessary that the criminal should be caught in the act, or in the pursuit that followed, and a unanimous sentence was also requisite. This court was the terror of the slaves, for, although the judges were held responsible for each execution, yet when did the voice of a serf reach the court of the palatine?

Perhaps no Magyar law made the state of the peasant more utterly wretched than that which gave the lord power to imprison or punish his serf without appeal. This jurisdiction was authorized from the days of St. Stephen to our own times, and it is easy to conceive what a terrible engine it must have been in the hands of an iniquitous master.

"The second tower, at the extreme end of the park, decorated less picturesquely than the first, had a very different destination. It had been the jail, where used to be confined the prisoners of those feudal lords, whose manorial courts were endowed even with *criminal* jurisdiction. We did not prize this *privilege*, and therefore, as soon as we possessed it, surrendered it into the hands of the county authorities, who could detain the culprits in the extensive establishment on the principle of solitary confinement, which the county nobility had erected. To us, it was a great comfort to be able to dispense with the painful *duty* of sending the transgressors of the law into our dismal dungeon."—Pulszky, p. 110.

This was written, not in 1049, but in 1849. This is one

of the "*historical rights*" which the court of Vienna vainly urged the Magyars to forego.

A thousand other lesser institutions served to distinguish the Magyar from the Slavonian. The freeman could not be subjected to a whipping, neither could he be chained. He was free from illegal or vexatious arrest, and the punishment to which he could be sentenced was proportioned to his dignity, unless when he was clearly convicted of a great crime. He elected his own magistrates, he enjoyed liberty of speech, and he could even prevent a forcible entry into his house by the officers of justice, with a simple protest, which he was bound to sustain in court within a reasonable time. The slave enjoyed none of these privileges. His very dress served to distinguish him from his master, for the Magyars have always been very solicitous concerning their national costume, and when they were bitterly incensed against the court of Vienna, the Emperor was always sure to regain their applause by causing his court to appear before them arrayed in the picturesque Magyar costume. Language was also an impassable barrier between Magyar and peasant. The Magyars neglected their own language for many years, and in the sixteenth century very many magnates could not read or write in the Magyar tongue. Since the close of that age, it has been cultivated with great success. But the Magyars would never condescend to speak in the Slavonian language, if he could avoid it, and hence the Latin has been for many centuries a living tongue in Hungary.

The foregoing sketch presents some of the principal features of the famous Hungarian Constitution, and of the customs which grew up from successive interpretations of that instrument. It is this Constitution for which the Magyars fought in 1849. It was in force until the 4th of March of that year. The greatest grievance of the Magyars always seemed to be, that Austria was determined to abolish it, if possible. Considering its intensely aristocratic provisions, it is easy to see that our sympathies, as Americans, ought in this matter to be given to Austria, for she was enlisted in behalf of human liberty. But the Magyars have hitherto regarded it as a sacred instrument.

"We are therefore justified by the experience of centuries in our hopes that the Constitution of St. Stephen will outlive the botchwork of the German theorists, who in 1848 attempted to overthrow

the institutions of the great king by means of a paper charter." — Pulszky, p. 19.

It is clear, then, that the Slaves, who formed two thirds of the population, supported the government, while they were denied all political, civil, and social rights, as far as these could be denied. An attempt has been made in several quarters, not only to deny these facts, but to deny that the freemen, as a body, were Magyars, and that the slaves, as a body, were of the Slavonic or original race. We have shown that it is so, by the testimony of our Magyar authorities. However, we will give another authority, out of the many at hand. Eötvös thus discourses :—

"The term *nobleman*, in the general Hungarian acceptation, means neither more nor less than a *freeman*; and the *peasants*, as the unprivileged class of the population, may be said to be in a state of *villainage*. The privileges of the Hungarian Constitution, namely, liberty of speech, freedom from unwarranted arrest, the privilege of not being subjected to corporal punishment, the right to elect their own magistrates, and a variety of similar immunities, are, in *all the charters*, described in terms which for a long time caused them to be *confined to the descendants of the ancient conquerors of the country*, or to those persons who obtained the freedom of Hungary by a *grant of royal letters patent*. The rest of the community, the Jews, Razen, Gypsies, Russnioks, and *other tribes*, are mentioned as guests, or strangers, *who have no political rights*. Whether bound to the soil, like the *peasants*, or migratory, like the Gypsies, they were alike *unprotected* by law, and at the mercy of all the *whims, neglects*, and *cruelties* of a legislature which bears traces at once of the fierceness of their Turkish neighbours, and the pedantic vindictiveness of the Hapsburgs. It was to break down the yoke which for *so many centuries* weighed upon the unfortunate *villains* and *aliens* of Hungary, that the reform party exerted itself against the Hungarian conservatives and the court of Vienna." — *The Village Notary*, Vol. I. Note 7.

The last flourish may pass for what it is worth. Mrs. Pulszky testifies clearly that the Slavonic tribes, as a *race*, were doomed to political death. Speaking of the downfall of the Viennese government, and of the great hopes in which the Slavonians indulged on account of their numerical superiority, she says :—

"They relied upon their numerical strength, neglecting to observe that the majority of their number were in civilization, wealth, and political consequence inferior to the other races, and on this account could not yet attain political ascendancy. . . . It

is one result of the *long prostration* which, at least in Austria and Hungary, *this manifold race has suffered*, that it has no national aristocracy. In consequence, the Slavonians became the most passionate democrats." — pp. 149, 150.

The famous manifesto of Ferdinand, in which he sides with the Magyars, and denounces Jellachich as a traitor, also testifies to the fact, that the Slavonic tribes inhabiting Hungary proper were bound to the soil.

"We were doomed to be mistaken," says the Emperor, "with you Croats and Slavonians, who owe to your union with Hungary the constitutional freedom *which alone amongst all Slavonic nations* you have been enabled to preserve for centuries."

We would not dwell upon this fact, were it not for the exertions of the Magyarized writers in England and this country to make it appear that the political and social distinctions in Hungary are founded upon classes, and not upon races. This assertion is negated by all history, but we have chosen to prove its falsity from the mouths of Magyar apologists. It will be seen that they furnish abundant proof that the Magyars in Hungary proper were freemen, and the men of Slavonic blood were in bondage, and that this state of things, with a few exceptions, has endured since the entrance of the Magyars under Arpad.

In 1222, the untitled Magyars extorted from King Andreas the charter of the Golden Bull, which is to the Hungarian Constitution what Magna Charta is to the British. It secures to the poor nobles all the rights and privileges which serve to distinguish them from the peasants, especially full exemption from taxation, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. At the same time, this Bull protected them from the attempts which were from time to time made by the magnates to overawe them, and trample upon their privileges. The "villain population" were left in their old condition, and the new laws made escape from it more difficult than ever.

It would seem that, while the Slaves were separated from the Magyars by almost impassable barriers arising from political and civil distinctions, they managed, in many cases, to improve their own material condition. The Magyars in the time of Stephen were in a very barbarous condition. Seventy years after the promulgation of the Constitution, King Bela experienced the utmost difficulty in inducing them to amend their savage manners.

"Bela displayed a restless activity in his attempts to improve the state of the country, and to introduce the *essentials* of a higher civilization. He urged the Magyars to resign the vagrant tent, and to fix themselves in permanent homes. He appointed fairs in various market towns, and he coined a certain quantity of money, and thus created a circulating medium, in the place of the old barter trade." — Pulszky, p. 22.

Towards the end of the twelfth century, the Magyars began to abandon their nomadic life, and to turn their attention to the cultivation of the internal resources of the country. From the year 1189, when Bela the Third married a daughter of France, the epoch of civilized Hungary begins. The accession of a prince of the house of Anjou to the Hungarian throne did much towards humanizing Magyardom. The great number of young Magyars who resorted to Paris, and the tide of French influence that poured into the land, soon changed the manners of the children of Arpad, and fitted them to appear with credit to themselves on the European stage. In fact, the nation attained the zenith of its glory under Louis the First, who reigned forty years. The savage feudalism of the Magyars was in some degree modified, and the Slaves were not, at this time, much below the servile standard in France. For the first time, the feudal system, as amended by Louis the Great, became a positive law of the land by its solemn recognition on the part of the Diet. The Slaves gained no political rights whatever; social distinctions between them and the Magyars and Magyarized foreigners were sternly maintained, but they were treated with greater humanity, and slowly, very slowly, the laws regulating their labor, and the nature of the tie that bound them to the soil, were amended. They were, in some favored localities, compelled to labor for their lords from two to four days in the week, and a portion of land, generally from twenty to forty acres each, was ceded to them, not as owners, of course, but as tenants. The laws provided that the Slave should not be violently deprived of his little holding. On those days which were not claimed by his lord, he could cultivate the farm ceded to him for his use. From it he had to support his family, to give one ninth of his harvests to his lord, and to pay *all* the public tithes, taxes, and other burdens. He had ceased to be a *slave*, in the more rigid acceptation of the term, and he had become a *serf*, — *adscriptus glebæ*, in the language of the law, — bound to the soil of his lord.

Sigismund, Emperor of Germany, king of Bohemia and of Hungary, meditated several reforms, and, among others, he devised a plan whereby at least one twentieth of the serfs might have regained their liberty. He granted several privileges to the towns, which, in the fifteenth century, were beginning to be of some importance. There were peasants bound to the soil, and yet wealthy enough to purchase their freedom, if permitted. Sigismund provided that, if such serfs would consent to go to the towns, free migration should be allowed, after all claims of the lord had been satisfied. One would suppose that an offer of this sort was a full emancipation of the serf, but it was no such thing. Town life was not so agreeable in Hungary as it is in enlightened countries. The Magyars eschewed it. The inhabitants of the towns were commonly Germans and Italians, who were in the charters styled *hospites*, guests. The *hospites* were of very little importance in Magyar eyes; they enjoyed municipal rights, but they were not represented in the Diet, and they had little or no share in the privileges secured by the common law to the elect race. The Magyars regarded them as somewhat above the Slaves, and far below themselves. Yet an admission into these municipalities was a step in advance for the serf, and a few managed to take it. Magyar opposition, however, rendered this and other measures of the king nearly fruitless. Their wrath was very great when he decreed the enrolment of one in every thirty-three peasants holding cessions of land. This was a fearful innovation, for every soldier was a freeman, according to the Constitution of St. Stephen, and only Magyars were soldiers. The king could do little or nothing in the face of prejudices which had been rooted for ages. "If he had no money to lavish," says Pulszky (p. 55), "he distributed patents of nobility, not bound to any special property, which therefore by no means answered the notions of the Magyars."

Another attempt was made to put arms into peasant hands, and the result was what might have been expected. It is always dangerous to put arms into the hand of a slave, unless his liberty is given with the weapon. The Magyars never desired their slaves to fight, because they might make the very natural mistake of confounding their masters with the public enemy. Moreover, the Magyar, who was always the most brilliant, if not the best, soldier in Europe,

looked upon the profession as a noble one. But the slaves were armed in 1512, and once assembled, for the first time during six hundred years, in arms, they were not disposed to lay them down without striking a blow for their long-lost liberties. The occasion was a crusade against the Turks. A great army was wanted, and the Magyars did not care to go. Accordingly, a royal decree permitted the serfs to enlist, when countless crowds flocked to the standard of the Chancellor Bakatsh. Instead of marching against the Turks, they marched against their oppressors. The Magyars had exerted themselves against this arming of the peasants, rightly judging that a general massacre would ensue, but their opposition had been fruitless. Dozsa, a man whose blood was supposed to have a Slavonic taint, was the leader of the fearful army.

“He told the people that the nobility was to be annihilated, and royalty abolished. Equal rights and equal duties were to be given and imposed upon every body. Hungary was large enough to keep all her children in plenty and ease. Such theories were highly palatable to the peasants, and, acting up to them, they assassinated the landed proprietors, sacked the cities, and burned the castles of the magnates. This was fearful, but still more fearful was the revenge of the nobility, who attacked and routed the peasant forces at Szegedin. Dozsa was placed upon a throne of red-hot iron, and crowned with a crown of the same metal; his captains were tortured and executed. And the Diet, which assembled after the insurrection, punished the peasantry by condemning them to servitude, binding them to the glebe, and depriving them of all political rights.” — Pulszky, p. 63.

The last sentence is a grain of Magyar dust, thrown at our eyes. If there were any of the poorer Magyars engaged in the rising, and if they were suffered to live, the sentence might apply to them. Summary vengeance was meted to the conquered peasantry.

The action of the Diet is more truly described by Eötvös (Vol. III. Note 3):—“The Diet declared that the peasants had forfeited *all* their rights. They were degraded to the state of serfs, *ad perpetuam rusticitatem*, they could *never* purchase their emancipation, and rise to the estate of citizens.” This law was enforced throughout the land. Some humane lords permitted their peasants to return to the old system of working for the castle a certain number of days in the week, and cultivating a piece of land for their own maintenance, and for the payment of the public

burdens, but the laws forbade any thing of this sort to be done.

An opportunity occurred in 1715, under Charles the Sixth, for the Magyars to conform to the laws of civilized Europe, in which feudalism had long disappeared. Several important constitutional reforms were proposed and carried in the Diet. A standing army was for the first time raised, and as the tax for its support was a new one, the Emperor desired the Magyars to pay it. They refused to do so, as it would be an atrocious violation of the Constitution to tax any free Magyar.

"They protested that, as they were the proprietors of the land, and as every burden on the peasant was a burden on his landlord, it followed that all that the peasants paid was in reality paid by them, and that to tax peasant and landlord meant to tax the landlord twice."—Eötvös, Vol. III. Note 3.

This reasoning was considered the perfection of logic in the Magyar assembly, and the poor peasant was accordingly taxed twice, or rather thrice. He had to pay his ninth to his lord, his tolls, taxes, and tithes to government, and the new war taxes besides.

We may here call attention to a remarkable fact. All the measures ever devised to oppress or enslave the people proceeded from Magyar sources. They had conquered the country, they had reserved the rights of freemen to themselves, and, with a few and generally fleeting exceptions, they reduced the entire Slavonic population of Hungary proper to a state of servitude. Besides being deprived of every shadow of political right, the peasant was incapable of owning land, he was held to pay all taxes raised in the kingdom, and he was scarcely allowed to pray for common justice, while a thousand privileges he was for ever incapable of enjoying served to remind him that he belonged to a degraded race. The only Magyar authority from whence relief was ever promised was that of St. Stephen, and we have seen how the good intentions of the king were frustrated by the force of circumstances. Louis the First and Sigismund made some wise decrees in favor of the peasants, but Magyar pride rendered them of no effect. Louis was a prince of the house of Anjou, and Sigismund of Luxembourg was also Emperor of Germany; hence both had wider views than were current in Magyardom. The Em-

peror Charles of Austria vainly attempted to induce the Magyars to pay the war taxes, as we have seen. At length the Empress Maria Theresa forced a reform into Hungary, in despite of Magyar opposition. In fact, she violated the Hungarian Constitution.

“Further, when, in 1764, the Diet refused to introduce a bill for the regulation of the relation of the peasant to the land-owner, which should distinctly define his rights and duties, she introduced by an absolute decree her *Urbarium* into Hungary, which, in spite of great defects, was yet very liberal for that period, and contained many elements of progress.” — Pulszky, p. 88.

Austria simply wished to have the rights and duties of the serf distinctly settled, and the Magyars were determined that they should remain as they always had been, in constitutional confusion. Such a law would be excessively inconvenient, for the peasant would appeal to it too often, and so thwart the will of his lord. And yet the new measure did not abridge the rights of the lord; it found the peasant in bondage, and it left him there. It only provided against a few of the worst features of the oppressive system. The peasant had to pay his ninth, and his taxes. He had, it is true, a piece of land to cultivate, and certain privileges in wood and turf cutting; but he was always liable to be oppressed in each of these particulars, and in ordinary cases without redress. The piece of land ceded to him might be exchanged for another, at the lord's caprice. The chief merit of the *Urbarium* was, that it clearly defined the rights and duties of the peasant in tax-paying, in wood and turf cutting, in the management and tenure of his little cession, and in a few other similar particulars. It simply protected the peasant from outrageous exactions, and yet, in the language of Pulszky, it was very liberal for that period. Foreign influence had proposed and partly introduced ameliorative measures into the system of Hungarian servitude, and here was a fourth, and the most efficient of all, emanating from the Austrian court, and enforced by an absolute decree, notwithstanding the negative vote of the Magyar Diet. The haughty sons of Árpád were so offended at the audacity of Austria in forcing liberty upon Hungary, that in the Diet of 1790, as Eötvös tells us, “they memorialized the crown about the manner in which the law had been introduced.”

Yet the Diet gave the law a provisional ratification un-

der the condition of a future revision. In fact, it would not have been safe to provoke the peasants and Austria by rejecting the decree. Nothing more was done by the Diet until the year 1836.

Joseph the Second, the son of Maria Theresa, attempted to abolish the whole Magyar system, and in their rage the Magyars refused, as they still do, to style him King of Hungary. Pulszky says of him :—

“ He was a perfect specimen of a German philosopher, respecting no historical rights, boldly overturning the ancient order of things. . . . In vain he proclaimed toleration, in vain he studied to govern according to the law of reason ; his ordinances were not respected, because he had shaken the public rights to their foundation.”

At the Diet of 1790, a part of the imperial policy was seriously discussed,—that which related to the subject we are treating. But it was only discussed, for the Magyars were impracticable ; they could agree upon nothing. The Emperor Francis called the attention of the next Diet to the subject, but it was again postponed, probably on account of the increasing troubles fomented by the French Revolution. The wars that ensued left Austria no time to think of any thing but her own interests. In 1832, the subject was once more urged by the Emperor upon the Diet. The language of his Majesty was so plain, that Magyar apologists have no other way of disposing of it than by impeaching his intentions, as if every reform in this quarter had not emanated from the court of Vienna.

“ The Austrian cabinet, too prudent to enter into open contest with a movement which was evidently becoming national, affected to adopt the views of the liberal party, hoping, by an apparent and partial acquiescence, to allay the excitement of the public mind, and to restrain and direct a movement which it could not suppress. The royal propositions embodied some of the principal measures of reform projected by the liberals.”—*Examiner*, p. 476.

This Diet revised the *Urbarium* of Maria Theresa, and the articles show to what a fearful extent the slaves had been oppressed for nine hundred years. The judicial power was taken from the lord. This power in substance implied the right of the lord to erect himself into a court, and sit in judgment upon his slave. The Magyar law allowed no appeal of the serf from his master, but this Diet abol-

ished the iniquitous statute, and also empowered the slave to institute a suit against a noble. The right of free migration was enacted for the fourth time. The taxes had become very burdensome, and a few antiquated ones were abolished; the number of days the serf was bound to work for his lord was reduced, the quantity of land he could hold in cession was increased, and a law was passed making it *possible* for him to redeem his tithes and labor, whereby he might become owner of a small portion of the land.

These articles indicate a step taken in advance of Magyarism. Yet they leave the peasant as they found him, a slave. Most of them were substantially contained in the Urbarium which the court of Vienna *forced* upon the Magyars, and *all* of them were sustained by the imperial recommendation earnestly made at the opening of the Diet. How Austria can be deprived of the credit of introducing measures which she persisted in enforcing in the first instance by an absolute decree, in despite of the strenuous opposition of the Magyars, and which she afterwards repeatedly urged upon the Diet, is a problem which we leave to our Magyarized writers. The same Diet voted that nobles should no longer be exempted from arrest, and that they should pay toll when crossing the new suspension bridge at Pesth. All these measures encountered the most earnest opposition, says the *Examiner*, "from the old Magyar patriots, who regarded the institutions of their country with a superstitious affection, and in whose eyes it was a sacrilege to lay a finger upon one stone of the venerable edifice."

At the Diet of 1843, the Emperor again reminded the Magyars that it was necessary to prosecute the work of reform. The previous measures which had been carried, making a peasant *capable* of being a freeman, and of owning land, were in danger of becoming a dead letter, unless something further was done. The laws exempting freemen from taxation were also to be reconsidered. The Diet acted upon the recommendations of the court of Vienna so far as to decree that the peasant should be *capable*, not only of becoming a freeman, but of buying the property of a noble, and of holding office,—after his emancipation, of course. But how was he to obtain his freedom? The Diet would not hearken to any proposition contemplating the emancipation of the entire peasantry. There was no obvious method of remunerating the lord for the loss of his peasant.

Worse than this, the peasants in Hungary proper outnumbered the Magyars, and if they were all freemen, they would outvote and domineer over their former tyrants. So the only peasant who could possibly profit by the new law was he who was rich enough to purchase his freedom. As for holding office, or being received as an equal into Magyar society, he was *capable* of it, and so is a black citizen of Massachusetts *capable* of holding a high office in the State.

The sincerity of the Magyars in all these measures for the emancipation of the peasants may be accurately estimated from what passed in the same Diet when the proposition to equalize the taxes was under consideration. It is clear, that, while the peasants bore all the public burdens and the freemen were exempted from them, there could be no such thing as liberty or equality before the law, or fraternity in society. Strenuous attempts were made to induce the Magyars to submit themselves to a law equalizing the taxes and other burdens imposed by the state. The court of Vienna was backed by Szecheny in the upper house, and by the radicals in the lower assembly. But their eloquence was thrown away. "The royal propositions," says the *Examiner* (pp. 486, 487), "called the attention of the Diet to some of the principal measures of reform demanded by the liberal party. . . . The liberal party could not, however, yet succeed in obtaining the passage of a law for the equal distribution of the taxes." The Diet of 1843 found the peasant a slave, and it left him a slave.

We come now to the famous Diet of 1848, the last Magyar assembly that was, or perhaps ever will be, held. It opened on the 5th of July, four months after the revolution in Paris, and three after the insurrection at Vienna. The main business of the Diet was to suppress the disturbances caused by the Slaves, who were everywhere rising, and to extort as much as possible from the Emperor in his helpless state. But it was absolutely necessary to do something in relation to the peasant reform. A radical party had grown silently in the very bosom of Magyardom. It was headed by Baron Eötvös and Szemere. In the Diet the party embraced more than one twelfth of the members; but it found little favor with the magnates, and still less with the untitled nobility, who were at this time headed by Kossuth. "It was composed," says Pulszky, "chiefly of young men of letters, who, full of spirit and ability, were but too prone to

discover the weak and faulty parts of the county government. Their leaders, though spirited and witty, failed in bringing their ideas home to the minds of their readers. The national instincts of the Magyars were opposed to such notions."

This party was untiring in its efforts to bring about a thorough reform in Hungary. It is probable that the liberal measures passed in preceding Diets, agreeably to the royal recommendations, would have been lost without their support. Many of them had a perfect understanding with the democrats of Paris and Vienna, and hence they knew, as early as 1846, that a general rebellion was in contemplation. The programme of 1847, published by some of the Hungarian opposition, and setting forth the reforms to be demanded at the Diet of 1848, met their concurrence as a *pro tempore* measure. They were probably sincere in wishing that the peasants should be admitted to the rights of Hungarian citizenship. Accordingly, when Kossuth decreed the emancipation of the peasants, he received their support. They had failed in a motion for a republic, but they were willing to vote for any measure that tended in that direction.

This measure of Kossuth has been extolled far more than it deserves. It is true that he decreed the emancipation of the slaves, but the measure could not fail to be illusory. It was necessary to promise the peasants something, to keep them friendly, or at least quiet, during the coming struggle. It may be that Kossuth meant, by a bold stroke, to anticipate the court of Vienna, which made the same decree on the 4th of March, 1849. The young Emperor ascended the throne on the 3d of December, and it was immediately whispered that he would do what he did in three months for the Slaves. At the end of the same month, Kossuth's party had not carried their measure in all its necessary details. They were yet discussing the question how the lord should be remunerated for the loss of his slave, and Kossuth could think of no better way than by robbing the Church of her lands. This last consideration we offer simply as a conjecture, but it is certain that the menacing position of the Slaves rendered some act in their behalf imperiously necessary, and Kossuth promised them what he must have known he could not perform, and his promise was received by them for just what it was worth.

The reasons why he could not perform it are evident. The party represented by him was the mass of the Magyar nation, the untitled nobility. This has been denied, but uselessly. Nothing is more certain than that the magnates, with scarcely an exception, kept aloof from him and from his party.

“Szechenyi’s followers were members of the high aristocracy, who resided in the metropolis, and scarcely ever busied themselves about the county elections.”—Pulszky, in Eötvös, p. v. “Kossuth’s party was supreme, both in strength and in numbers. The middle classes and the gentry belonged to it.”—*Ibid.* The middle classes here mentioned were the poor Magyar population, the untitled nobility. Now this party would have been utterly swamped, destroyed, by the measure of unfettered emancipation, as it was proposed by Kossuth. For the Slaves outnumbered the Magyars in Hungary, and they would outvote them, of course; the sceptre would pass from the master to the slave of nine hundred years standing, to the slave embittered by the unredressed wrongs of so many ages, and who hated his master as truly as his master hated, feared, and despised him. Considering the relations between Magyar and Slave as they have subsisted for so many centuries, it is easy to see what would be the consequence if the latter once obtained the ascendancy which Kossuth *promised* him. Magyardom would be utterly swamped. It would be annihilated in the Diet, and in all the county and town elections. Could any Magyar propose such a suicidal measure? Moreover, the Magyar untitled nobility comprised thousands who were utterly beneath many peasants in point of personal property and attainments. And yet the meanest Magyar was immeasurably above the Slave most distinguished for virtue, talent, and personal wealth, on account of the rights and privileges secured to his race. The following observation of Pulszky will not only afford additional proof of the fact, that, as a general rule, the only *freemen* of Hungary were *Magyars*, but it will give an exact description of the party represented by Kossuth:—

“The nobles were, in fact, all those who possessed the full and uncurtailed privileges of citizenship, and *this in right of birth*, not of property, comprehending, not only many little cultivators who tilled with their own hands the plot of land they themselves possessed, or rented from wealthier owners, but even many who sup-

ported themselves by the very useful, though not very aristocratic, pursuits of butchers, bootmakers, tailors, and *grooms*. These nobles, setting aside other personal privileges which they enjoyed, were the county electors. The whole number of voters has been estimated at *six or seven hundred thousand persons* in a population of *fourteen millions*."—p. 117.

The magnates of Hungary had little to fear from peasant emancipation if they received pecuniary remuneration, but what a loss would accrue to these untitled nobles who were distinguished from the Slaves only by their Magyar rights! "The common soldiers," says Pulszky (p. 305), "the alone unequalled heroes of the day, were sons of the people, upon whom Kossuth's influence ever remained unquestioned." Kossuth's measure, then, was opposed by the magnates because he could not make good their loss, and the untitled nobility would not hear of any thing more than a *promise* of it, because it would utterly ruin them, as Magyars, if carried into effect.

But there is abundance of other proof, that the measure was simply promised to gain time. We have seen that the Magyars were, from the earliest times, opposed even to an amelioration of the peasant condition. The *emancipation* of the peasants would have amounted, not to a reform, but to the *utter destruction* of the Hungarian Constitution. This is evident, because it is an instrument expressly designed to secure the eternal ascendancy of the Magyar race. And the other plans and declarations of Kossuth show that he was determined to maintain this constitution at all hazards. Austrian infringements upon it constituted one of the pretexts for the war. "The German democrats were estranged from the Magyars, because these were not willing to destroy nobility."—Pulszky, p. 150. "Hungary, which refused to give up its *nationality*, and to destroy aristocracy, was considered as a dangerous enemy by the Slavonic and Bohemian parties."—*Ibid.*, p. 199. The Hungary of which the authoress speaks in these places was the Hungary represented at the Diet of 1848-49; it was the untitled nobility, headed by Kossuth. "Nobody believed that the English aristocracy would allow the only *sound* aristocracy of the Continent to be destroyed by Austria."—*Ibid.*, p. 288. We give one more extract from the declaration of independence.

"The form of the government to be adopted for the future will

be fixed by the Diet. But until this point shall be decided on the basis of the *ancient and received principles which have been recognized for ages*, their possessions and dependencies shall be conducted by Louis Kossuth."

We have seen that this Kossuth party had no leaning whatever towards republicanism. In fact, the Magyars offered to recognize the young Emperor as king, if he would swear to maintain the Hungarian Constitution. The Emperor answered with the Constitution of the 4th of March, and from that moment all hope of accommodation ended. The new Constitution declared the peasants free. Now Kossuth had *promised* the same thing, but he knew that the Emperor would *do* it. Francis Joseph proposed to remunerate the proprietors, not by robbing the Church, but by selling the crown lands in Hungary. The untitled nobility, headed by Kossuth, saw that the peasant emancipation would ruin Magyardom for ever, and then, that is, *after* the Emperor had decreed it, and sent an army to enforce that and other measures, the Diet declared Magyardom independent of Austria!

Two things are evident from this recital of a few among the many facts given by our Magyar authors. One is, that the Magyars have always opposed every plan for the amelioration of the condition of the slaves, and that *Austria* deserves the credit of doing nearly all that has been done in this field. She has entreated and recommended the Magyars to be just to the peasants. She has gone to the length of forcing them, sorely against their will, to give them a beggarly instalment of justice. Finally, on the 4th of March, 1849, she abrogated the whole Constitution, which was inseparably connected with the iniquitous system. So that Austria has all along been the *real* champion of freedom in Hungary. So far as the relations between the races are concerned, the only liberty she has opposed is the liberty of one race to hold another in a subjection compared to which our Southern slavery is freedom. The other conclusion is, that, when Americans believed the Magyars to be at all disposed to favor a republic, they never were more shockingly deceived. In England they understood the matter far better. The only great mistake made there was in believing that the distinctions of the Hungarian Constitution, to uphold which Kossuth plunged the country into a disastrous war, were distinctions founded

upon classes only, and not upon *racés*, as we have shown they are. This huge lie was told in England to make the people believe that the two Constitutions were exactly alike, for all the distinctions recognized in England by the Constitution are predicated of classes. For the rest, the people of England thoroughly understood that the Magyar movement was essentially aristocratic, and their sympathies for it were challenged on this account. In France, too, the aristocratic character of the whole affair was well understood. Lamartine, in his book on the republic, says:—"I do not pretend that a quarrel of a part of the Hungarian people, the Magyar race, against another part, the Slavonic race, and that struggle of Hungary, thus divided with itself and against Austria, was the least in the world a French, or even a democratic cause. I know perfectly well that it was nothing of the sort. It was a civil war among the Hungarians themselves, growing out of quarrels historical in their origin, and out of jealousies of race."

Persons who have read the Hungarian declaration of independence have doubtless observed that the Magyars in *every part of it* darkly insinuate the real cause that drove them to make that declaration, and *nowhere* expressly mention it. That cause was the great act of the Emperor, whereby, on the 4th of March, he struck the chains from the limbs of ten million subjects of the Slavonic race inhabiting Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania,—chains which they had worn for nine centuries,—and decreed that the four million Magyars should *only* be freemen, and that the Slaves should be as free as their old oppressors. The Magyar grandees cared little about it, so that they were repaid for their loss, for they would then occupy a place with reference to the late peasants and the *late* untitled nobles which an English nobleman occupies with reference to the mass of the people. Nay, it is very probable that the haughty magnates were pleased with the change. Their behaviour during the war, their steady opposition to Kossuth, seem to prove it, and the reason may have been, that the magnate would no longer be elbowed by his own Magyar noble groom at the election, or be reminded that the poor Magyar claimed, with himself, and quite as strenuously, the privileges of blood, and was as decided an aristocrat as the grandee. It was to avoid unpleasant reminders of this sort that the magnate rarely appeared at county meetings,

and it is quite likely that he was little disturbed to see the whole body of poor nobles lost in the great Slavonic tide of slaves emancipated by Austria. To this emancipation, which was the death-warrant of untitled Magyardom, the world is indebted for the grandiloquent and not very veracious Hungarian declaration of independence. Bearing in mind what has hitherto been said, we are prepared to comprehend the meaning of passages in that document like these:—"It was only necessary that Austria should not envy the Magyars the moderate share of constitutional liberty which they timidly maintained with rare fidelity to their sovereigns." "The house of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and Constitution, designing to reduce it to a level with the other provinces long since deprived of freedom." "Hungary only asked that its Constitution might be guaranteed, and its abuses rectified." "The young Emperor declared his intention of depriving the nation of that independence which it had maintained for a thousand years."

Expressions like these occur in every paragraph, and their meaning is obvious. The Magyars mingle with this complaint another grievance of the first magnitude. Austria had not only emancipated the peasants of Hungary, but she had finally delivered Croatia and Transylvania from the tyranny of Magyardom. The Magyars claimed both these provinces as theirs.

It has been well observed, that if the cause of the Magyars against Austria was worth any thing, that of the Croats against the Magyars was unimpeachable. The real quarrel of the Magyars with the Emperor was, not that he had deprived them of their freedom, which is a ridiculous accusation, since the new republican Constitution of Austria secures to them a freedom really greater than they enjoyed before, but that he had annulled their privilege of holding millions in entire or partial bondage. The quarrel of the Croats with the Magyars was, that these had oppressed Croatia to an extent that had exhausted the patience of the nation, and that it had accordingly drawn the sword to assert its independence. The Magyars asked to be exalted above the Croats, the Croats asked to be equal to the Magyars. Hence the civil war in Hungary between the two races. At first, the court of Vienna seemed disposed

to favor the Magyars, but sober, second thought enlisted her on the side of the oppressed Croatsians.

Croatia was settled by a Slavonic tribe as early as the year 652, more than two centuries before the descent of the Magyars into Europe. Hungary was already peopled by the Czechs and Serbs, when Arpad overran the country, and reduced the greater part of the natives to servitude. Croatia bounded Hungary on the south, and it afforded an asylum to many fugitives from the neighbouring tract of the conquered country. It is probable that the natives of Southern Hungary, as well as the Croats, belonged to the Illyrian branch of the Slavonic family; and the Croats, partly from sympathy, partly from fear, began to regard the Magyars as the common enemy, and the two nations have since entertained for one another any thing but friendly feelings. It has been remarked often, that Croatia is the Ireland of Hungary. It is certain that the cause of Croatia against the Magyars is substantially that of the Irish Catholics against England. The Henry the Second of Croatia was Ladislas, the sixth Christian king of Magyarland. He subdued the Croatsians about the year 1090, nearly two hundred years after the irruption of the Magyars into Hungary. Under his successor, Koloman, the Croats attempted to free their country from the foreign yoke. "They believed," says Pulszky (p. 27), "that the new king was utterly ignorant of the trade of arms. He suppressed the insurrection, and completed the incorporation of Croatia." The last expression is a figure of speech. Andreas, the younger son of Bela the Third, seized Croatia and Dalmatia, and held them until the death of his brother Emrich enabled him to ascend the Hungarian throne. Under Andreas the Third, the last monarch of the house of Arpad, the Croats, who had never ceased to trouble the frontier, rose against the Magyars, and for a time they were virtually independent. It appears that they were pretty thoroughly subdued under Louis the Great, who was crowned in 1342. When his daughter, Maria, was crowned queen, the Croatsians again flew to arms, and the queen, hoping that her beauty and innocence would plead strongly in her favor, attended by a small army of Magyars, ventured into Croatia. But the Croats received her very much as Duffy proposes to receive Victoria. "The Croats proved inaccessible to romantic sentimentality.

The Ban Horvathy attacked the Hungarian guards at Diakovár, and defeated them; Gara and Forgács were, in spite of their heroic resistance, dragged from their horses, and beheaded under the very eyes of the queen, and of her mother, who were plundered of their jewels, and imprisoned in the Dalmatian castle of Novigrod."—Pulszky, p. 53. Sigismund of Luxembourg was elected king, and, by a treaty with the Ban Horvathy, the queen was liberated. Her mother had been previously executed by the vindictive Croats. Croatia maintained its independence for some years, notwithstanding Sigismund had entrapped upwards of twenty chiefs at Buda, by solemn promises of amnesty, and had them executed on the spot. Until the fall of the Hungarian branch of the house of Anjou, which happened when Louis the Second was defeated and slain by the Turks at Mohacs, in 1526, Croatia remained in an unsettled state. When Ferdinand of Austria was elected by the Magyars king of Hungary, the Croats, who never lost an opportunity of troubling their hereditary enemies, and, moreover, were by no means anxious to have a German rule over them, declared in favor of Zapolya, the rival of Ferdinand. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, a new source of dissension arose between the Magyars and the Croats. The principles of the so-called Reformation found favor among the Magyars, while Croatia steadily resisted all attempts to graft the new doctrines upon her soil. The Catholic Magyars speedily lost their ascendancy in the Diet, and did not recover it until 1647. During this time Hungary was in a deplorable state, and the Protestant party, as if to involve every thing in inextricable confusion, did not hesitate repeatedly to invoke the assistance of the Turks. Croatia also suffered much, in common with Hungary, from the incessant inroads of the Turks, who, at one time, possessed more than one third of the entire kingdom. After the expulsion of the Mahometans from the Empire, Croatia was forced to be content with a union, such as it was, with Hungary; but the national discontent, which had been kept alive eight hundred years, declared itself emphatically in 1848, when the Croats flew to arms at the call of Jellachich, and began the series of offensive measures against the Magyars, which, in 1849, resulted in the independence of Croatia.

The Emperor Ferdinand, in his first manifesto to the

Croatians and Slavonians, truly says that they alone among the Slavonic nations have been enabled to preserve a certain degree of constitutional freedom for centuries. This was because the Croats, who were always good soldiers, never lost an opportunity of annoying the Magyars, and these were compelled to recognize the Croats as, in a certain sense, a distinct nation. They seldom granted any thing to Croatia, unless when the strong hand forced them to do it. There were serfs in Croatia and in the other Slavonic provinces, as well as in Hungary; but in Magyarland the freemen and the serf were of different races, and this circumstance made a wide difference between the lot of the serf in Hungary, and his lot in Croatia. Where the lord and the slave are of the same race, the peasant often can and does rise above the condition in which he was born. The tie of blood always exerts a mitigating influence upon the feudal relations founded merely upon class distinctions. Croatia had a sort of diet of her own, and a Ban, or governor, who was generally of Slavonic blood. There was also a local supreme court of justice, called the Banal Table, and another tribunal for the hearing of civil causes. But the local assembly of the Croats had less power than was lodged in the Irish Parliament. The Magyars allowed them to enjoy some of the forms of constitutional government, which were rendered almost null by the inborn pride of the ascendant race. *The Examiner* (p. 494) says that "the citizens of Croatia were in many places debarred from the exercise of their political rights. They were attacked and driven from the place of elections by the members of the Illyrian faction, furnished with arms from the public arsenals. In vain they appealed to the king." The citizens of whom she speaks were Magyars, or Magyarized Slaves. The Illyrian faction comprehended the great majority of the inhabitants of Croatia and Slavonia, who were of Slavonic blood. The Magyars were not disposed to favor Croatia, because she had ever been a thorn in their sides. Then their own slaves in Hungary were of the same race as the Croats, and hence their pride forbade them to acknowledge these as equals. The game of Saxon and Celt was played in Croatia as well as in Ireland.

Language was another bone of contention. The Magyars scorned to speak in the Slavonic tongue, and the

Slaves hated the Magyar language too much to learn it. Yet it was one of the loudest complaints of the Croats, that the Magyars were resolved to introduce their language everywhere in Croatia, not only in the courts of justice, but in every public institution where it was at all practicable. It is pretty certain that these complaints were well founded. England endeavoured in a similar way to naturalize the English language in Ireland, and she has partially succeeded. Moreover, the Croats averred that the Magyars had from the beginning pursued a system towards Croatia, calculated to annul the best local and national rights of the people, and to Magyarize the country. The Magyars inhabiting Croatia too loudly and offensively asserted their privileges of blood. Then the Magyar central Diet exercised controlling influence over all the concerns of Croatia, and, of course, discountenanced every effort of the Croats in a national direction, and aimed to introduce into the land Magyar institutions, as far as practicable. The Parliament of England has steadily pursued a similar course with reference to Ireland, and with what success every Irishman can tell. This central Diet of Hungary was composed of two houses. The deputies of the lower house numbered from four to five hundred. Croatia, as a province of Hungary, was allowed to send deputies to the Diet. How many? Perhaps twenty? "Croatia," says the *Examiner*, "sent three deputies to the Diet, one of whom sat in the upper, and two in the lower house." It is easy to conceive what would be the treatment of the two Slaves in an assembly of nearly five hundred Magyars. The Magyars in the whole kingdom numbered four millions, and they were represented by the five hundred deputies. Croatia, with a population of nearly two millions, sent three men to represent her. In effect, the four or five Slave deputies who received a scornful permission to sit in the Diet with five hundred Magyars, represented a Slave population of nine millions. Daniel O'Connell, in the Imperial Parliament, called his brethren a race of hereditary bondsmen, and yet Ireland was far better treated at Westminster than Croatia in the Diet. The Croat deputies had always insisted upon speaking in Latin in the Diet. But in 1836, says Pulszky (p. 100), "the law [the Magyars] decided that henceforth the Magyar should be the language of the Diet, granting an exception to the

Croatian deputies only, who continued to speak in Latin. In 1844 it was decreed that in the Diet the Croatian members should likewise use the Magyar tongue, but should be allowed *six years more to learn it.*"

So the Croats rebelled in 1848. Jellachich crossed the Drave, and carried the war into Magyarland. Croatia is now an independent province of the Empire. Our democrats, who have so stupidly supposed that the Magyar cause was the cause of republican principles, will do well to study the Magyar declaration of independence, in which the Croats are denounced in almost every paragraph as *rebels*, and with a bitterness that scarcely has a parallel in the most envenomed proclamations of wrathful kings. Yet, reasoning from democratic principles, the Slaves of Croatia had a "*sacred right of revolution*," to be exercised according to their *sovereign* will. Yet, setting aside this argument *ad hominem*, nothing is more certain than that Croatia had always been very badly treated by Magyardom. Whoever recognizes the justice of the Irish cause cannot avoid acknowledging that the Croatian cause was as good.

An attentive consideration of the facts we have thus far adduced will make it evident that the Magyar cause, on which so much sympathy has been wasted in this country, was not only anti-republican, but radically a bad cause. The whole trouble in Hungary arose from the fact that the Slave population almost simultaneously revolted against the Magyars, who had oppressed them for so many ages. It was simply a civil war,—a war of races upon Hungarian ground. The Austrian government was neutral. "The transactions of Croatia with Hungary," says Pulszky (p. 165), "could legally be settled between them without any interference from Austria." "From Vienna, likewise," (*Ibid.*, p. 169,) "volunteers came to Hungary. Since Jellachich had crossed the Drave, enlistments for the Magyars had publicly taken place in Vienna, with the knowledge of the Minister of the Interior. Baron Dobbhoff looked on the Croatian invasion as a matter in which he was wholly neutral. He permitted the enlistment for the Magyars, and simultaneously an enrolment for Jellachich." In fact, Jellachich professed to fight in the name of Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria, and the Magyars denounced him in the name of the same Ferdinand, King of Hungary. This

neutrality of Austria could not long be maintained, of course, because, although the seat of war was not in the hereditary dominions of the Emperor, yet it was actually threatening to ravage a part of his empire. Jellachich did not cross the Drave until the 9th of September, 1848. The Emperor had forbidden him to hold the southern Slave congress at Agram, and had on the 10th of July issued his famous manifesto, in which he openly sides with the Magyars, and denounces Jellachich as a traitor. By the end of September, it was pretty evident that the court of Vienna had determined to leave the Magyars to their fate, and encourage Jellachich. Yet the Magyars continued to denounce the Croats in the name of Ferdinand, King of Hungary. When the young Emperor, Francis Joseph, ascended the throne, on the 2d of December, the Magyars hoped that he might assist them in crushing the *rebellion* of the Croats, and the Diet signified that Magyardom would recognize the new monarch, if he would consent to be crowned with the crown of St. Stephen, and acknowledge the *legal rights* of Hungary, that is, the ascendancy of the Magyars over the other races. It was not until the 4th of March, 1849, when Francis Joseph gave his remarkably republican constitution to the Empire, which deprived the Magyars of their "historical privileges," leaving them in a state of perfect equality with the Slaves, that they declared Hungary independent of the Empire.

Here our limits compel us to pause for the present; but our readers may expect the conclusion of the sketch, and a full defence of the Austrian government, in our next number.

ART. III. — 1. *Sessio Quarta Concilii Tridentini vindicata, seu Introductio in Scripturas Deutero-canonicas Veteris Testamenti*, per ALOISIUM VINCENZI SAMMAURENSEM, in Romano Archigymnasio Litterarum Hebraicarum Professorem. Romæ. 1842.

2. *The Holy Scriptures, their Origin, Progress, Transmission, Corruptions, and True Character*. London: Charles Dolman. 1850.

3. *The Church of Rome self-convicted of Error, with Regard*

to the Canon of the Scripture, and Tradition. Church Review, New Haven, October, 1850, Art. VI.

THE last publication on our list is that which determines us to introduce to our readers the learned Professor in the Roman University, author of the work first mentioned, who, with immense erudition, has vindicated the canon of Scripture sanctioned by the Council of Trent. As the work is rarely to be seen on this side of the Atlantic, we shall freely avail ourselves of its contents to meet the objections so recently put forward by the Reviewer, but which Vincenzi found in the pages of Horne, and which have been repeated by a thousand pens from the days of Luther and Calvin. It is the privilege of Protestants to acknowledge no final judgment, and consequently to press on our attention, with the freshness of novelty, difficulties which had been fully weighed before any definitive action was taken by the Church tribunals. "Even though vanquished they can argue still," and, like defeated litigants, they are ready to state anew the reasons in their favor, to produce their witnesses, and to prove the injustice of the verdict and sentence pronounced against them. We venture to invite attention, at the same time, to the second work on our list, which has no pretensions to originality, but presents a considerable amount of useful information on a most interesting topic. It should be circulated as widely as possible, in order to bring before all the evidences on which the Bible is received, and the means by which its study may be made a source of instruction and improvement. For Protestants no question is more perplexing than these:—On what grounds do you hold the Bible to be the word of God? How do you know with certainty its meaning, even in regard to the chief mysteries and doctrines? They indeed, with apparent confidence, allege that its pages bear the impress of inspiration, and that the whole Christian world acknowledges it, and add, that its meaning in all necessary things is plain to the sincere inquirer; but this is a mere begging of the question, an implied appeal to the authority of the Church, which is haughtily rejected. Their own endless divisions and their uncertainty prove to demonstration that its meaning is not easy to be ascertained.

They seek to make a diversion by reproaching us with

adding to the ancient Jewish canon a number of books wholly destitute of any Divine character. The adherents of the Church of England left these books in the undisturbed possession of canonical authority during the reign of Edward the Sixth, as the Homilies set forth in his time plainly show, since they quote them as Holy Scripture, and ascribe them to the Holy Ghost; but, strange to say, the Articles, which approve of the Homilies as containing "a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times," give those books only this very qualified praise:—"The other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners; but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine." This reserve might be very wise in the days of Jerome, whenever a doctrine was to be proved against those who did not recognize those books as divine; but it is unnecessary in regard to those who believe them to be dictates of the Holy Ghost, such as the Homilies proclaim them. The rule laid down in the Articles to discriminate Scripture is most unfortunate in its application:—"In the name of the Holy Scripture we do understand those canonical books of the Old and New Testament, of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church." Yet at the close of the same Article it is said,—"All the books of the New Testament, as they are commonly received, we do receive and account them canonical." Now it is notorious that doubt was long entertained in the Church, by large and influential portions of it, regarding several books thus commonly received in the sixteenth century, namely, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of John, the Epistles of James and of Jude, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. How, then, could the authors of the Articles reconcile this fact with their rule to acknowledge as canonical those only of which there never was any doubt? Mr. Newman, when writing Tract No. XC., contended that the doctrine of the Church of England in regard to the books called by her Apocryphal, by us Deutero-canonical, could be made to harmonize with that of Trent, by the aid of the strong expressions of the Homilies; but it would puzzle even him to reconcile the Homilies with the Articles, or the sixth Article with itself. Yet, with such contradictions staring him in the face, the Reviewer undertakes to convict Rome of inconsistency.

The Council professed to follow the examples of the orthodox fathers, which plainly meant the primitive and general tradition of Christian antiquity. The Church takes no individual father as a guide, although she sometimes confirms by her sanction the doctrine which has been vindicated successfully by some individual. In professing reverence for the fathers generally, she acknowledges that what they taught with unanimity as the faith originally delivered, was such in reality ; and that the great facts on which the transmission of doctrine depends, may safely be admitted on their testimony. They are competent witnesses as to the books generally read in the churches as Divine Scripture, and their judgment, when unanimous, or nearly such, is entitled to great deference. Far greater importance is ascribed to them as prelates of the Church, in Council, declaring doctrine, or facts connected with doctrine, than as writers composing doctrinal treatises, or interpreting Scripture ; since the combination of views and concurrence of testimonies necessarily carry with them greater weight, to say nothing of the promises of Divine assistance to those who are gathered together in the name of Christ.

The fidelity and simplicity with which the Council of Trent acted on these principles, in determining the canon of Scripture, are manifest. The fathers did not stop to inquire what bearing any particular book might have on the controversies of the day ; but, as a preliminary measure for all doctrinal investigation and judgment, they declared what books had been transmitted in the Church as sacred and canonical. They opened the archives of the Apostolic See and of the local churches, and drew forth the catalogues which were composed by Popes and Councils in the fifth and fourth centuries, to republish them as authentic lists of the sacred books. A Roman Council, consisting of seventy bishops, under Gelasius, at the close of the fifth century, had published a canon of Scripture, conformable to a list given by Innocent the First at the commencement of that century, with a mere verbal discrepancy in some manuscripts as to one book of Esdras, omitting Nehemias, and one book of the Macchabees. In the year 397, an African Council, held at Carthage, consisting of very many bishops, among whom Augustine was preëminent, promulgated a canon exactly the same as that which Innocent, a

few years afterwards, communicated to the Bishop of Toulouse. The same list of books is recorded by St. Augustine himself, in his book on Christian doctrine, with this preliminary remark:—"The whole canon of Scripture consists of these books." Here, then, was a canon approved of by the prelates of Africa and Italy in two numerous Councils, at an interval of a century, confirmed by two illustrious Pontiffs, and published anew in the fifteenth century to the Jacobites, at the time of the Council of Florence. It had the support of Augustine, truly a host in himself, who, in his writings as well as in the assembly of his colleagues, declared it to be conformable to primitive tradition. No other canon was known to have been published by the authority of any Pope or Council, unless, perhaps, at Laodicea, in Phrygia, by an assembly of twenty or thirty bishops, in 363, or about that period. Of the authenticity of this canon there was reasonable doubt, since it is wanting in some manuscripts, and it seems to have exercised no influence on the judgment of subsequent Councils, or on the minds of Christian writers generally. It is untrue that it was confirmed by the Fourth General Council, as the Reviewer most strangely affirms; for the mere mention of a collection of canons is not equivalent to confirmation, and in the judgment of the learned, those of Laodicea were not comprised in that collection. Paley more candidly acknowledges that its authority does not seem to have extended any farther than the province, and that Christian writers after that time treated of the sacred books without any reference to the decision at Laodicea. In this catalogue, which we think was added to the decrees by some one more attentive to Jewish sentiments than to the general usage of the churches, the books styled Deuterocanonical are omitted, with the exception of Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremias, which found favor with many who did not recognize the other writings. Whatever may be thought of the authenticity of the canon, it could not induce a moment's hesitation on the part of the fathers of Trent, who had before them several concordant lists framed by numerous Councils, approved by Popes, and confirmed by the general usage of the whole Church from the remotest antiquity. Accordingly, they published anew the canon of the Council of Carthage, and hurled anathema against the man who would dare deny the sacred and

canonical character of the books which it contained. Will any one pretend that this proceeding was not in accordance with the examples of the orthodox fathers? Were not the prelates of these two great Councils of Italy and Africa orthodox? Were not Augustine, Innocent, Gelasius, eminently worthy of this character? Even the Oriental schismatics have not ventured to dispute the correctness of the judgment of the Council of Trent on this point, since in 1672 a Greek synod held at Jerusalem under the Patriarch Dositheus acknowledged the same books as canonical Scripture, conformably to ancient usage and primitive tradition.

But the Reviewer alleges that many fathers adhered to the Hebrew canon. Granting for argument's sake that they so adhered before Councils had drawn up an authoritative catalogue, or given it a solemn sanction, surely it was consistent on the part of the Tridentine fathers to prefer the judgment of ancient Councils to the opinions of individual fathers. Councils in all ages have professed to be guided by primitive tradition, and to declare with authority what was taught by the fathers, and what is contained in the sacred writings. "This," they cried, "is the faith of the fathers: we all believe this." The judgment of a Council freely assembled, whose decrees are acknowledged throughout the Church, is justly presumed to afford the best evidence of the previous teaching of the fathers, which is examined, compared, and summed up, to prepare for the decision. It is a verdict of the assembled prelates, pronounced after a patient hearing of the witnesses. Those who object some passages of the fathers apparently inconsistent with the judgment of the Council are like persons judging of the merits of the case from desultory and vague statements, without that full knowledge which the comparison of testimony affords. With the same show of reason with which the Episcopalian alleges testimonies against the authority of the sacred books, the Arian objects the unguarded expressions of the ante-Nicene fathers, to overthrow the Divinity of Christ.

We must beg the indulgence of our readers, whilst we treat somewhat diffusely of the Hebrew canon. It is very commonly supposed that the inspired writings of the Old Testament were collected together by Esdras, after the return of the people from captivity, and solemnly proposed

to public veneration. This belief rests chiefly on some statement in an apocryphal book bearing his name, but which the Church has rejected. No evidence can be furnished that the Jews had a canon in its modern acceptation, although they certainly had a number of books which they venerated as composed under Divine inspiration. The law of Moses was publicly read for their instruction; the history of God's dealings with their fathers, as traced by the pencil of inspired historians, was presented to them; the psalms, which celebrated the mercies and wonders of the Deity, were chanted in their religious assemblies; the record was carefully preserved of predictions which the inspired seers had uttered; in a word, the oracles of God were intrusted to them. It is not improbable that Esdras collected together all the sacred books which were to be found; but it is utterly unlikely that he undertook to seal the collection, as if God had bound himself to add no new manifestation of his Spirit. Josephus, indeed, assigns as a reason why the works subsequently written did not obtain the same high degree of veneration, that the succession of prophets was not maintained; but the testimony and judgment of the Jewish historian can scarcely be deemed conclusive whilst the books themselves afford intrinsic evidence of the outpouring of the Divine Spirit, and our Lord himself warrants us in believing a succession of prophetic teachers down to John.* Certain it is that the books in question were received with high reverence among the Hellenistic Jews, of whom a hundred and twenty thousand lived at Alexandria under Ptolemæus Philadelphus. The Greek version of the Scriptures, called the Septuagint, is believed to have been made for their use; and the books styled Deutero-canonical were composed chiefly for their instruction. During more than three centuries before the coming of Christ the Hebrew language had declined, and Chaldean and Greek had become familiar even to the Jews of Palestine, whilst their brethren scattered abroad lost almost all knowledge of their ancient tongue. Together with the version of the Hebrew books, they kept the more recent works written in Chaldean or in Greek, read them in their religious assemblies, and bound them up in the same collection, as Beveredge testifies, — “publice legi, et eodem quo libri vere

* Matt. xi. 13.

θεόπνευστοι volumine scribi solebant." Walton, in the Prolegomena to his Polyglot, states that they passed from the Hellenistic Jews to the Christian Church.

The Jews of Palestine, who were not so well acquainted with most of these works as their brethren of Alexandria, seemed to cling more exclusively to the Hebrew books, which came down to them with the seal of venerable antiquity. By a special mode of counting them, they discovered a conformity in number to the twenty-two letters of their alphabet, and scrupled to admit any more, as if God had bound himself to limit the number of inspired works to that of the Hebrew alphabet! Josephus did not disdain to notice this fancy, which has served to many as a pretext for rejecting the Deutero-canonical books.

The earliest Christian writers, Barnabas, Clemens Romanus, Polycarp, Irenæus, freely quoted these books as Scripture, in the same manner as the other books. Several passages from Wisdom are found in the celebrated letter of Clemens to the Corinthians, which was for a long series of years read publicly in the churches, in testimony of its great excellence. He dwelt especially on the heroism of Judith, the subject of one of these books. St. Polycarp warns the Philippians "not to procrastinate when it is in their power to do good," enforcing the admonition by the words of Tobias, "Alms deliver from death." St. Irenæus uses the words of Wisdom,—"The just shall shine like the sun in the sight of their Father." He quotes a passage of Baruch as of Jeremias, with whom he was often identified, because he was his scribe; he numbers Tobias among the prophets; and in other instances he employs these books as sacred Scripture. Hippolytus Romanus, Arnobius Lactantius, Julius Maternus Finnicus, and Phæbadius, writers of the third and fourth centuries, are brought forward by Vincenzi as witnesses of the acknowledged authority of those books, which they quote in the same manner as the other inspired writings. These establish satisfactorily the primitive tradition of the Church, which included them in the canon.

We cannot deny that some mist of doubt was raised by the well-meant zeal of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who, in the decline of the second century, undertook a journey to Palestine to ascertain what books were commonly received as inspired by the Jews of those parts. The omission of

the books known chiefly to their brethren of Alexandria was calculated to perplex the minds of those who might not be fully informed of the Apostolic tradition on the subject; and the distinction, being once made, was observed by many with a view to mark those books whose authority might be urged successfully against the Jews. Most, if not all, of the fathers who admitted this distinction quoted the works at other times as Divine Scripture, which warrants us in interpreting their statements elsewhere in harmony with the general tradition, whereof they themselves furnish evidence. The books continued to be read publicly in the churches, as had been customary from time immemorial, and to be quoted as of Divine authority.

Origen, in his commentary on the first Psalm, expressly states that he gives the Hebrew canon, without at all intimating that he denies the authority of the books which are not contained in it. His sentiments on this subject admit of no ambiguity, since throughout his works he cites them as Holy Scripture. To mention only one passage in his third book against Celsus (cap. 72), he quotes, as a definition given in the Divine Word, a passage from Wisdom, vii. 25. The curious may find numerous quotations from his works in the learned treatise of the Roman Professor. His letter to Africanus, who was somewhat perplexed by the omission of the history of Susanna, and other facts, in the Hebrew text of Daniel, shows his unwillingness to regulate the Christian Scriptures by Jewish authority. He asks indignantly, — “Did not Providence, which gave the sacred Scriptures to the Christian churches for their edification, take care that they should be incorrupt?”

Eusebius, as an historian, stated after others the Hebrew canon, but he himself freely used the Deutero-canonical books, as Divine Scripture, to prove the coming of Christ. Thus he quotes “the Divine words” of Baruch, in his *Evangelical Demonstration*, Lib. VI. cap. 19. He also quotes as Scripture the prayer of Susanna (Lib. VI. cap. 1, *Præp. Evang.*), and numbers among the prophecies a passage of Wisdom (Lib. X. cap. 14.)

Hilary of Poitiers, following Origen, gave the Hebrew canon in his Preface to the Psalms, but certainly without meaning to detract from the authority of the other books, which he expressly quoted as Divine Scripture. Thus, on Psalm cxxv. he quotes as witnesses the Three Children sing-

ing in the furnace, Daniel in the lion's den, Eleazar faithful to the law despite of his persecutors, and the seven Macchabees with their mother, martyrs, who gave thanks to God when suffering unheard-of torments. He quotes the words of Wisdom, as of a prophet, Psalm cxviii. He employs the testimony of Susanna against the Arians, and quotes the prophetic words of Wisdom and of Baruch, to enforce the Divine doctrine against the Arians (*De Trin.*, Lib. I. et V.) The son of Sirach is also brought forward by him, and the language of the martyr Macchabee is addressed to the impious Emperor Constantius. "From his testimony," to use the words of the Reviewer, "we may perceive in what estimation the Apocrypha [Deuterocanonical writings] were held in the western part of the Roman Empire." Catholics and Arians alike acknowledged their Divine inspiration.

Epiphanius of Salamis "does not sanction," if we believe the Reviewer, "a single book of the Apocrypha," because, forsooth, he gives the Hebrew canon, and explains how the Jews contrive to make twenty-seven books count as twenty-two, in order to suit the number of letters in their alphabet! Yet he quotes Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, and the Canticle of the Three Children, as Divine Scripture. (*In Ancorato*, cap. 12, *et contra Basilidianos* *Hær.* VI. cap. 6, et Lib. II. *contra Origenem* *Hær.* XLIV. cap. 36.) He recites the history of Susanna, alleges the prophecy of Baruch, numbers Judith among the prophetesses, and extols the seven martyr Macchabees.

Jerome is the last hope of the Reviewer. He indeed states that the Church does not receive those books among the canonical Scriptures, or use them for the establishment of doctrine, although she reads them for the edification of the faithful. This can imply no more than that as yet no solemn definition of their canonical authority had been pronounced. He, however, translated the book of Judith, because it was on record that the Nicene Council had numbered it among the Sacred Scriptures, incidentally we suppose, rather than by an express declaration. He yielded to the request of some prelates, who urged him to translate Tobias, judging it right to gratify Christian bishops, although he should thereby incur the censure of haughty Pharisees. When blamed by Ruffinus for rejecting the portions of Daniel and Esther which were wanting in the

Hebrew text, he repelled the charge as a calumny, and alleged that he had stated the objections of the Jews, rather than his own sentiments. In fact, he expressly quotes *Ecclesiasticus* as Divine Scripture.*

We could multiply quotations, furnished us by Vincenzi and other authors, besides many which we ourselves have culled from the orthodox fathers, which prove that the Divine inspiration of those books was admitted even by those writers who, as critics or historians, gave the Hebrew canon. If any spoke of them with reserve, or quoted them less frequently, it was because they could not safely be urged against the Jews, or because their authority had not been solemnly defined and proclaimed. They were everywhere read in the churches, and "listened to," as St. Augustine testifies, "by all Christians, from the bishops down to the humblest of the faithful laity, by penitents and catechumens, with the veneration due to Divine authority."† This illustrious father strongly insisted that the Christian canon should not be regulated by that of the Jews of Palestine, since the Church of Christ was led into all truth by the Spirit given for her guidance. "We must not omit those books which we know to have been written before the coming of Christ, and which are received by the Church of the Saviour himself, although they be not received by the Jews."‡

If any one wish for an unprejudiced and early witness of the regard which was had to the books in question, let him take in hand the works of St. Cyprian, who quotes them indiscriminately with the other Divine Scriptures, and expressly designates them as words of prophecy and inspiration. The writings of Chrysostom, Ambrose, Basil, will answer the same purpose.

The irreverence with which even Episcopalians speak of these books is contrary to the language, not only of the Homilies, but even of the Articles, which acknowledge them to be serviceable "for example of life and instruction of manners." Every one who reads the books of *Ecclesiasticus* and *Wisdom* must confess that they abound with lessons of virtue. They are, however, commended to our reverence by higher considerations, since they contain re-

* *Ep.* XXXIV. *ad Julian.*

† *De Præd. Sanct.*, cap. XVI.

‡ *In Speculo.*

and bear intrinsic characters of inspiration far more striking than many books of the Hebrew canon; so that he who casts them aside irreverently incurs a fearful responsibility.

ART. IV. — *Conscience and the Constitution, with Remarks on the Recent Speech of the Hon. Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States on the Subject of Slavery.* By MOSES STUART. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1850. 8vo. pp. 119.

PROFESSOR STUART appears to have written this heavy pamphlet from patriotic motives, with an earnest desire to allay the uncalled for popular agitation on the subject of negro slavery, and to contribute his share towards the maintenance of domestic peace, and the preservation of the Union. His chief purpose appears to have been to remove the scruples of some of his friends, by showing that a man may with a good conscience support the Federal Constitution although it recognizes slavery, and requires the slave escaping into a non-slaveholding State to be given up on the demand of his owner; and though he is no great proficient in moral theology, and his style is prolix, prosy, and at times even garrulous, he has shown this to the satisfaction of all but mere factionists and cavillers.

We do not think that the learned Professor has made out his case as conclusively as he might have done. He is a man of respectable ability and attainments, but not remarkable for the strength or acuteness of his logical powers. He makes now and then a slip, of which an uncandid critic might take advantage. He is strongly opposed to slavery, but wishes at the same time to prove that the Christian may with a good conscience be a slave-holder. In order to prove this, he asserts and proves that slavery is not *malum in se*, and therefore, if a sin at all, it is so only *per accidens*. But in order to justify his inveterate hostility to slavery, he maintains that it is always and everywhere an evil, and excuses the old patriarchs for holding slaves on the ground of invincible ignorance! In the darkness of those early ages men knew and could know

no better! This we need not say is in contradiction to his assertion that slavery is not *malum in se*. But passing over slips of this sort, — somewhat common in all Professor Stuart's writings that have fallen under our notice, and which proceed from that want of intellectual culture and logical discipline so manifest in all Protestant education, — and looking only to the main design and argument of the pamphlet, we can very cheerfully commend it to our Protestant readers.

For ourselves, we need not say, for we have often said it, that we agree with Professor Stuart that slavery is not *malum in se*. We hold that in some cases at least slavery is justifiable, and to the slave even a blessing. To the slave it is always good or evil according as he wills it to be one or the other, or according to the spirit with which he bears it. If he regards it as a penance, and submits to it in a true penitential spirit, it is a blessing to him, a great mercy, — as are on the same condition to every one of us all the sufferings and afflictions of this life. We should covet in this world, not happiness, but suffering, and the more grievous our afflictions, the more should we rejoice and give thanks. Christianity does not teach carnal Judaism, but condemns it, and commands its opposite as the condition of all real good, whether for this world or for that which is to come. To the master, slavery is not an evil, when he does not abuse it; when he has not himself participated in reducing those born free to servitude; when he treats his slaves with kindness and humanity, and faithfully watches over their moral and religious well-being. The relation of master and man, as to the authority of the former and the subjection of the latter, differs in nothing from the relation of father and son while the son is under age, and there is nothing which necessarily makes the relation less advantageous to either party in the one case than in the other.

That slavery as it exists in our Southern States is for the most part an evil, we do not doubt; but it is so accidentally, not necessarily. The evil is not in the relation of slavery itself, but in the fact that the great body of the masters do not bring up their slaves in the Church of God, and train or suffer them to be trained to observe the precepts of the Divine law. The mass of the slaves in this country grow up in heresy or heathenism, to the everlasting destruction of their souls. Here is the evil we see and

deplore,—an evil, however, which none but Catholics do or can feel with much vividness. It is an evil which does not and cannot weigh much with Protestants, for the slaves are in general as little heathen and as orthodox as their masters. If the masters were good Catholics, as they ought to be, and are under the condemnation of God for not being, and brought up, as they are bound to do, their slaves in the belief and practice of the Catholic religion, there would be no evil in negro slavery to disturb us. The only evils we see in it are moral and spiritual, inseparable from heresy and heathenism. The physical and sentimental evils, or pretended evils, about which Abolitionists and philanthropists keep up such a clamor do not move us in the least. We place not the slightest value on what the men of this world call liberty, and we are taught by religion that poverty and suffering are far more enviable than riches and sensual enjoyment.

But conceding the evil of slavery as it exists in this country, it is far from certain that it is an evil that would be mitigated by emancipation, or that emancipation would not be even a greater evil. The negroes are here, and here they must remain. This is a "fixed fact." Taking the American people as they are, and as they are likely to be for some time to come, with their strong Anglo-Saxon pride, Anglo-Saxon prejudices, and Anglo-Saxon devotion to material interests, and hatred or disregard of Christian truth and morals, it is clear to us that the condition of the negro as a slave is far less evil than would be his condition as a freedman. The freed negroes amongst us are as a body, to say the least, no less immoral and heathen than the slaves themselves. They are the pests of our Northern cities, especially since they have come under the protection of our philanthropists. With a few honorable exceptions, they are a low, degraded, filthy set, steeped in vice and overflowing with crime. Even in our own city, almost at the moment we write, they are parading our streets in armed bands, for the avowed purpose of resisting the execution of the laws. Let loose some two or three millions like them, now held in slavery, and there would be no living in the American community. Give them freedom and the right to vote in our elections, and the whole country would be at the mercy of the lowest and most worthless of our demagogues. With only Prot-

estantism, indifferentism, infidelity, or savage fanaticism to restrain them, all their base and disorderly passions would be unchained, and our community would be little else than a hell upon earth. No; before we talk of emancipation, before we can venture upon it with the least conceivable advantage to the slaves, we must train them, and the American people also, to habits of self-denial and moral virtue under the regimen of the Catholic Church, which alone has power to subdue the barbarous elements of our nature, and to enable men of widely different races, complexions, and characteristics to live together in the bonds of peace and brotherhood. We cannot, therefore, agree with Professor Stuart in his demand for emancipation, and we are decidedly opposed, for the present at least, not only to the fanatical proceedings set on foot by our miserable Abolitionists and philanthropists to effect emancipation, but to emancipation itself. In the present state of things, emancipation would be a greater evil than slavery, and of two evils we are bound to choose the least. We have heard enough of liberty and the rights of man; it is high time to hear something of the duties of men and the rights of authority.

We write deliberately, and are prepared for all the obloquy which may be showered upon us for what we write. The cry of liberty has gone forth; we, as well as others, have heard it; it has gone forth and been echoed and re-echoed from every quarter, till the world has become mad-dened with it. The voice of law, of order, of wisdom, of justice, of truth, of experience, of common sense, is drowned in the tumultuous shouts of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity! — shouts fit, in the sense they are uttered, only for assembled demons declaring war upon the Eternal God. But this should be our shame, not our boast. It ought not to be, and, if the world is to continue, must soon cease. Society cannot subsist where the rights of authority are forgotten, and loyalty and obedience are foresworn. There is no use in multiplying words on the subject. Man is a social being, and cannot live without society; society is impracticable and inconceivable without government; and government is impossible where its right to command is denied, or the obligation to obey it is not recognized. It is of the essence of government to restrain, and a government that imposes no restraint, that leaves every one free

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to do whatever seemeth right in his own eyes, is no government at all. The first want of every people is strong and efficient government,— a regularly constituted authority, that has the right and the power to enforce submission to its will. No matter what the form of your government, no matter in whose hands the power is lodged, — in the hands of the king, of the lords, or the commons,— it must, in so far as government at all, be sovereign, clothed, under God, with supreme authority, and be respected as such, or society is only Bedlam without its keeper.

This is the great truth the American people, in their insane clamor about the rights of man and the largest liberty, that is to say, full license to every man, lose sight of, or in reality deny; and it is on this truth, not on liberty, for which all are crying out, that it is necessary now to insist, both in season and out of season. There may be times and countries when and where the true servants of God must seek to restrict the action of government, and lessen the prerogatives of power; but assuredly here and now our duty is not to clamor for liberty or emancipation, but to reassert the rights of authority and the majesty of law. You will be decied, if you do so. No doubt of it. But what then? When was it popular to insist on the special truth demanded by one's own age? When was it that one could really serve his age or country without falling under its condemnation? When was it that the multitude were known to applaud him who rebuked them for their errors, exposed to them the dangers into which they were running by following their dominant tendencies, and presented them the truth needed for their salvation? What great or good man ever proposed to himself to serve his fellow-men by following their instincts, flattering their prejudices, and inflaming their passions? Who knows not that error and sin come by nature, and that virtue is achieved only by effort, by violence, by heroic struggle against even ourselves? Is not the hero always a soldier? Let, then, the multitude clamor, let the age denounce, let the wicked rage, let earth and hell do their worst, what care you, heroic soldier of the King of kings? Go forth and meet the enemy. Charge, and charge home, where your Immortal Leader gives the word, and leave the responsibility to him. If you fall, so much the greater glory for you, so much the more certain your victory, and your triumph.

But we are straying from the point we had in mind when we set out. Our purpose was, to offer some remarks on what is termed "the higher law" to which the opponents of the recent Fugitive Slave Law appeal to justify their refusal to execute it. The Hon. Mr. Seward, one of the New York Senators, in the debate in the Senate during the last session of Congress on the Fugitive Slave Bill, refused to vote for the measure, although necessary to carry out an express constitutional provision, on the ground that to give up a fugitive slave is contrary to the law of God; and the Abolitionists and Free Soilers refuse to execute the law, and even in some instances resist its execution, on the same ground. When the honorable Senator appealed from the Constitution to the law of God, as a higher law, he was told by the advocates of the bill, that, having just taken his oath to support the Constitution, he had debarred himself from the right, while retaining his seat in the Senate, to appeal from it to any law requiring him to act in contravention of its provisions. The Abolitionists and Free Soilers immediately concluded from this that the advocates of the bill denied the reality of any law higher than the Constitution, and their papers and periodicals teem with articles and essays to prove the supremacy of the law of God. The question is one of no little gravity, and, to our Protestant friends, of no little perplexity. We may, therefore, be allowed to devote a few pages to its consideration.

We agree entirely with Mr. Seward and his Abolition and Free Soil friends, as to the fact that there is a higher law than the Constitution. The law of God is supreme, and overrides all human enactments, and every human enactment incompatible with it is null and void from the beginning, and cannot be obeyed with a good conscience, for "we must obey God rather than men." This is the great truth statesmen and lawyers are extremely prone to overlook, which the temporal authority not seldom practically denies, and on which the Church never fails to insist. This truth is so frequently denied, so frequently outraged, that we are glad to find it asserted by Mr. Seward and his friends, even though they assert it in a case and for a purpose in which we do not and cannot sympathize with them.

But the concession of the fact of a higher law than

the Constitution does not of itself justify the appeal to it against the Constitution, either by Mr. Seward or the opponents of the Fugitive Slave Law. Mr. Seward had no right, while holding his seat in the Senate under the Constitution, to appeal to this higher law against the Constitution, because that was to deny the very authority by which he held his seat. The Constitution, if repugnant to the law of God, is null and void, is without authority, and as Mr. Seward held his seat by virtue of its authority, he could have no authority for holding his seat, after having declared it to be null and void. This is an inconvenience he does not appear to have considered. The principle that would have justified his refusal to obey the Constitution would have deprived him of his seat as a Senator. Moreover, the question of the compatibility or incompatibility of the Constitution with the law of God was a question for him to raise and settle before taking his senatorial oath. Could he conscientiously swear to support the Constitution? If he could, he could not afterwards refuse to carry out any of its imperative provisions, on the ground of its being contrary to the higher law; for he would in swearing to support the Constitution declare in the most solemn manner in his power, that in his belief at least it imposed upon him no duty contrary to his duty to God, since to swear to support a constitution repugnant to the Divine law is to take an unlawful oath, and to swear with the deliberate intention of not keeping one's oath is to take a false oath. After having taken his oath to support the Constitution, the Senator had, so far as himself was concerned, settled the question, and it was no longer for him an open question. In calling God to witness his determination to support the Constitution, he had called God to witness his conviction of the compatibility of the Constitution with the law of God, and therefore left himself no plea for appealing from it to a higher law. If he discovered the incompatibility of the imperative provisions of the Constitution only after having taken his oath, he was bound from that moment to resign his seat. In any view of the case, therefore, we choose to take, Mr. Seward was not and could not be justified in appealing to a law above the Constitution against the Constitution while he retained his seat under it and remained bound by his oath to support it.

It is then perfectly easy to condemn the appeal of the Senator, without, as Abolitionists and Free Soilers pretend, falling into the monstrous error of denying the supremacy of the Divine law, and maintaining that there is no law above the Constitution.

What we have said is conclusive against the honorable Senator from New York, but it does not precisely apply to the case of those who resist or refuse to obey the Fugitive Slave Law now that it has been passed. These persons take the ground that the law of God is higher than any human law, and therefore we can in no case be bound to obey a human law that is in contravention of it. Such a law is a violence rather than a law, and we are commanded by God himself to resist it, at least passively. All this is undeniable in the case of every human enactment that really does command us to act contrary to the law of God. To this we hold, as firmly as man can hold to any thing, and to this every Christian is bound to hold even unto death. This is the grand principle held by the old martyrs, and therefore they chose martyrdom rather than obedience to the state commanding them to act contrary to the Divine law. But who is to decide whether a special civil enactment be or be not repugnant to the law of God? Here is a grave and a perplexing question for those who have no Divinely authorized interpreter of the Divine law. The Abolitionists and Free Soilers, adopting the Protestant principle of private judgment, claim the right to decide each for himself. But this places the individual above the state, private judgment above the law, and is wholly incompatible with the simplest conception of civil government. No civil government can exist, none is conceivable even, where every individual is free to disobey its orders whenever they do not happen to square with his private convictions of what is the law of God. The principle of private judgment, adopted by Protestants in religious matters, it is well known, has destroyed for them the church as an authoritative body, and put an end to every thing like ecclesiastical authority; transferred to civil matters, it would equally put an end to the state, and abolish all civil authority, and establish the reign of anarchy or license. Clearly, if government is to be retained, and to govern, the right to decide when a civil enactment does or does

not conflict with the law of God cannot be lodged in the individual subject. Where then shall it be lodged? In the state? Then are you bound to absolute obedience to any and every law the state may enact; you make the state supreme, absolute, and deny your own principle of a higher law than the civil law. You have then no appeal from the state, and no relief for conscience, which is absolute civil despotism. Here is a sad dilemma for our uncatholic countrymen, which admirably demonstrates the unsuitableness of Protestant principles for practical life. If they assert the principle of private judgment in order to save individual liberty, they lose government and fall into anarchy. If they assert the authority of the state in order to save government, they lose liberty and fall under absolute civil despotism, and it is an historical fact that the Protestant world perpetually alternates between civil despotism and unbridled license, and after three hundred years of experimenting finds itself as far as ever from solving the problem, how to reconcile liberty and authority. Strange that men do not see that the solution must be sought in God, not in man! Alas! reformers make a sad blunder when they reject the Church instituted by God himself for the express purpose of interpreting his law, — the only protector of the people, on the one hand, against despotism, and of government, on the other, against license!

But the people cannot avail themselves of their own blunder to withdraw themselves from their obligation to obey the laws. Government itself is a Divine ordinance, is ordained of God. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation." We do not say that all the acts of government are ordained of God; for if we did, we could not assert the reality of a law higher than that of the state, and should be forced to regard every civil enactment as a precept of the Divine law. In ordinary government, God does not ordain obedience to all and every of its acts, but to those only of its acts which come within the limits of his own law. He does not make civil government the supreme and infallible organ of his will on earth, and therefore it

may err, and contravene his will; and when and where it does, its acts are null and void. But government itself, as civil authority, is a Divine ordinance, and, within the law of God, clothed with the right to command and to enforce obedience. No appeal, therefore, from any act of government, which in principle denies the Divine right of government, or which is incompatible with the assertion and maintenance of civil authority, can be entertained. Since government as civil authority is an ordinance of God, and as such the Divine law, any course of action, or the assertion of any principle of action, incompatible with its existence as government, is necessarily forbidden by the law of God. The law of God is always the equal of the law of God, and can never be in conflict with itself. Consequently no appeal against government as civil authority to the law of God is admissible, because the law of God is as supreme in any one of its enactments as in another.

Now it is clear that Mr. Seward and his friends, the Abolitionists and Free Soilers, have nothing to which they can appeal from the action of government but their private interpretation of the law of God, that is to say, their own private judgment or opinion as individuals; for it is notorious that they are good Protestants, holding the pretended right of private judgment, and rejecting all authorized interpretation of the Divine law. To appeal from the government to private judgment is to place private judgment above public authority, the individual above the state, which, as we have seen, is incompatible with the very existence of government, and therefore, since government is a Divine ordinance, absolutely forbidden by the law of God, — that very higher law invoked to justify resistance to civil enactments. Here is an important consideration, which condemns, on the authority of God himself, the pretended right of private judgment, the grossest absurdity that ever entered the heads of men outside of Bedlam, and proves that, in attempting to set aside on its authority a civil enactment, we come into conflict not with the human law only, but also with the law of God itself. No man can ever be justifiable in resisting the civil law under the pretence that it is repugnant to the Divine law, when he has only his private judgment, or, what is the same thing, his private interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, to tell him what the Divine law is on

the point in question, because the principle on which he would act in doing so would be repugnant to the very existence of government, and therefore in contravention of the ordinance, therefore of the law, of God.

Man's prime necessity is society, and the prime necessity of society is government. The question, whether government shall or shall not be sustained, is at bottom only the question, whether the human race shall continue to subsist or not. Man is essentially a social being, and cannot live without society, and society is inconceivable without government. Extinguish government, and you extinguish society; extinguish society, and you extinguish man. Inasmuch as God has created and ordained the existence of the human race, he has founded and ordained government, and made it absolutely obligatory on us to sustain it, to refrain in principle and action from whatever would tend to destroy it, or to render its existence insecure. They who set aside or resist the Fugitive Slave Law on the ground of its supposed repugnance to the law of God are, then, no more justifiable than we have seen was the honorable Senator from New York. In no case can any man ever be justified in setting aside or resisting a civil enactment, save on an authority higher than his own and that of the government. This higher authority is not recognized by the Abolitionists and Free Soilers; they neither have nor claim to have any such authority to allege; consequently, they are bound to absolute submission to the civil authority, not only in the case of the Fugitive Slave Law, but in every case, however repugnant such submission may be to their private convictions and feelings, or what they call their conscience, for conscience itself is respectable only when it is authorized by the law of God, or is in conformity with it.

That this is civil despotism, that is, the assertion of the absolute supremacy of the state, we do not deny; but that is not our fault. If men, by rejecting the Divinely authorized interpreter of the law of God, voluntarily place themselves in such a condition that they have no alternative but either civil despotism or resistance to the ordinance of God, the fault is their own. They must expect to reap what they sow. They were warned betimes, but they would heed no warning; they would have their own way; and if they now find that their own way leads to death, they have only themselves to blame. It is not we who

advocate despotism, but they who render it inevitable for themselves, if they wish to escape the still greater evil of absolute license. As Catholics we wash our hands of the consequences which they cannot escape, and which any man with half an eye might have seen would necessarily follow the assertion of the absurd and ridiculous, not to say blasphemous, principle of private judgment. We have never been guilty of the extreme folly of proclaiming that principle, and of superinducing the necessity of asserting civil despotism as the only possible relief from anarchy. We are able to assert liberty without undermining authority, and authority without injury to liberty; for we have been contented to let God himself be our teacher and our legislator, instead of weak, erring, vain, and capricious men, facetiously ycleped *reformers*. As Catholics, we were not among those who undertook to improve an Infinite Wisdom, and to reform the institutions of the Almighty. We are taught by a Divinely authorized Teacher, that government is the ordinance of God, and that we are to respect and obey it as such in all things not repugnant to the law of God; and we have an authority higher than its, higher than our own, to tell us, without error or the possibility of error,—because by Divine assistance and protection rendered infallible,—when the acts of government conflict with the law of God, and it becomes our duty to resist the former in obedience to the latter. Civil authority is respected and obeyed when respected and obeyed in all things it has from God the right to do or command; and liberty is preserved inviolate when nothing can be exacted from us in contravention of the Divine law, and we are free to disobey the prince when he commands us to violate the law of God. We then do and can experience none of the perplexity which is experienced by our uncatholic countrymen. We have an infallible Church to tell us when there is a conflict between the human law and the Divine, to save us from the necessity, in order to get rid of despotism, of asserting individualism, which is the denial of all government, and, in order to get rid of individualism, of asserting civil despotism, that is, the supremacy of the state, the grave of all freedom. We have never to appeal to the principle of despotism nor to the principle of anarchy. We have always a public authority, which, as it is inerrable, can never be oppressive,

to guide and direct us, and if we resist the civil law, it is only in obedience to a higher law, clearly and distinctly declared by a public authority higher than the individual, and higher than the state. Our readers, therefore, will not accuse us of advocating civil despotism, which we abhor, because we show that they who reject God's Church, and assert private judgment, have no alternative but despotism or license. They are, as Protestants, under the necessity of being slaves and despots, not we who are Catholics. We enjoy, and we alone enjoy, the glorious prerogative of being at once freemen and loyal subjects.

There is no principle on which the Abolitionists and Free Soilers can justify their resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law. They cannot appeal to the law of God, for, having no authority competent to declare it, the law of God is for them as if it were not. It is for them a mere unmeaning word, or meaning only their private or individual judgment, which is no law at all, and if it were would at best be only a human, and the lowest conceivable human law. The highest human law is unquestionably the law of the state, as the state is the highest human authority conceivable. No appeal can then lie from the state to another human authority, least of all to the individual; for appeals do not go downwards, do not lie from the higher to the lower, as ultra democracy would seem to imply. The highest conceivable human authority has passed the law in question, and in so doing has declared it compatible with the law of God; and as its opponents have only a human authority at best to reverse the judgment of the state, nothing remains for them but to yield it full and loyal obedience.

We have dwelt at length on this point, because it is one of great importance in itself, and because we are anxious to clear away the mists with which it has been surrounded, and to prevent any denial on the one hand, or misapplication on the other, of the great principle of the supremacy of the Divine law. The misapplication of a great principle is always itself a great and dangerous error, and often, perhaps always, leads to the denial of the principle. Mr. Seward and his friends asserted a great and glorious principle, but misapplied it. Their opponents, the friends of the Constitution and the Union, seeing clearly the error of the application, have, in some instances at least, de-

nied the principle itself, and their papers North and South are filled with sneers at *the higher law* doctrine. The one error induces the other, and we hardly know which, under existing circumstances, is the most to be deprecated. Each error favors a dangerous popular tendency of the times. We have spoken of the tendency, under the name of liberty, to anarchy and license; but there is another tendency, under the pretext of authority, to civil despotism, or what has been very properly denominated *Statolatry*, or the worship of the state, that is, elevating the state above the Church, and putting it in the place of God. Both tendencies have the same origin, that is, in the Protestant rejection of the spiritual authority of the Church on the one hand, and the assertion of private judgment on the other; and in fact, both are but the opposite phases or poles of one and the same principle. The two tendencies proceed *pari passu*, and while the one undermines all authority, the other grasps at all powers and usurps all rights, and modern society in consequence is cursed at once with the opposite evils of anarchy and of civil despotism. The cry for liberty abolishes all loyalty, and destroys the principle and the spirit of obedience, while the usurpations of the state leave to conscience no freedom, to religion no independence. The state tramples on the spiritual prerogatives of the Church, assumes to itself the functions of schoolmaster and director of consciences, and the multitude clap their hands, and call it liberty and progress! We see this in the popular demand for state education, and in the joy that the men of the world manifest at the nefarious conduct of the Sardinian government in breaking the faith of treaties and violating the rights of the Church. When it concerns the Church, the supremacy of the state is proclaimed, and when it concerns government or law, then it is individualism that is shouted. Such is our age, our boasted nineteenth century.

Now there is a right and a wrong way of defending the truth, and it is always easier to defend the truth on sound than unsound principles. If men were less blind and headstrong, they would see that the higher law can be asserted without any attack upon legitimate civil authority, and legitimate civil authority and the majesty of the law can be vindicated without asserting the absolute supremacy of the civil power, and falling into statolatry,—

as absurd a species of idolatry as the worship of stocks and stones. The assertion of the higher law, as Abolitionists and Free Soilers make it, without any competent authority to define and declare that law, leads to anarchy and unbridled license, and therefore we are obliged, as we value society, law, order, morality, to oppose them. On the other hand, the denial of the higher law as the condition of opposing them asserts the supremacy in all things of the state, and subjects us in all things unreservedly to the civil power, which is statolatry, and absolute civil despotism. No wise and honest statesman can do either. But—here is the difficulty—the Protestant statesman is obliged to do one or the other, or both, at one moment one, at the next moment the other. This is what we have wished to make plain to the dullest capacity. Protestantism is clearly not adapted to practical life, and its principles are as inapplicable in politics as in religion. There is no practical assertion of true liberty or legitimate authority on Protestant principles, and neither is or can be asserted but as men resort, avowedly or otherwise, to Catholic principles. Hence the reason why we have been unable to discuss the question presented, and give a rational solution of the difficulty, without recurring to our Church. In recurring to her, we have, no doubt, offended the friends of the Constitution and the Union, the party with whom are our sympathies, as much as we have their enemies; but this is no fault of ours, for we cannot go contrary to what God has ordained. He has not seen proper so to constitute society and endow government that they can get on without his Church. She is an integral, an essential element in the constitution of society, and it is madness and folly to think of managing it and securing its well-being without her. She is the solution of all difficulties, and without her none are solvable.

For us Catholics, the Fugitive Slave Law presents no sort of difficulty. We are taught, as we have said, to respect and obey the government as the ordinance of God, in all things not declared by our Church to be repugnant to the Divine law. The law is evidently constitutional, and is necessary to carry out an express and imperative provision of the Constitution, which ordains (Art. IV. Sect. 2), that "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in

consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." This is imperative, and with regard to its meaning there is no disagreement. By this the slaveholders have the right to claim their fugitive slaves in the non-slaveholding States, and the non-slaveholding States are bound to deliver them up, when claimed. For the purpose of carrying out this constitutional provision, Congress passed a law, in 1793, which has proved ineffectual, and it has passed the recent law, more stringent in its provisions, and likely to prove efficient, for the same purpose. We can see nothing in the law contrary to the Constitution, and, as high legal authority has pronounced it constitutional, we must presume it to be so. Nobody really regards it as unconstitutional, and the only special objection to it is,—what is no objection at all,—that it is likely to answer its purpose. Now as the law is necessary to secure the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the Constitution, and as our Church has never decided that to restore a fugitive slave to its owner is *per se* contrary to the law of God, we are bound to obey the law, and could not, without resisting the ordinance of God and purchasing to ourselves damnation, refuse to obey it. This settles the question for us.

As to Protestants who allege that the law is contrary to the law of God, and therefore that they cannot with a good conscience obey it, we have very little in addition to say. There are no principles in common between them and us, on which the question can be decided. We have shown them that they are bound to obey the civil law till they can bring a higher authority than the state, and a higher than their own private judgment, to set it aside as repugnant to the law of God. This higher authority they have not, and therefore for them there is no higher law. Will they allege the Sacred Scriptures? That will avail them nothing till they show that they have legal possession of the Scriptures, and that they are constituted by Almighty God a court with authority to interpret them and declare their sense. As this is what they can never do, we cannot argue the Scriptural question with them. We will only add, that there is no passage in either the Old Testament or the New that declares it repugnant to the law of

God, or law of eternal justice, to deliver up the fugitive slave to his master; and St. Paul sent back, after converting him, the fugitive slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. This is enough; for St. Paul appears to have done more than the recent law of Congress demands; he seems to have sent back the fugitive without being requested to do so by his owner; but the law of Congress only requires the fugitive to be delivered up when claimed by his master. It will not do for those who appeal to the Sacred Scriptures to maintain either that St. Paul was ignorant of the law of God, or that he acted contrary to it. This fact alone concludes the Scriptural question against them.

But we have detained our readers long enough. We have said more than was necessary to satisfy the intelligent and the candid, and reasoning is thrown away upon factionists and fanatics, Abolitionists and philanthropists. There is no question that the country is seriously in danger. What, with the sectionists at the North and the sectionists at the South, with the great dearth of true patriots, and still greater dearth of statesmen, in all sections of the Union, it will go hard but the Union itself receive some severe shocks. Yet we trust in God it will be preserved, although the American people are far from meriting so great a boon. After the humiliation of ourselves, and prayer to God, we see nothing to be done to save the country, but for all the friends of the Union, whether heretofore called Whigs or Democrats, to rally around the Union, and form a grand national party, in opposition to the sectionists, factionists, and fanatics, of all complexions, sorts, and sizes. It is no time now to indulge old party animosities, or to contend for old party organizations. The country is above party, and all who love their country, and wish to save the noble institutions left us by our fathers, should fall into the ranks of one and the same party, and work side by side, and shoulder to shoulder, for the maintenance of the Union and the supremacy of law. We see strong indications that such a party is rapidly forming throughout the country, and we say, let it be formed,—the sooner the better. Let the party take high conservative ground, against all sorts of radicalism and ultraism, and inscribe on its banner, *THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION, AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW*, and it will command the support, we doubt not, of a large majority

of the American people, and deserve and receive, we devoutly hope, the protection of Almighty God, who, we must believe, has after all great designs in this country. Above all, let our Catholic fellow-citizens in this crisis be faithful to their duty, even though they find Mr. Fillmore's administration and our Protestant countrymen madly and foolishly hostile to them; for on the Catholic population, under God, depend the future destinies of these United States. The principles of our holy religion, the prayers of our Church, and the fidelity to their trusts of the Catholic portion of the people, are the only sure reliance left us.

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- ART. V. — 1. *The Decline of Protestantism and its Cause. A Lecture, delivered in St. Patrick's Cathedral, on the Evening of November 10, 1850.* By the Most Rev. JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Archbishop of New York. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 8vo. pp. 28.
2. *Developments of Protestantism, and other Fragments.* Reprinted from the "Dublin Review" and "Tablet." London: Richardson & Son. 1849. 16mo. pp. 166.

THESE remarkable pamphlets indicate the commencement of a new era in the controversy between Catholics and Protestants in Great Britain and this country. Hitherto, in both countries, Catholics have been accustomed to apologize for their religion, and explain away its offensive points, appearing to be content with repelling the calumnies invented against it, and showing that, upon the whole, it can compare advantageously with the best form of Protestantism. These pamphlets, as well as several other recent publications, prove that the day for this is passing away, and that Catholics are beginning to shake off their timidity, to assume in controversy their legitimate position, and to speak in the bold and energetic tones which become them; that, instead of stopping to refute anew objections which have been refuted a thousand times, and to repel calumnies which will be repeated as often as repelled, they are carrying the war into the enemy's country, and compelling Protestantism to defend itself. This is a great and important change of tactics. So long as Prot-

estantism is suffered to act on the offensive, to vent all manner of calumnies, and to urge all manner of objections, and we, simple souls, confine ourselves to the task of merely refuting them, it can maintain the appearance of a formidable opponent, and throw a cloud of dust in the eyes of the ignorant and prejudiced multitude; for it never heeds our refutations of its calumnies and objections, but continues always to repeat them as if we had said and could say nothing against them. But the moment we turn our arms against it, and force it to give an account of itself, its weakness is at once apparent to all the world. It has no ground on which to intrench, and no arms with which to defend itself, except those of the state.

The simple announcement, by such a man as his Grace of New York, of a Lecture on the Decline of Protestantism, together with the cause of that decline, is a pregnant event in the modern religious world, and must strike on the ears of Protestants as the trump of doom, filling their hearts with fear and perplexity. He is not a rash man, disposed hastily to commit himself. No man feels more delicately the pulse of his age and country, or marks more accurately their various tendencies. When such a man, occupying so high a rank in the Church and in society, proclaims in his own cathedral, and before the world, that Protestantism has declined, is declining, and must continue to decline, we may rest assured that such is the fact, the certain and undeniable fact. But he not only proclaims it; he triumphantly proves it, and, if any one wishes for more detailed evidence than he gives, it may be found in the second publication on our list, a work of rare sagacity and intelligence.

The views, facts, and reasonings of these remarkable publications are not precisely new to the readers of this journal, for we have often set them forth, in our humble way; but we are not a little gratified to find them so much more clearly, eloquently, and learnedly expressed than it was in our power to express them, and confirmed by authority so high as that of the Archbishop of New York, and so respectable as that of the learned and philosophical author of the essay on the Developments of Protestantism. Our own position, prior to our conversion, in the more advanced ranks of the Protestant community, gave us facilities for judging of the real character, tenden-

cies, and prospects of Protestantism not enjoyed by every one, and it was only after having proved, philosophically and historically, that it must, in so far as left to follow its own nature, decline into infidelity, heathenism, and absolute nullism, that we ever consented to abandon it. We saw that it had done the best that it could do, that it was incapable of amendment, and that, whatever else might be true or salutary, it in all its forms was false and of evil tendency, good neither for this world nor for that which is to come. We saw that, as a matter of fact, whatever it was in its origin, it had now ceased to bear a religious character; that as a theology it was absurd, as a philosophy ridiculous, as politics, either anarchy and unbridled license or absolute civil despotism; in a word, in so far as it pretended to be any thing more than a low form of heathenism, it was simply what that genuine Protestant Carlyle calls a *sham*. We saw that *Protestant Christianity* was a contradiction in terms, and that we had no alternative, unless we could content ourselves with saying two and two are five, but absolute infidelity or Catholicity. But when we have said so, many have been disposed to discredit us, and to set down our conclusion to our alleged ultraism, or tendency to run to extremes. The publications before us, from men who cannot be accused of the tendencies always falsely laid to our charge, abundantly confirm and triumphantly establish, in a manner at once popular and profound, all that we have contended for, as the following from the Archbishop's Lecture will fully show. The extract is long, but it is to the purpose, and we are happy to enrich our pages with a passage so eloquent and instructive.

“Protestantism began in the year 1517. It had then a solitary representative; and as regards religion, his voice was the only discordant sound that could have been heard in western Christendom. All had been united, all had subsisted in the harmony of one belief; and although scandal existed then, as now, and abuses of individual living were known; and although public and private morals might have furnished much ground for complaint, still, at least there was one ideally perfect, central rallying-point, on which men's minds were united,—the beauty, simplicity, and *Unity* of the faith of the Catholic Church, which God had established for the salvation of men. From this central point the new doctrine took its bearings of direct and indirect antagonism, and spread on every

side. It became the theme of general dispute, and into that dispute were promptly infused projects of political ambition, popular discontent, and every species of human element and of human motive calculated to give impulse to the new principle, which in itself, if it were true, would have been altogether worthy of the admiration of its adherents, and would have been well calculated to spread abroad the doctrine thus introduced and propagated with a rapidity to which there is no such thing as a parallel in the history of the Christian Church, or in the annals of the human race. From Wittenberg it spread throughout Northern Germany. It reached, in a different form however, the Cantons of Switzerland. It penetrated the empire of France. It took possession of Prussia. It pervaded Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England, and Scotland. It conquered them all; — and it met a successful resistance only on the western borders of Europe. The Irish nation stood together against it, and struggled with constancy, perseverance, and determination; and although the battle has lasted for three hundred years, and although that down-trodden nation has suffered intensely for its adherence to principle, still it has not given way to Protestantism. I cannot consider this as altogether the result of chance, for I can almost persuade myself that God in his providence permitted that there should be one western border of Europe upon which the eye of the pilgrim to this *free* hemisphere should rest for the last time, as upon Catholic soil, and that he should thus continue to cherish the old associations of the Holy Catholic Faith, by which all Europe had been, and the rest of the world might, finally, be emancipated from barbarism and infidelity.

“What is very remarkable is, that Protestantism should have made such progress in so short a time; — that, within fifty years from its origin, it should have conquered and taken possession of every inch of ground, of which it is in possession at this day; so that an old man of 1567 could see Protestantism triumphant in all the nations I have mentioned, and look back to the memory of boyhood, when he knew Brother Martin Luther, a pious monk, as Macaulay remarks, or what is nearly the same, remembered him, the young father of Protestantism, a fugitive from the laws of his country, seeking and happily finding a safe hiding-place in the suburbs of some obscure German village.

“O, how Protestantism must have been surprised, astounded, and overwhelmed at the immensity and variety of the spoils, into the possession of which it so speedily entered! Yesterday it was proscribed; to-day it is master of kingdoms, thrones, armies, provinces, treasures, and the accumulated religious and charitable offerings of Catholic generations for a thousand years! It came rapidly into the possession of what it had never labored to create; it reaped where it had never sown; and the toil of the husband-

man, who had cultivated the soil before, accrued to the benefit of his adversary, and was unrewarded. It found itself in possession not only of these, but of the Catholic churches,—and when I say Catholic churches, you will not understand me to mean such churches as we in our cold charity and poverty have been able to erect, but those great churches that were projected on a magnificent scale, and in the spirit of an age that religion had inspired, when acres were taken into the plan, after the Catholic forefathers of the Protestant occupants of all this ecclesiastical wealth, from age to age, had been making their offerings at the shrine of the one Church:—temples, not perhaps esteemed as worthy of God; but, at all events, such palaces, so to call them, for the veiled presence of Divine majesty and mercy among men, as might indicate at least to all time, *their* gratitude towards their merciful Creator and Redeemer. Protestantism took possession of them all, and found them so vast that it never has been able since to fill them with worshippers. The congregations of many of them now assemble in the choir, a part of the church which had been exclusively set apart for the clergy. And not alone the churches, but the universities, with all their endowments and benefices as depositaries of learning. All, all, passed promptly into the hands of Protestantism.

“I make these statements to show how little Protestantism has accomplished compared with the immensity of its means. If Protestantism had been what it professed to be, it found itself almost by surprise put in possession of the means wherewithal to carry its triumphs to the ends of the earth. The Church of Christ itself, the Catholic Church, was for three hundred years obliged to dwell in the Catacombs of Rome, not daring, or scarcely daring, to show itself; and when it did, it was with a prospect of martyrdom; but Protestantism seized upon a large portion of the wealth of Christendom, and became the master of kings and armies, senates and nations, universities and churches, and every thing that Catholics had, in the gradual accumulation of their charities for ages, contributed to erect for civilization and religion.

“We will now, therefore, regard Protestantism in its purpose. What was its mission? Its mission, according to its own statements, was to renovate a faded, fallen, and false Christianity. Its mission was to introduce a pure and perfect religion, as a substitute for that ‘apostate church,’ as it called the Catholic faith, from which itself went forth; and if this were its purpose, we should suppose it would take *certain* grounds in reference to its mission; for if it were conscious of the possession of truth, if it really believed it had now taken the form in which God would have the world to be saved, it was bound to propagate itself, to make itself known, to speak in a consistent, uniform, and unequivocal lan-

guage, so that it might accomplish, in time, something like what the pretendedly faded Church had indisputably accomplished, in its time before.

"Two things particularly it was bound to accomplish. One was, to convert pagan nations and Catholic nations; and the other was, to preserve itself: for, if it lost itself, in attempting to gain others, it would show that it was not what it pretended to be, but something not having that light and truth of which God is the author.

"I should perhaps attempt a definition of what Protestantism is. I have looked into the expositions of its most prominent advocates, but among them all I have sought in vain for any thing like a scientific or logical definition; nor can I conceive it possible to give such a definition of the word Protestantism. However, I will take it in the fairest light of which it is susceptible, and endeavour to give a definition by the elements of which it is composed. I take it that Protestantism is a general term, indicating that an individual accepting it explicitly protests against the Catholic Church in the first instance, but implicitly against all ecclesiastical authority; and claims, on the other hand, the right of taking the Holy Scriptures, reading them for himself, and taking the meaning and light which they reflect upon his mind as the religion of Christ. I am aware that, in order to determine its decline or progress, it is expedient that we should fix upon what was understood by Protestantism at the period to which I refer. I will therefore take the period of 1567, when Protestantism was comprised under three great divisions:—the Lutheran, the Calvinistic, and the Anglican; and, looking at the symbolical books of that period, it is to be understood as comprising two elements, one negative, the other positive. There is one aspect of the decline of Protestantism which can afford no comfort to the most-ardent adherent of the Catholic Church, and that aspect is seen in the tendency of Protestantism to rationalism and infidelity. Protestantism comprised, originally, a great number of the primitive truths of Christianity. These truths were doctrines which the first separation from us did not prevent Protestants from carrying forth with them; I mean the great mysteries of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation of the Saviour, the Redemption by the Son of God, Original Sin, the Holy Eucharist, with or without the belief of the Real Presence, and others, sanctioned in Christ's Church. These were the *positive* doctrines embodied in their symbolical books; while Prayers for the Departed, Transubstantiation, the Intercession of Saints, and so many other doctrines that had been the faith of Christendom, were excluded and cut off, and this formed the *negative* phase. You have, therefore, these two principles; and beyond these I cannot pretend to define what Protestantism is:—for if you pass from the generic title to the specific variety, and trace out its development from one

denomination to another, down to the latest phase of human error, you will find in them all these two elements, — this and this, no ; and this and this, yes. They all vary, and yet all profess to be guided by their own private interpretation of the Scriptures alone, while all agree in protesting against the Church of God. All of them protest against every species of authority, and all of them, still, retain some of the prominent and positive doctrines of the Christian Church, which become a test of religious association and a special ground of communion. We cannot, therefore, at this day, but regret that what was positive in those times has ceased in a great measure to exist in the Protestantism of the present day ; but if it once included all these fundamental doctrines, how great has been its decline on the side of Latitudinarianism ! I have written for this lecture perhaps some fifteen or twenty pages of authorities alone, and I have been obliged to put them all aside, because, if I should attempt the labor of quoting authorities, to make thorough work of it, I should have to occupy my whole time with them. But then what authorities should I have had to quote ? Why the authorities of Protestant writers, some calling themselves by one denomination and some by another ; but all of them showing the actual condition to which Protestantism has been reduced, on the very fields of its first and most astonishing triumphs. Do you speak of Germany ? In Germany, the doctrines regarding the Trinity are held, if held at all, only by the uneducated and ignorant ; but as for your preachers in the pulpit, as for your doctors of theology, and great men of every department, they have no conception of any such belief. Rationalism has taken the place of Protestantism, although men still claim the name, from the meaning and purport of which they have so widely departed. Do you speak of the facts usually referred to in proof of Christianity, the miracles, for instance, recorded in the Holy Scriptures ? They explain them all away. They apply the dreamy analogies of Mesmerism to the works of the Redeemer, and pretend, among other cases, that the man stricken with palsy was cured by Christ, because he had a deep insight into human nature, and knew the power of imagination, when he took the palsied man by the hand, fixed his eye upon him, and effected a cure. This is their explanation of Scripture ; and yet they are enjoying the emoluments of Protestantism, which were originally provided, in one form or another, for the support of the Catholic clergy, but which are now transferred to modern Protestantism, the principles of which are sapping and undermining the vital doctrines of Christianity in such a manner, that in a short time you shall see their dominions a wilderness of Paganism, and made all the more terrible because their inhabitants have been civilized.

“ Do you go to Switzerland, where Calvin established Protestant-

ism, and kept alive for a time the doctrine of the Trinity? In Geneva, if they have a patron saint, it is not John Calvin, but Jean Jacques Rousseau. His sentiments are the prevailing sentiments of those who call themselves Christians, and they are preached from the very pulpit from which the great father of that stern sect of Protestants once uttered his subtle but desperate scheme of predestination. In his day, if a man in Geneva professed disbelief in the Trinity, he ran the risk of capital punishment. But now, how changed! If a man in that city, at the present day, professes to believe in the Trinity, as Calvin believed it, he will not be burned to death,—he will only be laughed at!

“Go to France. The condition of Protestantism is nearly, if not quite, similar. Travellers tell us, that the temples there represent but a mockery of a memory of a departed creed;—that they are chill and dark, and that their preachers, if they speak of Christianity at all, speak in the rationalistic language of Germany.

“Go to Sweden; and all again is cold and stiff as iron; although the government holds dominion, and freedom of conscience, as we understand it, is unknown. There is, it is true, an apparent conformity to established forms in this and other northern states of Europe, which might deceive; but the explanation is, that the civil power will not tolerate any other outward forms of religion. We read, for instance, but the other day, of a painter, and a man of genius, inspired by the enthusiasm of what is warm and beautiful in art; and who, whether from this or from some higher impulse, wished to become, and did become, a Catholic;—whereupon he was banished from his native land, and all his property confiscated.

“Let us pass to England. Protestantism has not been able to preserve itself, even there. Look over its social and religious history from the year 1567 to the present day. See what England has passed through; and, at this day, Protestant though it still be in name, in feeling, and in law, yet it appears to be utterly unconscious of what really constitutes its religious life and mission. It seems to have no principle of self-explanation, nothing that is calculated to impress on others any respectful or reverential idea of what it is; utterly incapable of preserving the doctrines, which it thought belonged to itself, from the ruthless invasion of every advocate of error. On the other hand, if you look for any thing like propagation of Protestantism in the Catholic or Pagan world, you look in vain. It is long, indeed, since it felt the necessity of attempting something like what had been accomplished by the Catholic Church, in the conversion of the heathen;—and we find that as early as 1701 missionary societies were instituted. What they did, however, is a blank, so far as history is concerned. We know that, within our own memory, millions and millions of money

from England and these United States, and hundreds if not thousands of missionaries, have been sacrificed in the attempt to do something towards propagating Protestantism in the Pagan world; — and, I will say boldly, without success. I am aware that they speak of success in the Sandwich Islands; but I believe that the success of Protestantism even there, as a religion capable of propagating itself, on farther investigation will be found to be altogether illusory. We know that the population has diminished more than one half since it came under the influence and government of what are called missions; and we know farther, for we have it from their own writings, that the conversion of those who remain is of so doubtful a type, that during one period they passed a civil law *enforcing* attendance at public worship, and under its operation the inhabitants were driven to church; but now, for some eighteen years or so, since the law was repealed, their churches are getting empty; so that I conceive Protestantism will no more succeed in converting the inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands, than the Puritans did in converting the tribes of Indians, whom they drove from their hunting-grounds in the northern and eastern portions of the United States.

“ These failures to convert Pagans, therefore, are symptoms of decline; and if this failure comes, on one side, from the rejection of Catholic authority, or from the withholding its primary doctrines, must we not conclude that all those infidel systems which have grown out of Protestantism have grown out of it at its own expense? We must either admit that all Germany, and France, and Holland, have declined from Protestantism, and gone into the cold and dark regions of infidelity; or we must still call these nations Protestant, and allow that one condition of their Protestantism is the denial of the doctrines of the Trinity, and the holy mysteries of the Christian faith. Protestants would, I believe, universally assert the distinction. They speak of the *orthodox* denominations, as distinguished from what they consider heterodox or infidel varieties. If, therefore, both are not equally Protestant, how vastly has Protestantism declined in the direction of unbelief, skepticism, and heathenism ! ” — pp. 5 – 14.

There is no gainsaying this. Protestantism reached its limits in 1567, or by the close of the first fifty years of its existence, and it has not enlarged its territory one inch since, except by colonization in countries then unknown to the civilized world, or but recently discovered. No nation is Protestant now that was not Protestant then, and large districts in Europe, especially in Savoy and Germany, then Protestant, are now Catholic. Even in France, the Protestants and unbelievers combined are not to-day so

large a proportion of the French people as were the Huguenots in the reigns of Henry the Second and Charles the Ninth. Protestantism has never made a single conquest from the gentile world, and for over two hundred and eighty years, that is, for nearly the whole period of its existence, it has made no conquest from Catholic nations. Its expansive power was almost instantly exhausted, and it has been gradually losing the ground it originally occupied. This is a remarkable fact, well worthy of the serious meditation of every Protestant. It proves that Protestantism is struck with sterility; that it is destitute of true reproductive energy, and is destined at no distant day to dwindle into an insignificant sect, or finally to disappear from the earth it has not blessed. Another fact equally remarkable, and which no Protestant can have the hardihood to deny, is the entire falsification, by the event, of all the predictions and promises of the pretended Reformers. Nothing has been realized of what was promised. In no country, in no respect whatever, has Protestantism proved to be what we were told in the beginning it would be. It promised to restore the Gospel, from which it dared to say the Church had apostatized, and for the Gospel it gives us mere rationalism, transcendentalism, and heathenism, and it has made the Bible, as somebody has said, a fiddle, on which a skilful performer may play any tune he pleases. In the United States, according to the American Almanac, — Protestant authority, — over one half of the adult population belong to no religious society whatever, and are really heathen. The majority of the American people are what are waggishly, but expressively, called Nothingarians, although good Protestants in their hostility to the Catholic Church. In all Protestant nations faith is gone, morality is gone, and principle is gone. The least depraved among them may vie not unsuccessfully in immorality and unnatural crimes with the more depraved nations of heathen antiquity. The sin of Sodom is far from being unknown, and infanticide is quite too common even in our own country to permit us to reproach the modern Chinese with the exposure of infants.

These results should not surprise us. Human nature is, since the Fall, depraved, rotten, and there are no vices too filthy or crimes too foul for it to fall into when left to it-

self, without being elevated, strengthened, and sustained by the sacraments which Protestantism rejects. Even in Catholic countries, where faith still survives, and the graces of the sacraments are insisted upon and within reach, the depravities of human nature manifest themselves, and multitudes roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue. How much more so in Protestant countries, where there is no faith, no adequate moral instruction, no sacraments, and nothing but pride and a mere regard to public decorum to aid and protect virtue! The only solid foundation of virtue, private or public, is Christian faith, and its only safeguards are the Christian sacraments. Where these are wanting, you may indeed have for a time polished manners and kindly sentiments, but no genuine virtue, for men cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature. It is nothing surprising, then, that nations under Protestantism should lapse into all the vices, immoralities, and unnatural crimes of heathenism.

The decline of Protestantism in regard to Christian doctrine was in the natural course of things, and the infidelity and heathenism in which it everywhere results are only its legitimate development, the realization of what it originally *meant*. From the first, Protestantism contained the seeds of its own destruction. We cite again the Archbishop at length.

“But now the question comes up, What causes have prevented Protestantism from taking that spread, and exercising that influence over the human race, which should have distinguished a system, having, or claiming to have, the blessing and favor of God? The causes are no doubt many; but I think the primary cause, of which the others are consequences, is to be found in the very elements of Protestantism itself; — for I conceive that God has given to man but two general principles of guidance. One is Divine authority, which, as being Divine, is above him; and the other is reason, which is in him. If it be said that we, Catholics, because we admit authority, do not, exercise our reason, we have an answer which is obvious, and ought to be satisfactory; — and it is this: If you ask our reason for submitting to authority, we answer, that, in the exercise of that faculty, we have arrived at the conclusion that God, having made a revelation, has appointed a Church, to be the depositary and witness of his truth, and the guide to his people, to the end of the world. Now, if this be true, what can be more natural or *rational* than to submit our *reason* to the teachings and guidance that God himself has appointed? But

on the other hand, the Protestant system, from the beginning, essentially casts off all authority. It is very difficult to say now, what were, if any, the philosophical motives for asserting this principle, — whether asserted by accident, whether it was intended really to be a central and abiding point in the new system, it is difficult to say ; — but one thing is perfectly clear and obvious, — that the first exigency of condition in Protestantism was to *PULL DOWN*. Its first mission was not to build up, but to pull down ; and a more fruitful or efficient principle of encouragement for the destruction of whatever did exist never could have been devised by the perverted and perverting ingenuity of man, than the principle which made every human being the supreme judge of what was right and true, — with the injunction to reject all authority. Hence, therefore, the first destructive principle of Protestantism was a condition of necessity, though its votaries seem never to have had the foresight to reflect or perceive that this principle could be turned against any thing else, and in a little time, even against itself. But having once proclaimed the principle, it could not deny the consequences. Hence, after the first ebullition of that species of half political, half religious revolution, they began to draw the semblance of a creed around themselves, and to throw some restraints over the private reasoning of their own adherents. This attempt at restraint is the other element of Protestantism, and from that period, until the present day, supposing it to be thus constituted, it is manifest that it never could, under such principles, either preserve or propagate itself. And why ? Because these two principles came in contradiction one with the other. How can you make me free to read the Holy Scriptures and judge for myself, if you tie me down to your Augsburg Confession, your Westminster Catechism, or your Thirty-Nine Articles and Homilies ? What kind of freedom is that ? The freedom you proclaimed invited me to desert the Catholic faith, in order, as it would now seem, to put my neck into the yoke *you* have framed. You give with one hand, and take away with the other that which you had given. Now, therefore, I must be consistent with you. Whatever systems or confessions *you* have made, God is invariable ; and, following out his light and yours, I see you are in contradiction with yourselves, and cannot continue to have any active existence. Either reject authority, and make every man free to follow his own judgment, or admit authority ; and if you admit authority, then you recall your own principle ! Be candid, then, and do not deceive us with words. If you mean that we are to shape our belief according to your articles, tell us so. If we have reason to think you are teaching from God, we will follow you ; but, as it is, you adopt a principle which is destructive of every doctrine of your own system, and which, at the same time, de-

prives you of the right of correcting, and calling back, those who wander from your arbitrary standard of Christian belief. Hence it is, that all those persons who go in the direction of rationalism go on the first principle of Protestantism; and all those who accept authority and find it not in the system of Protestantism, and discover there no guaranty of a certain faith, one after another come back to the faith of their ancestors. This principle has followed Protestantism into every department of its quasi religious life. It is like the blood in the human system. It springs from the heart of Protestantism, and pervades the whole extremities. Hence the number of sects. No man can enumerate their shades and varieties. It would be vain to attempt it. But all of them are justified in their character, by the very first principle of separation from the association to which the primitive founders had belonged. Hence it is, too, that Protestantism has lost all organic influence over the masses of mankind, and that it has so lost all capacity to preserve even its own doctrines, that it is paralyzed, powerless, speechless; or if it speaks, its words are of no import. It has lost all central force; and because it was conscious of this defect from the beginning, you will observe that it immediately attached itself, in every instance, to the state, so that kings and courts became its master from the hour of its birth. It is free, and professes to be free, *only* in these United States; and of the use which it makes of its freedom, even here, none of its advocates have any great reason to be proud.

"It is said that it has emancipated nations. This is not the fact, but even if it were so, it was at the expense of *its own* liberty, seeing that itself became a state-slave from the first hour of its existence. Protestantism at this day, wherever it is established in the Old World, is but a part of the state. You may speak of its Consistories, Presbyteries, and Synods, of its Bishops, Ministers, and Dignitaries, but you will find them without a tongue to defend their own rights, or to define its doctrines, except the tongue which the sovereign or his civil minister puts into their mouths. In England itself, the country which has succeeded the best with Protestantism, have we not seen, but the other day, a dispute arising between a Presbyter and his Bishop about the nature and efficacy of the sacrament of baptism? — a topic which has been decided by the voice of universal Christendom for eighteen hundred years! In this dispute the Bishop had no authority or right of judgment over the Presbyter. On the contrary, he was opposed by the Archbishop; and there were the Presbyter, Bishop, and Archbishop, all learned professors of Protestant theology, and they could not define the doctrine of their church with regard to baptism, until it was made known to them by a civil officer, a judge on the bench; and to *his* opinion they were obliged to submit. Yet these Presbyters, Bishops, and Archbishops speak to us of setting, or having set,

nations free; they speak to us of the freedom of countries where the religion of which they are ministers is adopted and patronized by the sovereign and by the state! No doubt. But the connection between the church and the state rules, as I take it, that the church in such countries is a mere function or department of the government, in which the sovereign speaks to the Bishop, or the Judge on the bench to the Presbyter or the Metropolitan, as he does to the admirals of the navy, or the officers of the army.

"How then can Protestantism succeed in preserving itself, or in converting the erring world? And again, to speak of the *causes* of its want of success in preserving its own doctrines or in converting nations;—how has it been or how is it now possible for Protestantism to succeed? Its missionaries, for instance, carry with them double elements, the positive and the negative, namely, 'Such and such doctrines to be accepted, and such and such others to be cast aside.' Indeed, they often cast away all creeds as known to other men, and have no creed of their own except as they read and choose to interpret the Scriptures. We hear of companies of missionaries going to convert heathen nations, and of their holding consultations from day to day on board ship, to agree, in some manner, as to what kind of doctrines they shall preach and present to the heathen. We have an instance of one of their distinguished members who left this country as a missionary, who himself became converted on the voyage, and was baptized into a new sect on reaching the Pagan land. What has been the consequence of all this wavering, instability, and uncertainty? It has been the same as that which has produced the divisions, and weakened any power that ever existed in the Protestant system of religion. It is natural, and to be expected, that the heathen will say to such men, 'How can we hearken to the voice of missionaries who come to us conflicting with each other in doctrine? They should not come to us with contrary or mutilated messages from the Son of God. We shall remain as we are, till your learned missionaries agree among yourselves.' They have also still farther confounded the simple judgment of the Pagan. By the fact of being Protestants, they must necessarily commence the history of their religion, by saying that Christ established a Church for the purpose of propagating his doctrine, but that after fifteen hundred years it had failed, and *they* had come to renew it. How can the savage inwardly digest a story like that? How quickly will he, with the perception of natural instinct, not to say talent, reply, 'How can I know what confidence to put in you, if the Author of Christianity himself failed in his Church?'

"Thus, on every side, that inherent defect, that one principle which is self-destruction, has followed Protestantism in every one of its undertakings;—so that, at the present day, it does not in

reality hold together as a system of doctrines. There is no heart in it, no intellect, no comprehensive or comprehensible body of principles, by which men could be brought into religious and harmonious association with one another." — pp. 16–21.

Protestantism could not, if left to the free action of the human mind, but develop itself, and in accordance with its own essential nature. In the bosom of the Catholic Church there is development of life in obedience to the truth, but no development of doctrine, save such successive explications and definitions as are necessary to preserve the splendor, purity, and integrity of the original deposit of faith against the novel heresies and errors which, in consequence of men's perversity and subtle curiosity, from time to time arise to obscure, controvert, or deny it; because in matters of faith the Church teaches from the first the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and thus leaves no room for development or variation of doctrine without lapsing into error. Development of doctrine, as distinguished from development of practice, is predicable only where the truth is but partially communicated to the mind, or communicated mixed with falsehood, for it proceeds always from the effort of the mind to eliminate what it regards as the false element, and to complete, or realize the potentiality of what it regards as the true element. Protestantism had originally at best only a partial truth, and this truth it held mingled with falsehood. Even by its own confession, it was not the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Truth and falsehood are necessarily repugnant to each other. There was originally an innate repugnance between their several elements of doctrine professed by Protestants, and they had at best only a few fragments of the truth. Hence Protestantism could not remain fixed and invariable. Wherever the mind was free, it must struggle to get rid of this innate repugnance or contradiction, and to complete its view of truth.

Development must follow the inherent law or essential nature of its subject. Development in the vegetable must follow the inherent law of the vegetable world; in the animal, the inherent law of the animal world; in doctrine, the inherent law or essential principle of the doctrine, as Mr. Newman has satisfactorily proved in his theory of development, — a theory as profound and true when applied to heretical sects and doctrines as it is false

and dangerous when applied in the bosom of the Church to Christian doctrine, that is, the Catholic faith, objectively considered. Protestantism, then, if not prevented by external causes, must not only develop, but it must develop according to its own inherent law, or essential nature, and this it must do by eliminating whatever is repugnant to it, assimilating whatever is in accordance with it, and realizing its potentiality, or pushing its essential principle to its last logical consequences.

The inherent law or essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. Protestants, when they went forth from the Church, professed, it is true, to retain a certain number of Christian doctrines, and Protestantism taken as originally professed consisted of these doctrines and the principles it asserted in protesting against the Church, or in denying its authority. But these Christian doctrines, so far as it held them at all, it held in common with the Church, and therefore they did not and could not constitute its essential nature, its distinguishing characteristic, as Protestantism. If it had taken them for its point of departure, and eliminated what it held incompatible, and assimilated what was in accordance with them, that is, purified and completed them by development, it would have been obliged to abrogate itself, and return to the Church against which it protested. Its inherent law, its essential principle, its distinguishing characteristic, could not lie in what it held in common with the Church, but must necessarily lie in what it opposed to the Church, as the ground of its rejection of her authority. It must reject the Catholic Church, be a protest against her, let it be whatever else it might. The concession of the Church, or the recognition of her authority, in any sense or degree conceivable, was fatal to itself, the total destruction of its own being. It could be only by being Protestantism, and it could be Protestantism only by being opposed to Catholicity; and hence we find, historically, that Protestants, though differing among themselves in all else, agree to a man in protesting against the Church, and denying her authority. The principle of this denial of the authority of the Church, then, must be the essential principle, the distinctive nature, of Protestantism.

The principle of this denial is what is termed the right of private judgment. But the assertion of the right of pri-

vate judgment is at bottom only the denial of the right of any authority to control the judgment, that is, the simple denial of authority itself. In denying the authority of the Church on the strength of private judgment, the pretended Reformers did not deny it on the strength, or in obedience to the commands, of another authority opposed to hers, but on no authority at all. Their denial of her authority was then a simple negation, in which nothing was affirmed, and therefore the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. We grant that the pretended Reformers did not formally assert the right of private judgment, but they implied it, since in denying the authority of the Church they asserted no authority to justify their denial. It is true, they alleged the written word, but this amounted to nothing; because in alleging it they alleged nothing peculiar to themselves, no *authority* opposed to the Church. The Church asserted the authority of the written word as well as they, and their distinguishing mark was not in asserting the authority of the written word, for that authority no Catholic denies, but in asserting the written word as privately interpreted, that is, in denying all authoritative interpreters, and therefore all authoritative interpretation of it; which was, in effect, not the assertion, but the denial, of the authority of the written word, as the subsequent developments of Protestantism have amply proved. The written word is authoritative only in its sense, and its sense can be authoritative only in so far as authoritatively determined and applied. It is true also, that the pretended Reformers alleged the written word interpreted by the private illumination of the Holy Ghost; but this was only their private allegation, made on the strength of their private judgment, and therefore on no authority at all. Their peculiarity here was not in asserting the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost, for that every Catholic asserts, but in asserting their right of determining by their own private judgment whether the spirit by which they were moved was or was not the spirit of God; and hence the distinguishing trait of the allegation as a Protestant principle was the assertion of private judgment against the authority of the Church, that is, the denial of her authority on no authority. Hence, notwithstanding these two allegations, our assertion remains true and undeniable, that the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation.

It follows from this, that the development of Protestantism must necessarily consist in the development of the principle, if we may so speak, of denial or negation, in eliminating whatever it originally held along with it repugnant to that principle, and in carrying it out to its last logical consequences. But, from the nature of the case, this must be a successive throwing off of truth, and a gradual denial of all things. The elimination of every positive element, and the pushing of denial to its last logical consequences, is universal negation, the denial of God and the universe, — absolute nullism, which is absolute falsehood! This is the final term of Protestantism, what it originally meant, or was, potentially, from the first, in so far as Protestantism. Hegel and several others, in their speculative theories, have reached this final term, but the great body of the Protestant people draw up a little this side, though without any good reason in their own system for doing so, except that universal negation is necessarily the negation of itself, and pure falsehood, being a nonentity, is absolutely unintelligible; for, as we have often occasion to say, what is not, is not intelligible. Men may invent theories which imply absolute nullism, but all such theories are self-destructive, and can never be practically carried out; for negation is intelligible only by virtue of some affirmative principle, and falsehood only by virtue of the truth it denies. Hence, if there were no Catholic Church, Protestantism would be absolutely inconceivable, and if it could succeed in denying it and getting actually rid of it, it would itself become absolutely extinct, or at best only an unmeaning word. In consequence of the purely negative character of Protestantism, the number of pure and consistent Protestants must always be small, because common sense will always in most men be stronger than theory. Nevertheless, by the invariable law of development, the whole Protestant body must be always tending to be more and more thoroughly Protestant, and therefore be always struggling to throw off more and more of what little of truth they may have held in solution, and to approach nearer and nearer to pure unmixed falsehood. This is clear *a priori*; and it is proved by the whole history of Protestantism during the last three hundred years. The decline of Protestantism, under a doctrinal point of view, lay, as we have said, in the ordinary course of things,

for the development of negation, that is, the growth of negation is necessarily a decline, an approach towards ceasing to be, that is, to nonentity.

It should then excite no surprise, that Protestantism has successively eliminated the Christian doctrines which the pretended Reformers originally retained from the Church. These doctrines were affirmative, and necessarily foreign and repugnant to its essential principle, which it must preserve or cease to be Protestantism. It was doomed to eliminate them, and lapse into pure rationalism, transcendentalism, heathenism. It has done so, and it cannot help itself. All its attempts to retrace its steps, whether in England, Germany, or this country, and to take its stand nearer to Christian truth, are in vain, and only accelerate its general decline. It has no remedy, for it has no recuperative energy, no living principle. Its being is non-being, its life is the negation of life, and its movement is the movement of dissolution, of the body after life has departed, subjected to the operation of the natural chemical agents. It is strange that Protestant nations, not lacking in the cultivation of letters and affairs, should not have sooner discovered that the body they clasp to their bosoms, and on which they lavish their caresses, is a lifeless corpse, a mass of putrefaction, soon to be a ghastly and grinning skeleton. It is strange that they have been so slow in discovering the imposition which has been practised upon them, and that they should continue to glory in the pretended Reformation, even after having learned by their own bitter experience that of all the fine things it promised them it has given them none. Are they fools? In the one thing needful, most assuredly. They are among those of whom the Apostle speaks, who, "esteeming themselves wise, become fools," who, "ever learning, are never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." So it is. When men yield to their own fancy and follow the suggestions of their own pride, they lose their powers of discernment, and become the prey of every false illusion. Good seems to them evil, and evil seems to them good; truth wears to them the garb of falsehood, and falsehood the garb of truth; light is to them darkness, and darkness, light. Following their own foolish hearts, their minds become darkened, and God gives them up to a reprobate sense, and permits them to be carried away by strong de-

lusions in punishment for their rejection of the truth and consent to iniquity. They have, like the old carnal Jews, eyes, but they see not, ears, but they hear not, hearts, but they understand not. Yet, singularly enough, they imagine themselves enlightened, fancy themselves learned and wise, and use great, swelling words, as if they really knew and were saying something. Alas! how little do they suspect the ridiculous figure they cut in the eyes of Catholics, and how we should laugh at them, did not our charity subdue our risibility, and lead us to compassionate them. Alas! we cannot laugh at them; we can only weep for them. They have souls, souls for whom Christ shed his precious blood on the cross,—souls, capable of endless happiness through the grace of our Lord, or of the eternal tortures of hell. Why should they be lost? Dear Catholic friends, pray for them; besiege Heaven, day and night, with prayers for their conversion. O Mary, Refuge of sinners, pray for them, and present our prayers to thy Divine Son, that he will open their eyes, save them from themselves, and enable them to love him with their whole hearts, and thee as their sweet mother.

His Grace might have enumerated among the causes, no less than among the effects, of the decline of Protestantism, the partial relaxation in most Protestant countries of the barbarous penal codes enacted, and for a long time rigidly enforced, against the profession and practice of the Catholic religion. Protestantism was favored in its origin by the civil authorities, anxious to get rid of the restraints always imposed on their despotism by the Papacy; and it is a well-known fact, that the pretended Reform was never able to establish itself in any country, except by the strong arm of the secular power. To this not a single exception can be named. Protestantism never spread, became predominant, and sustained itself by the peaceable study of the Sacred Scriptures, free discussion, and moral suasion, but it owes its success to confiscations, fines, dungeons, scaffolds, and wholesale massacres, authorized by the civil authority. Its infancy, indeed, was baptized in blood, as its youth and manhood were nourished by it, but it was the blood of persecuted Catholics, not of its own martyrs. Unlike the early Catholics, under pagan Rome, who conquered the world not by slaying but by being slain, Protestants have made all their conquests by killing, and at-

tempted to secure their conquests by penal codes against Catholics, which would have afforded many valuable hints to a Nero, a Decius, or a Diocletian, and this, too, while they openly acknowledged that salvation was attainable in the Catholic communion!

The relaxation of these codes, either by a formal repeal or by suffering them to fall into desuetude, and the consequent partial toleration of the Catholic worship in Protestant countries, have operated seriously to the disadvantage of Protestantism; which could never stand a moment before its Catholic opponent, when it had not taken the precaution to dig out that opponent's tongue, and to bind him hand and foot. In an open field, with fair play, it never gained, and never could gain, any thing, but a shameful defeat, and Great Britain, while we are writing, confirms it, by proposing to reënforce, or to reënact, her old penal code against Catholics. In itself, Protestantism never had any strength, and it is never able in a fair argument to make even a show of defending itself. Hence everywhere it shrinks from argument, if there is any prospect of a reply. It cannot be coaxed or shamed into a discussion with Catholicity on equal terms, and now that it has no longer the strong arm of the civil law to fell its opponent, it resorts solely to petty squibs, to gross calumnies, or coarse vituperations, and the exhibition of obscene Leahys and Maria Monks. But these things after a while lose their savor, and its resources fail. What shall it do? Its sole strength — after the ignorance of the multitude, the gullibility inherent in all genuine Protestants, the pride of the human heart, and the depraved tastes, instincts, and passions of human nature — is and always has been in the civil government, and just in proportion as that abandons it, it dwindles into an insignificant sect, or lapses into the lowest form of Sadduceeism and gentilism. So true is this, and so rapid have been the decline of Protestantism and the growth of Catholicity under the relaxation of the old penal codes, that we expect to see efforts speedily made in all Protestant nations to revive them.

In point of fact, in those Protestant nations which profess to tolerate Catholicity, as well as in this country, which professes to recognize its equal rights, the state is constantly exerting its force in favor of Protestants, and against Catholics. It is still the state that supports Prot-

estantism, and its whole political and social action is directed against the Church. It liberally endows Protestant institutions of learning, taxes Catholics to support schools, to which in comparatively few instances can Catholics with a good conscience send their children, and even in liberal Massachusetts refuses to grant a simple charter of incorporation to a Catholic college. The whole system of state education, now so earnestly insisted on, and which no one can oppose without being charged with opposing education itself, is only insisted on because it is believed to favor infidelity, that is, Protestantism, and check the growth of Catholicity. The various philanthropic institutions, Farm Schools, Houses of Reformation, Normal Schools, and the like, are protected and favored by the state, solely with a view to the suppression of Popery and the preservation of Protestantism. But bad as these all are, and as much as the state may do through them, Catholicity, if tolerated at all, spreads and will spread. The knowing amongst Protestants see it, and, as they have relaxed nothing in their hatred of the Church, we may expect them ere long to demand more efficient and stringent measures against us. But we are pretty sure that it is too late for them, even if they obtain such measures, to succeed.

Our reason for thinking it too late for the revival or enforcement of the old penal codes with success, is not only in the actual decline of Protestantism, but in the new and imposing attitude assumed by Catholicity. Two years ago we were told from Protestant pulpit and press that it was all over with Popery. The Holy Father was in exile, and the capital of the Catholic world was in the hands of a ruthless demagogy, of infidel ruffians, paid by Protestant contributions, and sworn to overthrow the Catholic Church. All Europe was in commotion, social order was broken up, and it seemed that the civilized world was abandoned to the Red Republicans and Socialists, the emissaries of hell, and the determined enemies of God and man, of the Church and of the state. Two years have passed, and the Holy Father is restored to his temporal possessions, the chains with which civil despotism in France and Austria, Spain and Portugal, had bound the spiritual power are nearly all broken, and the Church, arising from the servile posture in which she had been

bound, resumes her pristine energy, and addresses the nations in the free, bold, and commanding tone, which the world has not heard before during these last three hundred years. England, out of hatred to Catholicity, fostered the conspiracy of Mazzini, and sent a cabinet minister to excite rebellion in all Italy, and the Church answers to her insolence by the National Council of Thurles, and the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy, with Cardinal Wiseman at its head. In France, we have, after so many years' silence, once more the free voice of the Church, and we see the state kneeling at her feet and imploring her to save French society from anarchy and total destruction. "The Gallican liberties" have become only a faint reminiscence, and the Gallican Church feels that her only safety is in filial submission to the chair of Peter. In Austria, the noble and pious young Emperor has given the death-blow to Josephinism, and restored to religion her freedom. Spain recalls her exiled prelates, and Portugal yields to the wishes of the Holy See. Catholic nations awake from their slumbers, shake off the timidity which had for centuries paralyzed their efforts, and on all sides Protestantism is assailed as it never has been before. It had brought all Europe to the verge of ruin; it had well-nigh precipitated the whole civilized world into barbarism, and the stern voice of indignant nations is heard calling it to stand forth and show cause why judgment shall not be executed against it. And it has no answer to give. Here is what encourages us. Catholics are becoming Catholics, are beginning to feel, as amid the disasters of so many centuries they had not dared feel, that God is for them, and no enemy can prevail against them. This is all that was ever wanting to make an end of Protestantism, or at least to compel it to retire into some dark corners, to be forgotten save by the antiquarian, or the curious traveller delighting to detect the remains of lost tribes.

Undoubtedly the Church in this world must always be the Church Militant, and we are never to expect her to be entirely free from either internal or external enemies. Her life through the ages is and must be the life of the individual believer, that of constant vigilance and unremitted warfare. Perfect peace and security are not to be attained to in this world; the victory is fully gained only at the end, and the triumph is reserved for heaven. Nevertheless,

as her heavenly Spouse visits from time to time the faithful soul with sweet and ineffable consolations, so does he visit and console his Church ; and it is not too much to believe, that he is about to visit and reward her fidelity with new consolations. We do not expect Protestantism, now mere Carnal Judaism and heathenism, will wholly disappear from the face of the earth, but we do believe that its power is broken, and that it should no longer be regarded as a formidable opponent. The woman has bruised its head, and the good God is about to visit the nations more in mercy than in judgment. We Catholics, while we watch and pray, may take hope, that we have seen the darkest days, and that Christ, who loves his Church and gave his life for her, descends to console her for her past sufferings, and for the insults she has recently received from her enemies. While we humble ourselves in the dust for our sins and short-comings, we may take new courage, and press forward with renewed ardor to the charge against the enraged but disheartened enemies of the Lord and of his Immaculate Spouse. Especially may we do so in this country, where we need nothing but courage, fidelity, and perseverance.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *John O'Brien, or the Orphan of Boston: a Tale of Real Life.* By Rev. JOHN T. RODDAN. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 12mo. pp. 264.

THE change which has taken place in the tone of our American Catholic literature during the last few years is not a little encouraging. It is more thoroughly Catholic, more manly and independent, more bold and energetic, and at the same time none the less really civil to those of our countrymen who are attached to heretical communions. There is no lack of charity or of civility in the faithful utterance of the Gospel, and in plainly telling those who are outside of the Catholic Church that they are out of the ark of safety. It is not we who say it, on our personal authority, as our private opinion or belief, but it is the Church who says it, on the authority of Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Nor do we say it in wrath, or in hatred or ill-will towards the heretical

and unbelieving; we say it because it is God's truth, because it is of the last consequence to them that they should know it, and because we love them for God's sake, and in our charity would save them from the fearful doom to which we see that they are exposed.

We are glad to see that our authors are less anxious about defending the Church than they were, — that they are less disturbed by the various objections urged or calumnies vented against her, and more in earnest to make Protestants aware of their own slippery foundation, and their absolute need of the Catholic faith and Sacraments. The Church is safe. The wrath of man and rage of devils cannot affect her. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household? In religious matters Protestants are neither candid nor well informed. To honorable controversy they are ill disposed, and ill qualified for it. They heed nothing we say in our own defence, and to our arguments for the Church they can never be induced to attempt a sober and candid reply. They have never learned to reason, are incapable of reasoning in religious matters, and, let us say what we will, they continue merely to declaim and vituperate as if we said nothing, and to repeat ridiculous slanders a thousand times denied and refuted. The only way in which we can reach and do them good is to press them hard on their own principles and doctrines, and by our vigorous and well-aimed attacks make them feel their own nothingness. We must put them on their defence, and drive them from their last intrenchments. In this way we may shame them out of their absurdities, and force them to listen to the truth which saves.

These reflections are suggested by the little work before us, which, though not in all respects perfect, is a masterly production, and written on the principle we most heartily approve, by one who knows whereof he affirms. It is an original work, — original in its conception, its plan, and its style. Its style is peculiar, and not precisely to the taste of every reader, and by some will be regarded as deficient in dignity and polish; but it is free, bold, dashing, clear, and simple. It is not the style most approved by critics, but it is the style which experience in all ages and countries proves to be the most natural and effective. If we wish to reach and move the heart, we must never stand on our own dignity, or waste our strength in efforts to conciliate the good-will of the fastidious. We must break through many a conventionalism, and forget ourselves in the effect we would produce. We may easily be too correct, too polished, and too dignified, to be effective. The saints often appear singular, not to say eccentric, to those not saints. Mr. Roddan writes without any thought of himself, with entire self-forgetfulness, and seeks only to convey the thought and produce

the impression he wishes, without the least reference to his own reputation. His mind is remarkably active, fresh, and vigorous, and he transfers it with unrivalled felicity to his glowing pages. In them all is life and movement, and the reader cannot but read on, carried away by a power he sees not, and captivated by a charm he does not once think of stopping to analyze.

Mr. Roddan is remarkable for the ease with which he grapples with the most difficult problems of philosophy and theology, and brings them within the reach of the ordinary mind. His book can be read with interest by the mere child, and with instruction by the man of mature intellect. In this respect he has scarcely an equal. He is not less remarkable for his graphic power. His descriptions are unrivalled, and in reading them we see the objects described, and live the scenes presented. His story is a simple story of a poor orphan boy, and in no instance transcends ordinary life; it is told in the simplest manner imaginable, and yet it has all the interest of an exciting romance. It apparently owes little to the imagination, and taken in detail it indicates little of a poetic temperament, and yet we have found few works of imagination or creations of the poet equally effective in chaining the attention, and keeping alive the interest of the reader. Humble as are its pretensions, it is a work of real genius, as well as of consummate skill and ability, and must place the author with good judges in the front rank of our best American authors.

John O'Brien is not a model character, and is by no means held up, or to be held up, for imitation. This perhaps is a defect. Taking him as the ideal, the ideal of the book is not high enough, and this would be a serious objection, if the work were intended to be read solely by the boys of the class to which John belongs. No boy will rise as high as he aims, and every one should therefore be taught to aim at the highest, lest in practice he fall too low. But the author had another purpose in view; he wrote, not only for the instruction of boys, but still more for the instruction of parents and guardians. He did not aim at setting before the young a model for them to imitate, so much as he did at making us acquainted with the real character of the class of boys who throng our streets, trouble our police, fill our Houses of Reformation and Refuges for Juvenile Offenders, and are not seldom regarded as utterly hardened and incorrigible. Owing to the poverty of a large class of our people, their little acquaintance in their own country with the dangers of town life, and their neglect or inability, from various causes, to educate their children as they should be at home, there is in all our cities an undue proportion of Catholic children, orphans, or worse than orphans, that crowd our streets, and grow up rowdies. There is no denying the fact, whether we speak of Boston or any other of our larger Atlantic cities. These boys are the

principal subjects of our petty police, and as they grow up furnish a formidable number of subjects for the higher police. The evil in both a religious and social point of view is great, and cannot by any person of right feelings be regarded with indifference. That these boys are bad enough nobody denies, and that Catholics have by no means done all they could, and all they were bound by their religion to do, to correct and save them, nobody can pretend. We have much in this respect to answer for.

But Mr. Roddan has undertaken to show, and no one was more competent to do it, that these boys are by no means so depraved as is commonly supposed, and that, with a little vigilance and a little judicious kindness, they might easily be made an honor to our community, instead of being its plague-spot. The Catholic population, again, are far less inexcusable than might seem at first sight. They are to a great extent strangers in the country, ignorant of its peculiar temptations and dangers, and for the most part poor, and obliged to strain every nerve in order to live. They have good intentions and exhaustless charity, but they lack means. The wealth that should supply the means is not in their hands, and the charitable institutions of the country are not under their control. Here is the difficulty.

There is, no doubt, ample provision made in our Boston community for the maintenance and education of orphans and unprotected boys, but this provision, so far as made by the public or private charities of Protestants, and which suffices in great measure for Protestant boys, who are not expected to have any other virtues than thrift and public decorum, is so made that our children cannot avail themselves of it without extreme peril to their souls. The difficulty is, not that Protestants are not liberal enough with their means, that they are not ready enough to contribute both time and money, but it is that they will furnish their aid only in such a way as to prevent our boys from growing up Catholics. They will not coöperate with our clergy and our Religious, and leave them to look after the faith and morals of Catholic children, but will operate in their own way, and make all their institutions and charities the means of providing for the body at the expense of the soul. Here is the reason why we regard, and cannot but regard, your Reverend Welleses, Barnards, and Bigelows, and your Deacon Grants, with their associate philanthropists, as practically the emissaries of Satan, the prime conspirators against the souls of our poor boys. We impugn not their motives nor their liberality, but we tell them very plainly that the practical effect of their efforts is, when not to train our children to the dungeon or the scaffold here, to deliver them over to eternal damnation hereafter, and hence we regard their labors and charities with horror rather than with gratitude.

The boys we speak of must either be trained up Catholics, or be

the pests of society. This may be regarded as a "fixed fact." They will either have the Catholic religion or no religion. The simplest and most effectual way of remedying what we all, Catholics as well as Protestants, regard as a great evil, would be for the public authorities, private associations, and liberal individuals, to aid our clergy in training up these children in the religion of their parents, that is, to relieve the Catholic poor as Catholics. Our clergy should have free access to all those public institutions which receive our unfortunate, vicious, or criminal Catholics, whether old or young, and private associations and individuals should make the Catholic clergy or the Sisters of Charity their almoners, as far as the Catholic poor are concerned. In this way the evil could be removed at one half the expense of the present Protestant charities, which serve only to increase that evil. The most scrupulous Protestant might with a good conscience consent to this, for no Protestant doubts, or pretends to doubt, that salvation is attainable in our Church, or dares maintain that it is necessary to become a Protestant in order to be saved.

But we have opened too vast a subject to be discussed in a brief literary notice. *John O'Brien* will be found to contain many valuable hints on it, and some suggestions of great importance, especially to Catholics. The author is master of the subjects on which he touches, and he gives us lessons from experience that we shall do well to heed.

We have spoken of the Catholic boys that throng our streets, but we are far from regarding these boys as worse than Protestant boys, or, in fact, as half so really vicious. The characteristic of Protestants is to display their virtues and conceal their vices; that of Catholics, especially of Irish Catholics, is to display their vices and to conceal their virtues. In the former expect no more virtue than you see, in the latter no more vice than appears at first sight. Our poor Irish Catholic boys have no hypocrisy, and are very careless as to appearances, but they have warm hearts, affectionate dispositions, and good principles. They are rarely led into vice except through their love of fun and their fine social feelings. Then, again, far more is laid to their charge than they are guilty of. A Protestant boy, cool, calculating, hardened, and hypocritical, often commits an offence, and then charges it upon some poor Irish boy, and appears in the Police Court as a witness against him. What avails it that this poor Irish boy protests his innocence? Who believes him? Was a Yankee boy ever known to tell a lie? We are Yankee born and bred, with probably not a drop of Celtic blood in our veins, but we confess that familiar acquaintance with these poor Irish boys, even those regarded as abandoned, has made us wellnigh ashamed of our Yankee descent. We know what Yankee boys are, and they are not to be named in the same day with these poor Irish Catholic boys in our streets.

2. — *Report of the Case of JOHN W. WEBSTER*, Master of Arts and Doctor of Medicine of Harvard University, Member of the Massachusetts Medical Society, of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of the London Geological Society, and of the St. Petersburg Mineralogical Society, and Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard University, *indicted for the Murder of GEORGE PARKMAN*, Master of Arts of Harvard University, Doctor of Medicine of the University of Aberdeen, and Member of the Massachusetts Medical Society, *before the SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS; including the HEARING ON THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR, the Prisoner's CONFESSORIAL STATEMENTS AND APPLICATION FOR A COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE, and an APPENDIX, containing several interesting Matters never before published.* By GEORGE BEMIS, Esq., one of the Counsel in the Case. Boston: Little & Brown. 1850. 8vo. pp. 628.

THIS is a full and authentic report of the case of Dr. Webster, and leaves nothing to be desired for the complete understanding of it in all its details, down to the execution of the unhappy murderer. We are glad that Mr. Bemis, than whom no one was or could be better qualified to prepare it, has published it, not only because the case is one of deep and startling interest, but because it gives those persons abroad who have so freely censured the court and jury which tried Dr. Webster, an opportunity to retract their censures, and to reflect on the propriety of being less rash in their future judgments. No man of sound mind can read the evidence as here reported, and not be forced to the conclusion that Dr. Webster was legally and justly convicted of the murder of Dr. George Parkman. The evidence, although circumstantial, was full and irresistible, and the jury could not have done otherwise than return a verdict of guilty, without perjuring or stultifying themselves. We were ourselves among the last, prior to his conviction, to believe in the guilt of Dr. Webster; but the evidence, as reported in the newspapers at the time, forced us to believe it. Yet if we had retained any doubt, the report before us, and which gives the evidence as it was given before the jury, would have completely removed it. The case is one of profound interest, and triumphantly refutes the common objections as to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. It proves that such evidence may be irresistible, and amply sufficient to warrant conviction. That the verdict was just, no one can now pretend to doubt, for Dr. Webster, finally, clearly and unequivocally confessed it to be so.

We look upon this case as the most important which has occurred in our Commonwealth. The conviction and execution of John W. Webster have proved, what was becoming extremely doubtful, that

law can be enforced in this Commonwealth, and despite all the influences that can be brought to bear against it. No State in the Union has so disgraced itself by its fanaticism and mock philanthropy as Massachusetts. On the one hand, it has struggled to revive the sort of legislation introduced by Calvin into Geneva, and, by means of associations and committees, to determine what we shall eat and what we shall drink, when go to bed and when get up, thus depriving us of the last remains of individuality, of personal freedom and independence; while, on the other, it has labored, through a maudlin sentimentality, with equal zeal and success, to mitigate legal severity, and to suffer the gravest crimes to go unpunished. The very idea of legal punishment has been condemned as inhuman, and never to be tolerated by a Christian people. A universal sympathy has been got up for all violators of the law, and the greater the rogue the more tenderly is he to be treated. The whole pack, "Tray, Blanche, Sweetheart, little dogs and all," are let loose upon every one who dares hint that some portion of public and private sympathy should be reserved for the virtuous and unoffending, wronged by the violators of the law, and whoever ventures to assert that it is the duty of the magistrate to avenge them is wellnigh worried to death. When Dr. Webster was put upon his trial, it was a question whether the law should reign in this Commonwealth, or whether it was henceforth to be an unmeaning word, and every species of crime and disorder to be tolerated. Considering the evidence in the case, more was at stake than the life of a single man, and on the verdict of the jury and the execution of the sentence of the court depended the life or death of the Commonwealth itself. Had the court and jury failed in their duty, and the Executive shrunk from the vindication in all its rigor of the violated law, legal order would have been utterly prostrated, and there would have reigned here henceforth only the most frightful anarchy. There would have been no safety for person or property, and all would have been given over a prey to lawless passion, ferocious fanaticism, and maudlin sentimentality, with soft words on its lips and the most deadly malice in its heart.

The conviction and execution have proved that law *can* still be executed in Old Massachusetts, notwithstanding all that has been done to undermine its authority in the hearts of the people. This itself is much. They have served also to open the eyes of many people to the necessity of maintaining the laws, and to the inevitable tendency of the loose notions and false philanthropy which have hitherto been so fatally cherished amongst us. The anti-hangman party has in consequence received a severe check, and the Channings, Parkers, and Spears are now at a heavy discount. If such a cold-blooded murder as that of Dr. Parkman, by such a man as Dr. Webster, can take place in one of our public institutions in

open day, people ask, who is safe, and what security have any of us? They begin, also, to reflect on their favorite doctrine of the dignity of human nature, and the pretence that crime is one's misfortune rather than his guilt. Here were none of the circumstances usually alleged in palliation of the most diabolical crime. Here was no low, degraded outcast from society, no poor, ignorant, uneducated vagabond, but a man highly educated, of refined intellectual culture, moving in the most respectable and cultivated circles, the member of an honorable profession, a Professor in our oldest and most renowned University, and enjoying a high reputation throughout the whole scientific world. This man murders, murders in open day, and murders his oldest, his long-trying and best friend, after having shamefully defrauded him. Who after this can doubt the reality of the malice of the human heart, and look upon the most heinous crimes as one's misfortune rather than his guilt?

The whole tragedy has tended to prompt serious reflection in our community, and to turn the current of our thoughts in a more safe and rational direction. It has refuted innumerable theories, stripped off many disguises, and exposed modern philanthropy in its nakedness. Some good does Providence thus, in his inscrutable wisdom, educe from the shocking crime, and fearful punishment, and we trust the lesson in the long run will prove as salutary as it has been painful. We are not among those who demand cruel and barbarous punishments; by our natural disposition we are inclined to range ourselves among those who seek to mitigate them; but we are far from agreeing with the author of *Paul Clifford*, who cites with approbation the saying of the debauched demagogue, John Wilkes, that "the very worst use you can put a man to is to hang him." Sometimes it is the very best use, and the only use, you can put a man to. His execution on the gallows has the use, when deserved, of vindicating the outraged law, and protecting the lives of the innocent, who should be at least as dear to us as the guilty. The execution of Dr. Webster has brought our community to a pause, and will induce it, we trust, to retrace its steps, to return to the good old ways, and to distrust all novel theories, and alleged new discoveries, in morals or in criminal jurisprudence.

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3. — *Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe.* Written in Spanish by the Rev. J. BALMEZ. Translated from the French. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 501.

WE cannot better introduce the first American edition of the great work of Balmez on Civilization, than by copying and adopt-

ing as our own the following admirable notice of it from that excellent paper, *The Pittsburgh Catholic*, one of the best conducted, most spirited, and most truly Catholic journals we are acquainted with.

“Protestants no longer contend that they have a system of religion; they have ceased all profession of regard to dogmatic truth, and no longer claim that they have benefited the human race, by discovering any new, or superior, means of saving the human soul. But one thing they do still boast,—that they disenthralled the minds, and struck the fetters off the limbs of their fellow-men. They admit that they have done little or nothing for the soul of man, but they claim that they have done a great deal for his body. This work is an answer to those arguments based on the real or fancied temporal superiority of Protestant to Catholic countries.

“Balmez, its author, was a priest of Spain, whose death, at the early age of thirty-eight years, occurred but very recently. His first literary production was published in 1840,—he died in 1848. His attention was turned to the erroneous views so common in regard to the supposed temporal benefits conferred upon the human race by Protestantism. The result of his researches and reflections was the elaborate work now before us. ‘What do history and philosophy say on this subject? How has man, either individually or collectively, considered in a religious, social, literary, or religious point of view, been benefited by the reform of the sixteenth century? Did Europe under the exclusive influence of Catholicity pursue a prosperous career? Did Catholicity impose a single fetter on the movements of civilization?’ These are the questions which he discusses, and discusses so ably and impartially, with such fulness and minuteness of detail, with so much earnestness, and, withal, with such warm and lofty eloquence, as to set the question for ever at rest with all honest men sincerely desirous of truth, who give to this treatise that attention which it most richly merits.

“We shall not attempt any analysis of the contents of the work; the book, to be appreciated, must be read and studied, as we trust it will be read, by all Catholics capable of understanding it, and by all Protestants who think, or are in the habit of saying that they think, the Catholic Church opposed to civil liberty. For the benefit of such, and by way of giving a brick as a sample, we make the following extract from the thirteenth chapter,—‘*Protestantism and Catholicity considered in their relations to social progress. Preliminary coup d’œil.*’

“‘Our hearts swell with generous indignation when we hear the religion of Jesus Christ reproached with a tendency towards oppression. It is true that, if you confound the spirit of real liberty with that of demagogues, you will not find it in Catholicity; but if you avoid a monstrous misnomer, if you give to the word liberty its reasonable, just, useful, and beneficial signification, then the Catholic religion may fearlessly claim the gratitude of the human race, *for she has civilized the nations who embraced her, and civilization is true liberty.* It is a fact now generally acknowledged and openly expressed, that Christianity has exercised a very important and salutary influence on the developments of European civilization; if this fact has not yet had given to it the importance which it deserves, it is because it has not been sufficiently appreciated. With respect to civilization, a distinction is sometimes made between the influence of Christianity and that of Catholicity;

its merits are lavished on the former, and stinted to the latter, by those who forget that, with respect to European civilization, Catholicity can always claim the principal share, and, for many centuries, an exclusive one; since, during a very long period, she worked alone at the great work. People have not been willing to see that, when Protestantism appeared in Europe, the work was bordering on completion; with an ingratitude and injustice which I cannot describe, they have reproached Catholicity with the spirit of barbarism, ignorance, and oppression, while they were making an ostentatious display of the rich civilization, knowledge, and liberty for which they were principally indebted to her.

"The chapters on Slavery, the Inquisition, Religion and Liberty, and Resistance to Civil Power, would afford new and important matter for reflection to most of our flippant Protestant preachers and editors, to whose careful consideration we cordially commend the whole work, as the best means of enlightening their darkness, and answering, once for all, their frivolous queries and petulant objections.

"This translation is made from the French edition, which was published simultaneously with the Spanish; it is executed excellently well. The translators are Messrs. Hanford and Kershaw, of England. The American edition is enriched with a biographical sketch of the illustrious author. The typographical execution of the work is excellent, and does great credit to the enterprising publishers."

4. — *The Banquet of Theodulus, or Reunion of the Different Christian Communions.* By the late BARON DE STARCK, Protestant Minister, and First Preacher to the Court of Hesse-Darmstadt. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1850. 18mo. pp. 204.

As we do not happen to know any thing of "the late Baron de Starck," we wish the American editor of this volume had condescended to give us some information concerning him, and not have taken it for granted that every body knew all about him. We are told in the title-page that he was a "Protestant minister," but we should like to be informed whether he was a Protestant minister when he wrote this book, and whether he died in or out of the communion of the Church. This, we presume, the editor could have told us, but this we have no means of knowing. Editors of Catholic works, in this country, are a little too apt to forget that we young Catholics are not masters of universal literary history.

The book as a literary production possesses great merits, and contains a great amount of useful information compressed within a small compass. The author shows the decadence of Protestantism, and urges the reunion of all Protestant communions with the Catholic Church, on the only practicable condition, that is, of their going to her, and not requiring her to come to them. In general the Catholic interlocutor, Odilon, formerly Abbot of St. Apollinaris, is made to talk like a good Catholic, with a very competent knowl-

edge of his religion, and of the history and tendencies of Protestantism; but we are sorry to see that sometimes his mildness gets the better of his orthodoxy, logic, and straightforwardness. His Lutheran and Calvinistic friends are greatly scandalized at the doctrine of exclusive salvation, at the dogma, "No salvation out of the Church," and he, poor man, tries to maintain that it is not a dogma of the Church, while he concedes that it is. No Protestant ever labored harder, or with greater sophistry, to prove that of contraries both are true, and he finds himself finally forced to give up his Church as the only religion by which a man can be saved, and to content himself with maintaining that it is in various respects the *best* religion. If the author was at the time of writing a Protestant minister, all this might pass; but if he was a Catholic, he deserves no slight censure either for his ignorance or his heterodoxy. If there is any thing we detest, it is the attempt on the part of Catholics to modify Catholic dogmas to suit the prejudices of their hearers or readers. Catholicity can bear being stated truly; if not, let us away with it at once, and have nothing more to say about it.

We know that the dogma, No salvation out of the Church, is offensive to all who refuse submission to the Church, but then we know, and so does every Catholic, that it is a Catholic dogma, and to deny it or attempt to explain it away is neither just to them, nor allowable in us. The Church does not propose herself as the best religion among a number of good religions, but as the *only* true religion, as the only religion whereby men can be saved. It is for this reason we urge upon all to become Catholics; it is this which fires our zeal for conversion, and makes us willing to suffer any torture, if we can but win one soul to Christ. If there is harshness or severity in the doctrine, it is not our fault, for we do not make the doctrine; but we confess we cannot understand by what right any man can call the doctrine of God harsh or severe.

One thing we know; God is just, and will condemn no one unjustly, or punish any one beyond his deserts. We therefore know that, if he saves none out of his Church, none out of his Church do or can merit salvation. But nobody need be so silly as to suppose that, in declaring with the Church the doctrine of exclusive salvation, we judge individuals. We judge nobody. It is you that object to us who judge, not we. You say, you will not embrace a religion which teaches that *your* ancestors are damned. Well, who asks you so to believe? Who says your ancestors died out of the Church? It is you, not we. We only say, *if* they died out of the Church they are damned, and we know not what mighty merit *you* have that God should not damn your ancestors as well as others, if they died his mortal enemies. But whether they did or did not so die, we pretend not to decide; we leave that to Him to whom all judgment belongs. We do not know what passed between them and God at the last moment before the soul left the

body. We do not say that all who are heretics, schismatics, and infidels will be damned; we only say, if they live and die such they will go to hell, and therefore we entreat you to return or be converted to the Church, that you may be saved. The chiefest of sinners may be saved, not as a sinner, not out of the Church, but by entering her communion, and doing what she commands. You who hear us say this have no excuse. *You* at least cannot plead invincible ignorance, for you at least have the opportunity of knowing the truth. No man, of course, will be damned for not knowing that of which he is invincibly ignorant, which he has never had it in his power to know. But how do you know that any one lives and dies *invincibly* ignorant of the Holy Catholic Church? You know you are not invincibly ignorant, and by what right do you say others are? Remember Pelagianism is a heresy, and that God gives sufficient grace unto every man to know and do his will, and that if any do not know and do it, it is their own fault. When he commands all to enter the communion of his Church, he makes it possible for all to enter, if they choose. Bring the question home, then, to yourselves, and do not attempt to be wiser than what is revealed, or presume to sit in judgment on Almighty God. His Church is near *you*, and, though no one will be condemned who has the Christian life, remember that out of her communion you cannot have that life.

5. — *The American Almanac and Repository of Useful Knowledge for 1851.* Boston: Little & Brown. 1850. 12mo. pp. 351.

THIS annual is so well known, and its reputation so well established, that there is no occasion on the appearance of a new number to do more than simply announce it. The number for this year falls behind none of its predecessors in interest and utility. Besides the calendar, it contains a great amount of useful and interesting information, and a learned and truly scientific paper on *Animal Electricity*, by Professor Lovering, of Harvard University. The work issues from a Protestant source, and unhappily Protestants cannot treat even pure mathematics without infusing more or less of heresy. Yet this is as unexceptionable as any thing we can expect at their hands, and we can, upon the whole, commend it to our readers, as a very desirable and valuable work.

6. — *Purgatory opened to the Piety of the Faithful; or the Month of November. To which is added a Perpetual Suffrage, a Daily Exercise, and a Novena.* From the Italian. Boston: J. A. Capes. 1850. 18mo. pp. 146.

THIS is one of Mr. Capes's excellent little devotional publications, which only needs to be known to be highly esteemed. The devotion which it recommends, and of which it is a manual, is one that cannot be too much encouraged. The souls in Purgatory can be helped by our suffrages, and never should we withhold them, or be remiss in offering them. There is no charity more sweet than that of praying for the repose of the faithful departed. The little work before us is published with the approbation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of this Diocese.

7. — *Truth stranger than Fiction. A Narrative of Recent Transactions, involving Inquiries in Regard to the Principles of Honor, Truth, and Justice, which obtain in a distinguished American University.* By CATHERINE E. BEECHER. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 296.

MISS BEECHER could hardly have been worse employed than in writing this book, which, as it seems to us, can answer no good purpose, and only serve to injure her friend, to whose imprudence it gives an uncalled for notoriety. There is no doubt the lady was scurvily treated, but we see nothing very strange in the conduct of the young minister, who appears to have been not unwilling to amuse himself at her expense. The lady was old enough to be his mother, and should not have suffered him to make a fool of himself by playing the lover. That he lacked principle Miss Beecher proves clearly enough, but at the same time she proves with equal clearness that the lady lacked discretion, and we think the less publicity given to the affair the better for all parties.

Miss Beecher, however, seems to have been willing to sacrifice her friend to her theological spite against the University in question. She wished to excite public indignation against it, and destroy its influence, for it does not happen to be precisely orthodox according to her standard of orthodoxy. But the whole matter is a private quarrel between Protestants, in which we take no sort of interest. Both parties are equally heretical to us, and we are not in the habit of expecting the Christian virtues in any very eminent degree from heretics. We do not feel called upon to engage with Miss Beecher in a war against Yale College, and we assure her that we find as much to censure in her and her movements as we do in its principles and conduct. We remember something about a book published some time since, said to be written by her, boldly advocating Tritheism, explaining the mystery of the Trinity to mean three Gods, equal in power, majesty, and glory, and we have heard something about her educational efforts at the West. If we have little sympathy with Yale, we have less with her and her

friends. So she will please excuse us for not taking up the cudgels against the Professors of Yale College, and the particular association of Protestant ministers she refers to, who are, for aught we know, as respectable as Protestant professors and ministers usually are, and certainly are as estimable, in our judgment, as the Popery-hating "brother" who so signally failed in getting a judgment in favor of his sister.

8. — *Sermons of REV. JOHN KING LORD, late Pastor of the First Orthodox Congregational Church in Cincinnati, Ohio. With an Introductory Notice*, by NATHAN LORD, President of Dartmouth College. Boston : Perkins & Whipple. 1850. 12mo. pp. 414.

THE author of these sermons, a son of the well-known President of Dartmouth College, was a very amiable and intelligent young man, as we can testify from the slight personal acquaintance we had with him, and well calculated to win the love and esteem of all with whom he came in relation, providing they were not repelled by his Puritanism. The Introductory Notice, written by his father, is an affectionate tribute to the memory of a well-beloved son, and is written with true feeling and manly dignity. Of the doctrines of the book we cannot be expected to speak; for they are of course such as we do not approve. But there is an air of earnestness and sincerity in the writings of both father and son that we respect, while the standard of thought is above what we usually look for in Puritan ministers.

9. — *Choice of a State of Life*. By FATHER C. G. ROSSIGNOLI, S. J. Translated from the French. Published with the Approbation of the Most Rev. Archbishop Eccleston. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1850. 24mo. pp. 232.

THE approbation of his Grace, the Archbishop of Baltimore, is a sufficient guaranty that this is an excellent little book, and we are sure that it will be so regarded by all good judges who read it. The choice of a state of life is a matter of great importance to the young, for it is in the state of life to which God calls us that we can feel the best assurance of our being truly useful, and of receiving the grace necessary to the salvation of our souls; and it is that state, whatever it be, we should always seek, and having found it, we should therewith study to be content. We commend most cordially this little work to the serious study of all our young friends, who are called upon to choose their state of life.

10. — *A New Treatise on the Duty of a Christian towards God. Being an enlarged and improved Version of the Original Treatise written by the Venerable J. B. DE LA SALLE, Founder of the Christian Schools. Translated from the French. By MRS. J. SADLIER. First American, from the Eighteenth Paris Edition. New York : Sadlier. 1850. 12mo. pp. 324 and 48.*

THE publishers have added to this volume *Prayers at Mass*, and *Rules of Christian Politeness*, which will be found an acceptable addition. We have not seen the work in the original French, and cannot therefore speak of the fidelity of the translation, but from Mrs. Sadlier's reputation as a translator, we presume it to be no less faithful than spirited and tasteful. The work itself is used as a class-book in the Schools of the Christian Brothers in France and Canada, and has been translated at the request of the Christian Brothers for the use of those of their pupils who speak the English language. It is an admirable class-book for instruction in Christian doctrine, and equally admirable for parents who would refresh their own knowledge of their religion, and teach their children their duty to God. We wish it were adopted as a reading-book in all our schools.

The reviewer has no occasion to turn critic in announcing a work so well known and so highly approved as the one before us. We notice, however, some inaccuracies and a few inelegances of style and expression which we trust will be corrected in a second edition. The use of *would* for *should* we have noticed in a few instances. The following sentence, p. 9, is not happily turned : — "The better instructed you are, you will be the firmer in your faith, and the more you study your religion, you will become the more impressed with her divine beauty." This is not in accordance with the English idiom. We should write, — "The better instructed you are, the firmer will be your faith, *or* the more confirmed will you be in your faith, and the more you study your religion, the more will you be impressed with its divine beauty, *or* the more impressed will you become with its divine beauty." These are trifles, but in books intended for the young we always demand great purity, propriety, and elegance of style.

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11. — *The Christian Instructed ; or Precepts for Living Christianly in the World.* From the Italian of QUADRIPANI. Boston : J. A. Capes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 154.
12. — *Cassigur of Accabee ; a Tale of Ashley River, with other Pieces.* By WILLIAM GILMOUR SIMMS. New York : Putnam. 1849. Small 4to. pp. 112.

13. — *Eight Pieces of Sacred Music, for Four Voices, Soprano, Alto, Tenor, and Bass, with the Accompaniment of the Organ.* Composed and dedicated to the Right Reverend J. B. Fitzpatrick, Bishop of Boston. By A. WERNER, Organist at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross. New York and Boston: D. & J. Sadlier. 1850.
14. — *A Catholic Hymn-Book, designed principally for Catholic Youth.* Second Edition, revised and improved. Boston: J. A. Capes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 127.
15. — *The Little Catholic Hymn-Book; containing a Collection of Hymns, Anthems, &c., for Schools and Private Use, selected from Approved Sources.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 32mo. pp. 128.

* * With this number we enter upon the eighth volume of this journal, the seventh since it has been devoted to the exposition and defence of the Catholic faith. We have now been in the Church over six years, and we trust that our former friends, who predicted that we should not remain in it six months, are now prepared to give us up as likely to live and die in its communion. We have almost forgotten that we were ever any thing but a Catholic, and find the doctrines and opinions once familiar to us now strange and scarcely recognizable. We find ourselves at home in the Church, and we have no wish or thought that strays beyond it.

We are deeply grateful to the Catholic public, especially to the venerable Bishops and their clergy, for the liberal and charitable support they have thus far rendered us. In reëxamining our journal during the last six years we have found many imperfections, which we would we had been able to avoid, and we are sure that we have by no means deserved the high commendations we have received. Nevertheless, we are conscious of having aimed well, and of having had no peculiar theories, hobbies, or crotchets of our own, and we trust that our short-comings will be, as they have been, charitably regarded. It has never been our intention to be severe or uncourteous in our language; what we have aimed at has been to be orthodox in our doctrine, and bold, manly, and independent in its statement. If we have erred in either respect, we hope we shall be forgiven.

During the greater part of the time we have been conducting this Review we have had to combat latitudinarian and revolutionary tendencies among Catholics, as well as error and heresy outside of the Church. Many *liberal* Catholics have been liberal in their abuse of us, and we have not had the rare fortune to escape being wounded in the house of our friends. But times have changed,

and events have brought about a change in the feelings and tendencies of the great body of those among us who were to some extent carried away by the spirit of the age and country. On all the points on which we gave offence to professed Catholics, the Catholic press of the country has come nobly to our aid, and all the Catholic journals in the country now appear to speak with one heart and one voice. We believe our most painful trials are over, and that in those matters commonly regarded as outside of faith there is now a very strict harmony of thought and feeling between us and our Catholic community generally. No credit is due us for this fact, for, if we understood better than some others the dangerous tendencies tolerated, we were enabled to do so only because we had ourselves more fully than others shared and followed those tendencies, and had at an earlier day been led to see and experience their danger. Moreover, the change has been effected, not by any thing we have said or done, but by the developments that have taken place in the Red Republican and revolutionary movements abroad. Events have verified our predictions, indeed, but they have opened the eyes of those Catholics who were carried away by their generous hatred of oppression and love of popular liberty. For the future we trust with the blessing of God that we shall be able to confine ourselves mainly to attacking the errors without, and to the great work of aiding Catholics to assume in this country that position that will command a respect for their rights, now, alas, too often trampled upon. The Catholic religion has every right to be here, and its right to be here, and to be freely professed, must be practically acknowledged, where we are few, as well as where we are many. The time has come, when we must be one not only in faith and worship, but as citizens; for the time has come when greater efforts than ever will be made by our enemies to crush us. The Catholic community must be consolidated, and regard itself as one community, and as such exert all its moral influence, and exercise all its constitutional and legal rights.

With deep gratitude to the Catholic public for the kindness and forbearance with which it has thus far received our humble efforts, we send forth this number of a new volume with renovated courage and hope, thankful to the Great Head of the Church, that he grants to one so unworthy the inappreciable boon of laboring in his cause. We beg the prayers of our Catholic friends that He not only continue to us the boon, but enable us to labor in his cause to his acceptance and their edification.